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European Security Policy: Strategic Culture in Operation?

PETER SCHMIDT AND BENJAMIN ZYLA

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The recent disagreement among EU member states with regard to the air campaign against Muammar Gaddafi's authoritarian regime in Libya has raised questions about the EU's strategic culture and role in international security policy. On the one hand the project of European security cooperation advanced rapidly with the turn of the new century, on the other there re-occurred – after the split on the Iraqi issue in 2003 – a major disagreement among member states with regard to an important security issue in the EU's southern neighborhood. In the end, NATO took on the task of carrying out air operations because the EU was not able to come to a decision. Against this backdrop, policy makers and scholars alike face ever more serious questions: What kind of security actor is the EU? What substance does it bring to the world stage? How is it different from other security actors? This special issue examines these questions from a strategic culture (SC) perspective. This suggests itself because the development of a strategic culture was the major lever by which the European Union's principal planning document, the European Security Strategy (ESS), tried to guide its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), and by this the EU's role in the world in security matters.[1]

Why are these questions important? In the late 1990s, the European Union started to become a truly internationally operating security actor with operations ranging from southern Europe to Africa, the Middle East, and South-East Asia. Europe's presence in the world advanced rather rapidly, from concentrating on creating a pool of 60,000 rapidly available troops (the so-called Helsinki headline goals) to be deployed to global hot-spots, to the first signs of strategic thinking and planning by the formulation of a European Security Strategy in 2003, and finally to the formation of European Union battle groups in 2004.[2] These capacity-building efforts included the necessary institution-building – that is, putting in place governance mechanisms that could oversee the planning, deployment, and evaluation of European Union operations abroad – as well as the establishment of formal coordination mechanisms with the United Nations (UN) and NATO. All these efforts materialized in some twenty-plus missions on three continents.[3]

Why Strategic Culture?

This volume aims to respond to a flagrant lacuna in the literature on assessing the EU's operations by using a well-known analytical concept in the field of international relations, the strategic culture approach. In doing so, it provides one of the rare analyses where many of the EU's military and civilian crisis management operations are

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used as case studies to gain access to larger cultural developments and predispositions of the actors involved. Existing studies on this topic mostly concentrate on one particular operation rather than setting their single case in a larger analytical context, which makes generalizations resulting from the case studies more difficult.

Many scholars regard the SC approach, notwithstanding some major criticism, as something which is worth to be examined and further advanced. This accepted wisdom led us to take a closer look at both sides of the coin: the operational side of CSDP (including cooperation with the UN and NATO)[4] and the theoretical efforts to use SC as a tool for the understanding of states' behaviour in the area of foreign and security policy. Furthermore, we found that the strategic culture approach is an ideal starting point for analysing CSDP operations for two additional reasons:

Firstly, it allows conceptual and theoretical elasticity, and thus promises to be inclusive of a variety of scholars and theoretical traditions in international relations. It thus holds the prospect of 'bridging' the gap between two dominant streams of IR theory that seldom cross-fertilize, namely the orthodox 'rationalist' approaches most prominently advocated by realists and neo-institutionalists on the one hand, and 'reflectivist' theories (i.e., constructivism) on the other.[5] Because the strategic culture approach is not automatically associated with one particular theoretical paradigm in the field of international relations, it promises to produce novel empirical, theoretical, and possibly interdisciplinary insights into cultural studies in general, and international relations theory in particular. While being relatively new in the literature (see further below for details), the strategic culture concept promises to provide insights into the exogenous as well as endogenous material and non-material predispositions of nation states' behaviour.

Secondly, the placing of cultural studies in the context of an evolving European foreign and security policy is in itself new, and thus holds great promise not only for a better understanding of the EU's external actions, but also to refine the strategic culture concept as an analytical tool.

Trajectory of the strategic culture paradigm

While subscribing to theoretical pluralism in this special issue, it is useful to revisit the trajectory of the strategic culture concept. Whereas each chapter individually refers to and builds upon the strategic culture paradigm, none of the chapters that follow gives historical significance to the concept itself or discusses its intellectual evolution in greater detail. Reviewing the history as well as the ontological underpinnings of the strategic culture concept thus lets us appreciate the origins and theoretical refinements of this approach over time. It also provides a better grounding of the discussions that follow in this special issue as the authors engage with the analytical concept rather selectively.

The literature, broadly speaking, clusters the scholarship on strategic cultures into three 'generations'.[6] The first generation preferred to use the term 'national character' rather than 'strategic culture' to explain national behaviours and to link political attitudes to personalities.[7] Scholars of this generation were interested in examining how forms of language, religion, beliefs, and values shaped, for example, the German and

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Japanese 'national character' in World War II that led them to fight in the ways they did (such as by employing kamikaze fighters in the case of Japan). In other words, scholars studied what we would now call the political culture, which was defined as a 'subset of beliefs and values of a society that relate to the political system'.[8]

This national character scholarship was further developed in the 1970s by Jack Snyder, who is often credited with being the first to 'export' the concept of political culture into the domain of security studies. He was interested in looking at how the behaviour of the Soviet Union could be explained by examining the organizational, historical, and political contexts in which those decisions were made. Snyder's work was to a great extent applied and designed for government officials in order to predict the behaviour of America's pivotal enemy. Political elites, in his mind, articulate a 'unique strategic culture related to security-military affairs that is a wider manifestation of public opinion, socialized into a distinctive mode of strategic thinking'.[9] Snyder defined culture as 'symbolic vehicles of meaning, including beliefs, ritual, practices, art forums, and ceremonies, as well as informal culture practices such as language, gossips, stories, and the rituals of life'[10]. A few years later, Colin Gray refined Snyder's work and argued that distinctive national styles with 'deep roots within a particular stream of historical experience'[11] can influence the foreign policy behaviour of states. They provide a milieu in which decisions regarding national security issues are made. In short, this first generation of scholarship defined strategic culture as 'context' that bridges the epistemological divide between both cause and effect. David Haglund's paper in this volume partially speaks to this generation. It is a tool that helps us to understand rather than explain the behaviour of states.

The second generation of strategic culture scholars questioned the first generation's epistemological claims and developed testable hypotheses.[12] Their objective was to apply a rigorous scientific approach to the study of strategic culture(s) by constructing a falsifiable methodology that would lead to a cumulative research programme, and one that could be used to predict the future behaviour of states.[13] Such behaviour was conceptualized as being detached from political culture in order to isolate strategic culture as the independent variable and the former as the dependent variable, and to avoid tautological arguments. The consistency of the independent variable over time determined the coherence of a strategic culture.

The third generation of strategic culture scholarship emerged in the early 1990s and, again, questioned the epistemological assumptions of the earlier generations. Inspired by the evolving constructivist school of international relations, scholars began to theorize about identity formations and norms that were shaped by the interplay of history, tradition, and culture. Similar to the second generation, strategic culture was conceptualized as an independent or intervening variable affecting state behaviour.[14] However, it is a metaconcept that goes beyond representing a singular process of cause and effect.[15] It informs social actors normatively of what they are supposed to do and how to behave in particular situations, as well as in the cultural and social contexts in which they operate. Along those lines, national identities and interests are not simply the product of the so-called international system but are socially constructed and shaped by practices of interaction among

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social actors. In turn, this reasoning implies that collective units (that is, society) play an integral part in shaping and defining national identities and interests, and that society holds normative elements that are in need of interpretation and understanding.[16] To put it in other words: social actors reproduce norms and structure and base their actions on their acquired knowledge, habits, and routines. It is precisely in this sense that strategic cultures are able to provide an insight into the 'reasons' for state actions.[17]

A brief look at the theoretical chapters and case studies

The volume starts off with three theoretical chapters, all of which speak to and discuss the above mentioned first and third generation of strategic culture research. The second generation is missing from this discussion because, as already stated, we did not conceptualize the empirical part as a test case, as envisaged by the second generation of SC research, but rather as a process of inferring insights of elements of a SC and the explanatory power of the strategic culture approach in general.

David Haglund's paper, rooted in the realist research design, seeks to further develop the first generation of strategic culture research. After an extensive discussion of the methodological snags of the concept, he defends SC in a moderate fashion as being useful as 'context' and even more as 'cognition'.

Per Norheim-Martinsen, taking as his starting point the last wave of strategic culture research – the constructivist angle – argues that the European Union's strategic culture is not so much about common interests than it is about 'preferred means' of action, with the concept of cohesion as the major focal point.

Sten Rynning examines strategic culture from the vantage point of classical realism. It is very interesting to see that despite his taking a very different theoretical approach than Norheim-Martinsen's, he comes to a similar conclusion in arguing that CSDP can only produce moderate results because it is primarily 'about maintaining restraint within Europe, where the shadow of great power rivalry and war still looms'.

As we see, these theoretical approaches have different foci: Haglund discusses the methodological question of *Verstehen* versus *Erklären*, Norheim-Martinsen analyses the European Union's narrative on SC and Rynning determines the 'real function' of CSDP from the perspective of classical realism and on this basis the limits of the strategic culture concept.

Military operations

The theoretical discussion is followed by an analysis of ESDP's military operations. The section starts off with Charles Pentland's discussion of the deployment of European Union forces in the Balkans (Operation Concordia in Macedonia and EUFOR Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina). He uses Jack Snyder's early definition of strategic culture, taking ideas, emotions and habits that the members of a strategic community have shared over time as a reference point, and argues that – regardless of the limitations of analysing two cases only – it is possible to identify at least rudiments of a 'distinctive strategic culture' beyond the world of words: the missions were aimed at responding to major threats as indicated in the ESS, the member states shared the

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same interests in this case, the Balkans are a regional priority for all member states, there was an attempt to install a system of 'effective multilateralism', and 'soft power' is the EU's primary mode of influence. Pentland sees SC not as a cause, but as the 'context' of behaviour, allowing observers 'to detect intimations' of the central ideas in EU strategic culture.

Analysing Europe's two Congo missions (Artemis and EUFOR Congo), Peter Schmidt proposes to extend the scope of strategic culture to make it a more meaningful concept in analysing the European Union's military operations. By this, he looks to advance the concept of SC in a multi-level decision-making context. He focuses not only on strategic preferences, but also on specific interests in a certain situation and the 'games' played across three decision-making levels. He identifies at least two types of 'game' which have a substantial impact on the configuration and mandate of the mission: the 'barrack yard syndrome', which has an effect on the way countries take part in operations, and 'multilateral Caesarism' as a feature which threatens the role of parliamentarian control and in this way can have a substantial impact on the formulation of the mandate of the mission.

Jean Y. Haine's analysis of the Chad operation transcends the traditional theoretical and political debate on strategic culture by assessing the SC 'in practice' through the classical definition of 'strategy'. For Haine, strategy aims at 'setting the conditions and objectives to influence the adversary's will'. Against this background, he considers the Chad operation not as a strategic undertaking but as the appliance of a 'specific set of European *political* and *security* beliefs that should not be confused with a *strategic* culture'.

Civilian operations

Reinhardt Rummel and Arnold Kammel investigate the CSDP's civilian missions in the Balkans, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea Basso and, via the African Union, in Sudan, and ask if some sort of European strategic culture can be found in these cases, which span two continents.

Rummel sets the bar high by taking 'geopolitical quality' as a reference point. Against this background, he assesses that the European Union is not about to create a SC, because it lacks a serious civilian–military nexus which is, in his view, a prerequisite of a factual SC. On the civilian side, he observes also that the EU limits its actions to the handling of a series of individual cases of intervention which lack a strategic focus and grand design. He realizes that only France and the United Kingdom see themselves as having a far-reaching role in a multipolar world. In a moderate sense, he admits, however, that Brussels can take pride in its civil–military comprehensive approach and its policy of assistance to the African Union. What is missing in general terms is a cohesive political framework for the European Union's actions.

Kammel makes this political point more explicit. He agrees that the four Balkan missions 'already provide [...] a marker for the existence of an emerging European strategic culture in the process of formation', but he identifies one decisive hampering factor – a real Common Foreign and Security Policy, or in other words, a cohesive political framework.

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Institutional outreach

Ingo Peters scrutinizes the European Union/United Nations relationship from the standpoint of asking how much differences with regard to strategic culture hamper inter-organizational cooperation, and by this the EU's goal of establishing a system of 'effective multilateralism'. He comes to the conclusion that more than any differences with regard to SCs, 'material factors such as budgetary interests, institutional factors and operational practices, for example decision-making rules, or standard operational procedures for conduction of missions and operations' create obstacles to effective cooperation.

Benjamin Zyla unpacks the prevalent strategic cultures of the European Union and NATO into their normative, ideational, and behavioural components and detects a significant normative overlap between the two institutions, with the exception of 'the use of force, the sanctioned range and type of missions, and the resources justified to carry them out'. He tries to explain this cultural overlap by considering NATO's strategic culture as a subculture of the EU's.

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The gist of the subject

Indeed, our focus on the European Union's operations and cooperation with NATO and United Nations did not disclose picture-perfect links among the case studies and between the case studies and the theoretical aspect of SC. However, a number of interesting findings across the empirical part and the theoretical articles surfaced.

First, it does not come as a surprise that the answer to the question of whether the European Union possesses a certain strategic culture or not depends on the reference point and definition of the terms employed. When you take a 'geopolitical quality' or the influence on 'the adversary's will' as a benchmark, the European Union has no real strategic culture. Nonetheless, there are many indications that there exists a cluster of ideational and cultural preferences that guide Europe's civilian and military operations or at least have the potential to do so. This divergence of definitions, however, discloses a certain tension between – at least some – national SCs and the European Union's SC, because the above mentioned high benchmarks refer to traditional national understandings of strategy. In this regard, the European Union's SC is more than just the aggregate of national SCs: it transcends them.

Second, there is an interesting link between Norheim-Martinsen's constructivist and Rynning's neoclassical realist analysis with regard to the European Union's constraints of being a global actor. Both authors emphasize the limitations of the EU's strategic culture: Norheim-Martinsen argues that there is agreement only on the means and not on the interests; Rynning identifies similar constraints but sees these constraints as being rooted in still ongoing power struggles among member states. This bears witness to the above mentioned potential for the SC approach 'to bridge gaps' between streams of IR theories.

Third, the convergence of the European Union's and United Nations' strategic cultures, as documented above all by Ingo Peters, suggests two points: first, despite the fact that the SCs of both organizations are very similar, the realization of

'effective multilateralism' knows other factors that can obstruct cooperation. Indeed, 'effective multilateralism' seems much harder to achieve than is envisaged by the ESS.

Much of the United Nations' culture is about impartiality and neutrality. It is shown that the European Union and the UN's predispositions are very similar in this regard. This explains why the European Union does not fit into Haine's notion of strategy aiming to influence an 'adversary's will'. It also, however, raises the question of whether the European Union–United Nations relationship will always be a complementary one or will also develop competitive features, because both are acting on the basis of a similar SC in the same field. And indeed, some of the operations which are not investigated here – for example, the European Union's observation mission in Georgia or the mission on the Palestinian–Egyptian border – are operations which have been undertaken by the UN.

Fourth, the picture is, nonetheless, not crystal clear. On the Balkans, the European Union member states not only agree on the appropriate means, as Norheim-Martinsen emphasizes, but also on some interests, regardless of their disagreement with regard to the recognition of Kosovo as a sovereign state. These interests become increasingly differentiated when the question of a military operation is on the negotiation table and the targeted region is further away. Decisions on whether such operations take place originate from the interest of a member state but are heavily constrained by the European Union's strategic culture (as in the operations in Chad and DR Congo). Against this background, it appears more appropriate to speak in these cases of the European Union's SC as a 'system of constraints' for national approaches, rather than a 'system of preferences'. This provides some support for Sten Rynning's neoclassical realist approach to CSDP as a system of inner-EU constraints.

Fifth, this state of affairs is closely related to the convergences and differences between NATO's and the European Union's strategic culture as analysed by Benjamin Zyla. NATO places far fewer constraints on the use of military force than the European Union does. This is also exemplified by the Libyan air strikes against Gaddafi's Libya: it was not the European Union but NATO which was able to run the air campaign. In this regard one can argue that the existence of NATO still prevents the European Union from further developing its SC and becoming a competent military actor. However, the opposite view also has a lot to commend it: NATO provides more flexibility and is able to overcome political deadlocks inside the European Union.

Sixth, the similarities between the European Union's and the UN's strategic cultures, as well as the important role of member states when it comes to the deployment of military force, suggests that the scope of strategic culture should be extended to specific interests of member states and especially to the games played by international organizations and member states at the various levels. In order to bridge the gap between SC and behaviour, the traditional SC approach must adapt to the fact that there is a multi-level system. In this regard the European Union should not be regarded as an autonomous actor with a single SC: the decision-making system includes member states and the United Nations in a way that enables one to speak of a common 'cultural space'.

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Seventh, one can assume that there is some sort of system of preferences – or constraints – which has an influence on the European Union's general approach to the role of civilian and military means in international politics, as well as the EU's operations. The relationship still exists, but is not such a close one when it comes to civilian operations – this is even more true with regard to military operations. From a methodological point of view, the relationship between these preferences and specific operations, however, cannot be seen as a cause, and only to a certain extent as a context, for the European Union's campaigns. In this regard, use of the SC concept to explain specific EU security operations is more limited than in the case of fully-fledged nation states' operations. The reason for this is the lack of political cohesion among the 27 member states, which makes the EU a rather fluctuating actor. Specific interests and the behaviour of actors during the 'games' on the various political levels leading to military operations are highly influential factors. In other words, flexibility governs the European Union's military decision-making process in particular and, in turn, explains the variable force composition of the EU's military expeditionary undertakings.

Eighth, flexibility is the enemy of causal explanations. In the case of the multi-level decision-making processes of the European Union, the strategic culture approach appears less able to establish a link between the European Union's SC and behaviour than in the case of nation states. Including specific interests and 'games' to close the gap is useful – but not in the sense of causal thinking; only in order to develop a more meaningful framework for the interpretation of specific decisions.

Finally, a cautionary point for integration processes in regions beyond Europe. The European Union's principle of flexibility carries, from the point of view of an 'ever closer Union', a negative connotation. In spite of this, it is only through this flexibility that the EU is able to act, especially in the military sphere. It seems that processes of integration always face the question 'how much is too much'? The current Euro crisis embodies a negative example in this regard: the abolition of exchange rate flexibility, regardless of the major economic and political discrepancies among Euro member states, has made the system too inflexible. The result is severe turmoil. The European Union's CSDP has escaped this deadlock until now. This limits its outreach on the one hand, but at the same time provides many opportunities to act on the world stage.

What does this all imply for the utility of the SC concept, the EU's role in the world and the future of European cooperation in security matters?

There is evidence that the SC approach is a useful concept through which to understand the EU's actions with regard to security operations. However, it has to be adapted to the multi-level character of EU decision-making in order to provide a full-blown understanding of the evolution and composition of the EU's strategic culture. The problem is that these extensions, such as special national interests and the SCs of member states, as well as political games across the various levels of decision-making, seem to bridge the gap between the EU's SC and behaviour on

the supranational level less convincingly than in the case of consolidated nation states. This is also due to the fact that other organizations, like the UN or even NATO, are able to take actions which could also be undertaken by the EU. European states have some choice with regard to the actions to be taken. To make the SC concept more compelling, it is therefore suggested in the discussions on EU's SC to focus not too much on the EU itself, but to also include the UN and even NATO and to understand these IOs as a 'cultural space'. The case of Libya provides evidence for this approach: while the air campaign was undertaken by NATO, the EU indeed has – together with the UN – a greater role to play in the aftermath of the war.

The EU's Chad operation and the Libyan case also shed light on the EU's role in the world. Indeed, it has a role to play on the world's stage (not in the sense of classic strategic approaches, but in the sense of a set of political and security beliefs), which is quite similar to the UN's approach. More precisely, the role is based on a comprehensive understanding of security and is quite often symbolic, in the sense that specific operations are meant less to solve the security problem at hand than to promote and support the further building up of European instruments in security matters. The EU will also try to establish a system of 'effective multilateralism'. This, however, is easier said than done, even in the case of the 'similar-minded' UN. It is likely that the more the EU takes on actions which were previously typical UN operations (such as the European Monitory Mission in Georgia or the EU mission in Rafah at the crossing point between Gaza and Egypt, currently on standby), the more not only organizational obstacles but also elements of competition will play a role in downgrading the effectiveness of cooperation.

Regardless of all ambitions for greater jointness and cohesion, the future of the European Union's SC will still be based on the principle of 'flexibility' rather than bringing the combined power of all member states and EU bodies to bear. NATO plays a contradictory role in the future development of the EU's SC: on the one hand it allows, as shown recently in the Libyan case, for deadlocks among EU member states to be overcome; on the other, its involvement can also be understood as a stumbling block to the further development of CSDP and thus the EU's strategic culture. In that sense, to borrow William Wallace's words, the EU's strategic culture is 'so far, not very far'.

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NOTES

1. With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) became the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).
2. See stock-taking of the first five years see Nicole Gnesotto (ed.), *EU Security and Defence Policy. The First Five Years (1999-2004)* (Institute for Security Studies, European Union: Paris, 2004).
3. See http://consilium.europa.eu/media/1232545/map_en0711.pdf
4. It is necessary to raise two points here. First, from our point of view, operations, which can be considered practices of CSDP policies, reveal more about a strategic culture than the building up of sheer military and civilian capacities. They are in a way practices of sometimes stiff policy, which often is nothing more than rhetoric. This is especially true for the multi-level decision-making process of the EU, which is based on decisions by 27 member states. In this complex decision-making environment the agreement on building up capacities easily becomes an 'empty promise' that has little impact on real behaviour. Second, the European Union's outreach to other IOs also

has a theoretical dimension, in the sense that it can answer the question of whether the European Union disposes over a unique and separate strategic culture and whether and – if at all – how it is interwoven with NATO and the United Nations. There is the hope that this outreach provides a contribution to the further development of SC approaches in general, and the EU's SC in particular.

5. Robert O. Keohane, 'International Institutions: Two Approaches', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 32, No. 4 (1988), pp. 382.
6. It should be noted, though, that not all scholars agree with this clustering. For a different approach see Alastair Iain Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 5–22.
7. See, for example, Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1946).
8. Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965), p.11.
9. Quoted in Jeffrey S. Lantis and Darryl Howlett, 'Strategic Culture', in John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Eliot Cohen (eds), *Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies* (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), p.85.
10. Jack L. Snyder, *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1977), p.8.
11. Colin S. Gray, 'Comparative Strategic Culture', *Parameters*, Vol. XIV, No. 4 (1984), p.28; see also Colin S. Gray, 'National Style in Strategy: The American Example', *International Security*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (1981), pp. 35–37.
12. A rebuttal of the first generation arrived promptly: Colin Gray, 'Strategic Culture as Context: the First Generation of Theory Strikes Back', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (1999), pp. 49–69.
13. Alastair Iain Johnston, 'Thinking about Strategic Culture', *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 4 (1995), pp. 32–64.
14. John S. Duffield, *World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy after Unification* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998); Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, *The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002); Gray, 'Strategic Culture as Context' (note 12); Peter J. Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
15. Ronald L. Jepperson and Ann Swidler, 'What Properties of Culture do we Measure?', *Poetics*, Vol. 22, No. 4 (1994), p. 360.
16. John Gerard Ruggie, 'Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Towards a Neo-Realist Synthesis', *World Politics*, Vol. 35, No. 2 (1983), pp. 261–285; John Gerard Ruggie, 'What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge', *International Organization*, Vol. 52, No. 4 (1998), pp. 855–885.
17. Martha Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), p.15.

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