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EU Strategic Culture: When the Means Becomes the End

PER M. NORHEIM-MARTINSEN

Going back some thirty years, the strategic culture debate has evolved in step with scholarly developments and changes in the security environment, proving its endurance with the recent revival of the concept as part of the contemporary European security debate.¹ The appeal of the concept rests in its inherent potential for incorporating a range of more or less elusive ideational factors, such as history, norms, identity, values and ideas, in explanations of why certain states – and, more recently, institutions – act the way they do. Herein we also find strategic culture's weak spot: the term means different things to different people. Or, as Colin Gray remarks: 'The ability of scholars to make a necessarily opaque concept like strategic culture even less penetrable is truly amazing'.² Indeed, to some the idea of a European Union strategic culture represents something of a contradiction in terms, because the persistence of heavily ingrained *national* strategic cultures would seem to render it impossible.³ To others, the idea that national strategic cultures may coexist with a European one seems wholly uncontroversial.⁴ However, this article starts with the assumption that when the EU uses military force or other instruments of power, it does so *de facto* within some notion of a strategic culture.⁵ That is, strategic culture should be seen as a constitutive factor that facilitates and/or constrains strategic actorness. From this point of departure, the article moves on to show that, since the adoption of the European Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003, a specific strategic culture has in fact evolved, in which consensus on a comprehensive approach to security as a unique European Union asset, rather than on a broad set of shared security interests amongst its Member States, has become the focal point for the fledgling ESDP.⁶

The end of the Cold War spurred some essential changes to the European security environment that together pushed in the direction of a heavier security role for the European Union. At the same time, the EU carried forward a strong awareness of its origin as a project for peace, having risen from the ashes of two world wars. This necessarily put some constraints on the way that defence aspects were to be accommodated in the European Union framework. Moreover, after having been subject to debate in academic circles for some time, the idea of a common EU strategic culture 'that fosters early, rapid and when necessary, robust intervention' was also elevated to a policy objective in the European Security Strategy.⁷ Seven years on, it is still too early to judge if this objective has been met – if, indeed, a culture is something that can be purposely created or shaped as one sees fit. However, the document itself soon became a source of ambition and a benchmark against which the Union's security policy was to be measured.⁸ But the almost routine comparisons

with its American counterpart, the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS), initially obscured the wider role that the ESS was to play in consolidating a common European strategic narrative.⁹ A fresh look at the ESS reveals that the EU need not be very different from a state in the way that it uses strategic narratives as a way to legitimize, expand or restrict the scope of its actions. As such, the document had a reach far beyond the short-term political context in which it was conceived. It was in itself a significant step in the constant reaffirmation and incremental evolution of an EU strategic culture.

This article, therefore, approaches the European Security Strategy as a key expression of a nascent strategic narrative, and a readily observable social mechanism through which an EU strategic culture reveals itself. This implies an interpretative approach, in which the European Security Strategy is analysed in the context of how ESDP has evolved over the last years. The article argues that the notion of a comprehensive approach to security stands out as a natural – or culturally conditioned – focal point around which ESDP was to be shaped. It concludes that acting comprehensively has become an end in itself for the EU, and a rather successful way to frame EU actions under ESDP. However, before moving on, it is necessary to revisit briefly both the recent academic debate on an EU strategic culture and the overall strategic culture research agenda, to avoid some of the loopholes and conceptual difficulties that studies of culture tend to entail.

Strategic Culture Revisited

The strategic culture research agenda has, since the term was first coined by Jack Snyder in 1977, evolved in step with scholarly trends and changes in the security environment. Snyder himself held that strategic cultures are the product of each state's unique historical experience, which is reaffirmed and sustained as new generations of policy-makers are socialized into a particular way of thinking.¹⁰ Criticizing the rational actor models of the time, Snyder questioned the predominant assumption that the Soviet Union and the United States would share nuclear strategic thinking, which among other truisms had laid the basis for the MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) strategy. This shift of focus 'from rational man to national man' was immediately picked up by a number of scholars in the late 1970s and early 1980s who agreed that factors such as historical experience, political culture and geography can and often do act as constraints on strategic thinking.¹¹ However, as Snyder later summed up: '... some of the early American literature on strategic culture exaggerated past US-Soviet differences, and exaggerated the likelihood that such differences would persist in the future'.¹² Incidentally, similar criticisms can be launched against the persistent propensity to make comparisons across the Atlantic, this time between western Europe – with the EU as the most pertinent expression of what is typically European – and the United States.¹³ The resulting stereotyping of Europe as weak and the United States as strong has helped obscure questions such as whether comparisons between two such vastly different entities are even feasible, whether US standards represent sensible yardsticks against which to measure European power, or whether transatlantic differences are rooted merely in material preconditions or

in more fundamental differences of identity and culture. As a timely reminder, therefore, one should bear in mind that strategic culture, despite some of its later uses, was originally intended as a tool to explain the persistence of the way that a given strategic community thinks and behaves; it was not intended as a comparative tool.

As a reaction to the inherent danger of ending up with ‘caricatures of culture’, a second generation of strategic culture scholars, having observed the differences between what policy-makers say and what they actually do, voiced a general scepticism towards the feasibility of studying culture at all.¹⁴ According to them, strategic culture was not expected to have much effect on strategic behaviour. Again, similar sentiments are mirrored in the recent debate about a European Union strategic culture. Some scholars remain sceptical of the actual impact of an EU strategic culture, since it seems to them to be reflected mostly in rhetoric.¹⁵ And whereas some tend to downplay the role of ‘symbolic victories’ such as the 2001 Laeken Council, at which the ESDP was declared operational,¹⁶ others conclude more favourably.¹⁷ The point is that there might be a considerable gap between the usually upbeat tone of EU declarations and actual improvements, material or otherwise, in strategic capacity, as perhaps best conceptualized in Christopher Hill’s ‘capability-expectations gap’.¹⁸

Some of these apparent inconsistencies were picked up by a third generation of scholars, who essentially parted ways on the question of whether or not *behaviour* was to be defined inside or outside of the term. If behaviour was separated from culture, as Iain Alistair Johnston argued, one would be able to draw up a falsifiable theory of strategic culture, which could be pitted against other alternative explanations.¹⁹ Yet Johnston’s attack on previous strategic culture scholars resulted in a protracted discussion with Colin Gray, who argued that strategic behaviour must irrevocably be part of strategic culture, since culture represents the context for *all* things strategic.²⁰ In a more recent paper Gray also rather tellingly deems the failure to agree on a definition of strategic culture ‘rather foolish since there is general agreement on the content of the subject and, roughly, on how it functions’. Including or excluding behaviour from the definition is, he goes on, ‘a burning issue for theory builders but otherwise not really of any great significance’.²¹ However, while one could be tempted to sympathize with Gray’s conclusion, it seems worthwhile to try to pursue some level of scholarly agreement on the relationship between strategic culture and actorness. One way to conceptualize this relationship that would also incorporate the more contextual quality of the concept of culture is to look at it as a *constitutive* one. While traditional causal theorizing involves asking whether x causes y, and then measures correlation between the independent and dependent variable(s) and the corresponding causal effects, students of strategic culture are more interested in the conditions that constrain or make y possible. According to its main proponent, Alexander Wendt, constitutive theorizing involves asking ‘how possible’ and ‘what’ questions in order to reveal ‘conceptually necessitating’ conditions for a phenomenon to take place; for example, the existence of the rules and norms of diplomacy can be seen as constitutive for interstate bargaining.²² Similarly, strategic culture can be seen as constitutive for strategic actorness. Yet for Wendt, rules, discourses and social structures are constitutive of objects, agents or actions.

Constitutive theorizing is, therefore, cautiously presented as explicitly non-causal, and as a scientifically valid alternative to causal explanations. However, others have argued that constitution is not just conceptual

but also ontological, that is, conceptual relations that define meanings play themselves out in the (materially embodied) world outside of language. Constitutive theorising, then, is not just about inquiring into how they play themselves out in the social world, giving rise to certain practices and social relations.²³

The key point is that constitutive theorizing is a valid part of scientific inquiry that arguably offers a useful understanding of the perceived epistemological relationship between strategic culture and actorness.

From this understanding, we can move on to pinpoint the social mechanisms through which strategic culture reveals itself. Strategic culture is, after all, a notoriously elusive concept, the appeal *and* curse of which rests in its inherent inclusiveness and all-encompassing nature. However, it can be argued that some elements of a strategic culture can be studied with more precision than others. Going beyond the Johnston/Gray debate, Kerry Longhurst, for example, offers a distinction between unobservable and observable components of strategic culture.²⁴ In the first category we find the ‘foundational elements’ of strategic culture, or the core values that give it ‘its basal quality and characteristics’.²⁵ As unobservables, or *a priori* qualities, these are the factors that seem prone to the kind of caricatures of culture for which earlier strategic culture studies have been criticized. Ole Wæver raises a similar concern with regard to analyses of Europe as a security community. He argues that the origins of peaceful Europe seem ‘terribly over-determined’, and that ‘thus, a study of “security communities” should not focus on origins but try to grasp the clashing social forces that uphold and undermine “expectations of non-war”’.²⁶ These clashing social forces parallel, in turn, what Longhurst refers to as the ‘actual *observable* manifestations of the strategic culture – the “self-regulating *policies* and *practices*” which give active meaning to the foundational elements by relating and promoting them to the external environment’.²⁷

In a similar vein, Iver B. Neumann and Henrikki Heikka approach strategic culture as the product of the dynamic interplay between *discourse* and *practice*.²⁸ Drawing on sociological studies of culture, they argue that discourse is the vehicle through which strategic culture reveals itself, while practice is the socially recognized form of behaviour that stems from it and ultimately defines the strategic culture in question.²⁹ This discursive turn in strategic culture studies can, in turn, be related to a growing interest in the role of *strategic narratives*.³⁰ Lawrence Freedman contends, for example, that

Culture, and the cognition which it influences, is rarely fixed but in a process of development and adaptation. . . It is in this context that the concept of narratives – compelling story lines which can explain convincingly and from which inferences can be drawn – becomes relevant. Narratives are designed or nurtured with the intention of structuring the responses of others to developing events. They are strategic because they do not arise spontaneously but are deliberately

constructed or reinforced out of ideas and thoughts that are already current. . . Narratives are about the ways that issues are framed and responses suggested.³¹

In a contemporary security environment, Freedman goes on, the role of strategic narratives has become even more salient, since the wars of ideas that take place in the media and the public domain are often as important as the ones on the ground. Security strategies, strategy papers, Defence White Papers and the like, as the most deliberate expressions of strategic narratives, represent not merely, or perhaps even primarily, strategic guidelines, but documents for public consumption, deliberate efforts to legitimize future actions and reconcile with or signal difference to the 'other' as part of shaping one's own strategic identity. In his book *Writing Security*, David Campbell, for example, shows how the United States has continuously and actively used narrative descriptions of 'the other' to consolidate an American 'self' that needs to be kept secure.³²

Strategic narratives are, as such, not merely rhetorical, but represent 'speech acts' – that is sentences or locutions with a certain force.³³ Sometimes they even contain the power to change, insofar as by saying something, or performing a speech act, an option that was not there before is created. Repeating the statement can, in turn, reinforce an idea, build up a sense of common identity or cause, or even command certain actions by way of rhetorical entrapment. Strategic narratives represent, as such, a key mechanism through which strategic cultures reproduce, expand or limit the cultural boundaries for what a strategic actor can or is expected to do.

This does *not* imply that an actor is in a position to use narratives freely to change or create a certain strategic culture, which seems to be indicated by the ESS' call for one that specifically 'fosters early, rapid and when necessary, robust intervention'. Strategic narratives are essentially conservative, since they need to be constructed out of ideas that are recognizable to and considered legitimate by their recipients. Nevertheless, the European Union is – perhaps more than most states, upon which centuries of history and traditions weigh heavily – in a position to shape its strategic narrative. Or as Martin Ortega claims, since it was created in a benign environment, it could be constructive rather than responsive.³⁴ However, insofar as (strategic) narratives are 'compelling storylines' and not 'the truth', they may be challenged by competing narratives if or when the EU were to 'lose its aura of progressivism', as Mark Gilbert warns in his excellent analysis of how a commonly shared progressive conception of the European integration project has produced an over-simplified, unhistorical and somewhat teleological version of contemporary European history.³⁵ A strategic narrative, as any narrative, is ultimately reliant on its credibility and legitimacy as such.

With this in mind, we shall now move on to revisit the European Security Strategy as essentially a strategic narrative intended to 'sell' the burgeoning ESDP as an inherent and natural part of an evolving EU. Accordingly, attention is predominantly directed to the overall storyline that the document conveys and its implications for ESDP, rather than to the more historically dependent details of a document which is now more than seven years old.

The European Security Strategy in Context: Going beyond Constructive Ambiguity

Until 2003, ESDP had been successfully clouded by ‘constructive ambiguity’.³⁶ The relatively loose shape and direction of the project, as reflected in the, to some, irreconcilable goals of European autonomy *and* the strengthening of the Atlantic Alliance, gave ample room for coordinative narratives at the national level that supported the fleeting ESDP but still agreed with the rather different aspirations of what Jolyon Howorth has labelled French Europeanism, British Atlanticism and German federalism respectively.³⁷ However, as the evolving crisis in Iraq made it obvious just how fragile the political unity on which ESDP rested was, it eventually became clear that ‘constructive ambiguity was no longer an option’.³⁸ Therefore, although the need for a firmer policy platform on which to base ESDP had been obvious for some time, it was the Iraq crisis that triggered the process that led to the adoption of the document titled *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy* at the Brussels European Council on 12 December 2003.

The European Security Strategy thus served the specific purpose of mending relations between US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s infamously branded ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe, and the rift that had emerged between Europe and the United States. However, in hindsight it can be seen also, in the words of Alyson Bayles, as a ‘conceptual and procedural turning point [and] an important stage in the developing self-awareness and ambition of the EU as a player in the global arena’.³⁹ In the end, the ESS was drafted and adopted in less than seven months, truly a remarkable feat in light of the cumbersome intergovernmental procedures that formally underpin ESDP. This was made possible by a combination of a favourable political climate at the time, a sense of urgency, and the fact that Solana and his team were there to pick up the task and carry it through efficiently without breaking the trust of the Member States.

As became clear in 2007, when President Sarkozy signalled a major revision of the ESS as part of his plans for the upcoming French Council Presidency (in the second half of 2008), this combination of factors was something that could not easily be reproduced.⁴⁰ Instead, the European Union Member States mandated a *review* of the implementation of the ESS in December 2007. This resulted in a round of high-level seminars, which gave a small group of senior academics and practitioners the opportunity to offer their views on the future parameters of the EU’s security and defence policy. The method was, as such, not dissimilar to the one that produced the ESS in 2003, but this time the impact was more sobering. Rather than resulting in the bold new security strategy that President Sarkozy had signalled, the December 2008 European Council adopted a rather more modest *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy*. Apart from adding some threats to the list, the document essentially reaffirmed the key elements of the 2003 ESS, making clear that it ‘remains fully relevant’ and that the report ‘does not replace the ESS, but reinforces it’.⁴¹ In any case, the document was almost immediately forgotten and never received a fraction of the comments and analysis that the 2003 ESS attracted. That the latter did receive so much attention is probably also the main

reason why it has proved so enduring in the minds of both academics and practitioners.

Because of the special political circumstances in which it came about, the European Security Strategy was followed by a trail of analyses that compared it with the US National Security Strategy (NSS) issued by the Bush Administration the year before.⁴² Whether the two documents – one issued by an ageing superpower and the other by a regional security institution with newfound military ambitions – are, in fact, comparable is certainly questionable: some would argue that this amounts to comparing apples and oranges. Nevertheless, Christoph Heusgen, then Director of the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, is reported to have said that the title and acronym of the ESS was chosen deliberately because comparisons with the US version were not only inevitable but also what the Member States intended.⁴³ Consequently, as Simon Duke points out, the existence of the NSS was exploited in the ESS, which used, in the words of Alyson Bayles, ‘the concomitant language to signal subtle differences as well as togetherness’.⁴⁴ On the other hand, whereas the NSS served as ‘a reference and justification for action policy choices’, the ESS served as a reference and justification for having a common security and defence policy in the first place.⁴⁵ Also, whereas the publication of the NSS is a more or less frequent enterprise, allowing the reader to assess the evolution of a national strategy, the ESS was a first, though obviously not appearing in a strategic void. At the same time, it was ‘too late’ in the sense that the ESDP was already well under way. As such, the European Security Strategy had not only to define where the ESDP was going, but also its status as of 2003. That is, it had to reconstruct the rationale for ESDP, until then based on ‘constructive ambiguity’, a notion that simply did not hold water as the project was taking shape.

The European Security Strategy as Strategic Narrative: Creating a Purpose for ESDP

A strategy paper ought to define actual goals and set up priorities to achieve policy objectives, while describing which means can be used, and under what conditions, to fulfil those objectives.⁴⁶ However, it also serves as a premeditated justification or rationale for situations where ultimately external use of force can be used. It is a tool for building preparedness for and acceptance of these situations in the minds of constituents as well as the outside world. Accordingly, a strategy paper typically starts with a general description of the security environment, which in turn sets the pace and direction for the rest of the document; that is, a paper that starts from the assumption that one is at war will necessarily invoke a greater sense of urgency than one that places itself in a less threatening security environment. As part of this exercise, a strategy paper typically offers an interpretation of how the status quo has emerged and the role that the state or organization has played in getting there.

Whereas the American National Security Strategy took as its point of departure the end of the Cold War, ‘a decisive victory for the forces of freedom’, the European Security Strategy – somewhat surprisingly, given the centrality of this event for the creation of ESDP – virtually leapfrogs over the Cold War. Instead, it goes back to

what Frank Schimmelfenning refers to as the ‘founding myth’ of European integration, the historical responsibility for creating lasting peace among democratic European states.⁴⁷ As such, the ESS essentially restored an idea that had played a minor role in the integration process during the Cold War, by placing it at the heart of the forces that had ‘transformed relations between our states, and the lives of our citizens’, with the result that Europe had never been ‘so prosperous, secure or free’.⁴⁸ Having successfully escaped the legacy of two devastating world wars, the logic goes, Europe should now ‘be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world’.⁴⁹

The reference to the founding myth can be seen as an attempt at pinning ESDP to the one uniting experience that the European states have in common, while offering an alternative to national strategic cultures. However, a question that has been frequently asked is whether it represents a strong enough rationale on which to build a shared and strong European strategic culture. Adrian Hyde-Price argues that the unprecedented effect that the experience of war has traditionally had on national strategic cultures is exactly why such a common European strategic culture is unlikely to emerge.⁵⁰ In a similar vein, Peter van Ham argues that the founding myth ‘breaks a pattern since historically war and violence have played a major part in state-formation’.⁵¹ Or, as he goes on to state: ‘Without war “we” hardly know who “we” are’. Consequently, the absence of robust EU military operations may help us appreciate ‘why the EU lacks confidence and status in the military arena’.⁵² The National Security Strategy, again offering a striking contrast, described a state at war again, only ten years after declaring victory in the Cold War.⁵³ The war references are toned down in later versions of the NSS, but the typical NSS rhetoric nevertheless signifies a strikingly different strategic outlook to that of the ESS.⁵⁴ While the United States continues to see a world replete with dangers, the EU rather sees security challenges that need to be taken seriously in order to avoid a situation where Europe ‘*could* be confronted with a very radical threat indeed’.⁵⁵

In fact, the European Security Strategy presented a rather different rationale for a security strategy. Insofar as an important function of such a document is to preserve or strengthen a strategic culture, the peaceful starting point for the ESS represented a less solid cultural building block, so to speak, when compared with the role that the experience of war has traditionally played in the shaping of national strategic cultures. In other words, the EU founding myth, regardless of the unprecedented role that it had played in the transformation of a Europe never ‘so prosperous, secure or free’, represented an inevitably weak platform on which to base the use of force, which is what a security strategy – or at least the more controversial parts of it – is mainly about. Nevertheless, the European option clearly has its appeal, as reflected, for example, in the re-education of the German public and Europe at large over the course of the 1990s, leading to the general acceptance and even encouragement of German armed forces being used for purposes other than territorial defence, even as it challenged supposedly deep-rooted national strategic cultures built on the experience of suffering two world wars.⁵⁶ However, the success and prominence granted to the European integration project in the shaping of the status quo inevitably leaves an obligation, whether moral or instrumental, upon the EU to continue the enlargement

process, thus ‘making a reality of the vision of a united and peaceful continent’.⁵⁷ This has made it progressively harder to identify an ‘other’ that may serve as a reference point for the European ‘we’, a concern that has been raised at every juncture in the integration process.

Despite the obvious tacit awareness of a set of common values that constitute a European epistemic community, the European Security Strategy also lacks references to core European values or beliefs (such as Christianity or liberal democracy), as well as the more moral tone that the American National Security Strategy tends to display. While the latter, underpinned by the unique position of the United States, describes a global responsibility for spreading moral principles revolving around the central ideas of freedom and liberalism, the ESS, in contrast, restricts the European Union’s primary role to the maintenance of regional stability, while recognizing that the EU ‘should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security’.⁵⁸ Only in its own neighbourhood does the ESS explicitly identify a responsibility for promoting certain values, since ‘it is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well governed’.⁵⁹ The ESS also lacks the NSS’ unambiguous will to use military force to protect core values when under threat.

In fact, it is notable how few pointers the European Security Strategy offers on the use of military force, at least when judging by the amount of comment that the EU’s move into the military realm has attracted. The absence of military references in the document can, of course, be attributed to the continual lack of agreement amongst the Member States on this particular issue.⁶⁰ Yet the apparent preference given to non-military instruments in the ESS is also, as indicated above, rooted in distinctive features of an EU strategic culture, and represents thus at least partly a conscious or path-dependent European choice.

A Reluctant Military Actor: Acting *European* as an End in Itself

The only place where the use of military force is explicitly mentioned in the European Security Strategy is in connection with failed states in which ‘military instruments may be needed to restore order’.⁶¹ The use of the term ‘restore’ seems, in turn, to restrict military means to the post-conflict phase, and then only in concert with other reconstruction tools.⁶² At the same time, the ESS does recognize a need for a stronger focus on military instruments, and even proactive military engagement, as reflected in the call for a strategic culture that fosters ‘early and robust intervention’ and the recognition of the need for ‘the full spectrum of instruments’ to be available for the European Union.⁶³ In fact, the somewhat ambiguous treatment of the issue of military force, and the apparent cautious downplaying of any references to such, seem to counteract previous and current steps toward a stronger military role for the EU. In light of other developments, therefore, the strategic narrative conveyed by the ESS seems somewhat out of touch with the way that ESDP has evolved in practice.

This perceived disparity is best explained with recourse to the peaceful rationale from which the European Security Strategy started out, which from the outset resonates badly with a strong military focus. On the one hand, most Member States do seem to appreciate that military power is necessary for increasing the EU’s

weight on the world stage, and that engaging in military operations is a rational way to boost its hard power. Yet, on the other hand, they are well aware of the fact that the move into the military realm in certain respects conflicts with the very image of the EU and the ideas, values and norms that uphold it.⁶⁴ In that sense, acting militarily, but well within the overarching conflict-preventive (read: more benign) parameters, has become an end in itself and a way to legitimize military force as an inherent and natural part of an EU strategic culture.

When read as a traditional security strategy, the European Security Strategy does not immediately or principally lend itself to the usual ends/means teleology.⁶⁵ In looking at how the military dimension has been incorporated into the EU, therefore, it is arguably better understood as the product of a logic of *appropriateness* rather than of a logic of *consequences*.⁶⁶ ESDP is, indeed, a pertinent example of how culture binds rationality. We could thus add a notion to the 30-year-old strategic culture dichotomy of *rational* man vs. *national* man, namely that of *supranational* man: that is, when acting within the auspices of ESDP, all actors are induced or compelled to do so in a way that falls within certain premeditated conceptions of how the EU as a collective should behave. In other words, the way in which to act has become a source of a European 'self'. The 'other', as the omnipresent contrast against which an identity needs to be shaped, is in this logic to be found in the United States.⁶⁷

Despite the reconciliatory motive of the European Security Strategy, which predominantly came to the fore in a general convergence on the interpretation of threats (terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction [WMDs], and 'rogue' or 'failed' states),⁶⁸ a gap was evident in the particular approaches to countering or managing the threats. A central point of the subsequent debate was the real and perceived difference between the ESS' *preventive engagement* and the NSS' *pre-emptive action*. The latter, referred to as the Bush doctrine, signalled that the US would be willing not only to prevent but also forestall an adversary from attacking vital US interests by way of a pre-emptive military attack.⁶⁹ However, Solana, speaking on behalf of the EU, made it clear that preventive engagement stops at the 'mainstreaming of conflict prevention without implying any obligation to undertake pre-emptive military strikes either by the EU or by individual member states'.⁷⁰ The message was further underlined by the change of wording, reportedly due to German insistence, away from 'pre-emptive engagement' after the first version of the ESS was presented in Thessaloniki in June 2003. However, some of the more striking differences were gradually toned down after the initial shock of the 11 September attacks faded. The 2006 version of the NSS gave, for example, a more sobering account of the terrorist threat and the 'protracted struggle' (as opposed to 'war'; see above) against it.

Yet beyond the more obvious differences, the European Security Strategy was at its core a confirmation of a broad, multidimensional or *comprehensive* notion of security that had emerged over the years.⁷¹ At the heart of this approach is the integration of all dimensions of foreign policy, from aid and trade to diplomacy and the military, and a preference for conflict prevention through dialogue, cooperation and partnership rather than armed intervention. However, the idea of a holistic approach was, as Sven Biscop points out, certainly not new.⁷² Organizations such as the UN and the CSCE/OSCE had been promoting comprehensive security during the Cold

War, while the EC/EU mostly played the part of the follower, at least when it came to actively promoting the idea – although peace through cooperation had, of course, been the central rationale for the European integration project from the start. However, in the mid-1990s the EU also started to reform its structures for conflict prevention and crisis management, joining the ‘comprehensive trend’ that gained momentum in the first decade after the Cold War.⁷³ Eventually a comprehensive security logic received something of an omnipresence in EU documents, as reflected, for example, in the *Stability Pact for Central and Eastern Europe*, as well as in actual policies, such as the Stability and Association Process(es) in the Balkans and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership programme (EMP).⁷⁴ The acknowledgement of the *need* for comprehensive approaches was, in turn, gradually translated into a potential *asset* for the EU – that is, something that Europeans are ‘particularly well equipped’ to do.⁷⁵

This created a strong, almost teleological drive to highlight integrated civil–military concepts as a way to legitimize and take ESDP forward. This was also duly reflected in the ESS, which stated that ‘none of the new threats is purely military; nor can be tackled by purely military means [but] each requires a mixture of instruments’.⁷⁶ Incidentally, the lack of preparedness of the US-led coalition in Iraq for dealing with the massive challenges that emerged in the wake of the war, and the dawning of the fact that a ‘war’ on terror could not be won militarily, placed the EU firmly in the driver’s seat of the ongoing comprehensive trend. As Sven Biscop remarks:

From being absent in the Iraq debate, the European Union thus became a trend-setter, or perhaps more accurately, helped to clear the obstacles for the already existing trend towards a holistic approach to continue after the low point of the Iraq crisis.⁷⁷

Eventually, the European Union also warmly endorsed (or perhaps *hijacked* is a better word) the *Comprehensive Approach* – a term that in its abbreviated, conceptual form was initially associated with NATO civil–military operations – and started to refer to it as a success factor for its policies and operations.⁷⁸ In that sense, it has successfully been ‘written into’ the EU’s strategic narrative and accepted as an inherent part of its strategic culture. This was possible because the idea of a comprehensive approach to security fitted well into the conventional narrative of the European integration process as a project for peace by underlining the military dimension’s secondary nature. That is, the EU prefers to act using its traditional strengths as a non-military power – and has successfully done so in the past, ‘making a reality of the vision of a united and peaceful continent’ – but must also be able to use force to tackle emerging crises in its neighbourhood and beyond.⁷⁹ It has a stated non-aggressive purpose and has allowed the EU, at least until recently, to portray itself as a ‘benign interventionist’ perhaps not devoid of, but somewhere above the national interest.⁸⁰ Moreover, the idea of a comprehensive approach to security represents a source of a strategic ‘self’ for a peaceful Europe without clearly defined enemies. As such, a contrasting ‘other’ is typically found in the United States, but without having to resort to the kind

of negative stereotype imaging of an adversary that has often dominated national strategic cultures in the past.

Finally, the comprehensive approach underlines that ESDP represents something different and that it does not duplicate NATO. This was a precondition for ESDP in the first place, as reflected perhaps most explicitly in US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's famous three Ds – no diminution of NATO, no discrimination and no duplication – formulated in her speech to the 1998 NATO summit. That the term 'Comprehensive Approach', albeit as a concept and not an idea, originated in NATO was then perhaps somewhat ironic, but the way in which the EU has taken ownership of the term suggests that the EU may be inherently and intuitively better equipped to carry it through. As such, it also represented a potential comparative advantage for the EU, or a European *way of warfare* that has suddenly come into fashion with the need for post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction in places such as the Balkans, Central Africa, Iraq and Afghanistan.

Concluding Remarks

The purpose of this article was to show that the concept of strategic culture can be usefully applied to a non-state actor like the European Union. By drawing on recent developments in strategic culture theory, it has shown that the idea of strategic culture is not only compatible with the European Union, but may be a particularly useful conceptual tool for studying actors for which cultural factors can make up for the lack of more material ones, such as borders, language, political structure, national history, and so on. It seems that students of strategic culture have for too long been preoccupied with the national interest, as reflected in the repeated claims that an EU strategic culture is impossible due to the inherent differences between its 27 Member States. At the same time, *how* to act has become all the more important in the modern world – as reflected, for example, in the massive opposition against some of the excesses of the American war on terror in the wake of 11 September, at a time when moral support should never have been higher. Focusing on discourses or strategic narratives as an inherent part of a strategic culture thus opens up avenues for further research, including more fruitful comparisons between the United States and the European Union than the traditional strong/weak dichotomy.⁸¹

From this point of departure, this article has shown that, since the adoption of the ESS, a quite specific strategic culture has in fact evolved in the European Union, in which consensus on a comprehensive approach to security as a unique European asset, rather than on a broad set of shared security interests amongst its Member States, has become a focal point for the fledgling ESDP. This is important because it shows that the EU may be capable of strategic action even in the absence of clear agreement on a pre-identified set of collective security interests that could replace the national interest. That is, behaving like Europeans, or within the boundaries of a shared strategic culture, becomes an end in itself when acting as a collective under the ESDP label. In other words, an EU strategic culture does not replace national strategic cultures, but rather supplements them.

However, one problem seems to be that this does not provide for a particularly strong or robust strategic culture. Indeed, European Union assertiveness tends to crumble in the face of competing political agendas, as can be observed currently in the slump in EU operational activities following the enduring economic crisis that continues to preoccupy European state leaders. This has also left Germany firmly in the driver's seat. It is no secret that Berlin has been sceptical towards expanding the ESDP agenda in Africa, for example, which until recently has been a key area of operations for the EU. In the case of Libya it also made its objections obvious to the rest of the world by abstaining from the vote on UN Security Council Resolution 1473. At the moment, an EU strategic culture does not appear robust enough to trump these and other concerns. This could change following the prospective withdrawal of European troops from Afghanistan in 2015. The Libya campaign may point towards a renewed Franco-British push for Western intervention in this region. The question is whether the EU will be chosen as the vehicle through which to channel new operations.

If the slump in European Union operational activities continues, the danger is that the EU's own strategic narrative, as described in this article, will be challenged by competing, less appealing narratives as the institution fails to produce ways, means and results that fall within the inevitable constraints and expectations that come with the narrative.⁸² Strategic culture is, after all, not a one-way street, but the product of the *dynamic interplay* between discourses or narratives, on the one hand, and practices on the other. A strategic narrative relates to and codifies ideas and values that exist 'out there' already as the cultural boundaries inside which a strategic actor operates. The narrative can be constructive, in the sense that these boundaries can be incrementally and cautiously shifted. Yet a complex multi-level actor such as the EU, in particular, has limited control over how the narrative plays out when confronted with other actors and real-world events. A strategic decision, Carl von Clausewitz reminds us, will always have both intended and unintended consequences that reflect back on an actor in ways over which it has very limited control. A decision to intervene in one situation at one point may create expectations or precedents for similar situations in the future. Likewise, a repeated focus on the EU's unique potential as a comprehensive security actor will create an expectation that it will also act decidedly comprehensively, and invite criticism if it fails to produce ways, means and results that reflect this.

So far, the European Union has not carried out any fully integrated civil–military operations. The operations in Africa in particular have for the most part been traditional low-intensity military peacekeeping. Most of them have also been pushed forward by France, relied on French military capabilities and been evaluated on their military accomplishments.⁸³ It seems that the EU is constantly drawn into a discourse where military robustness in itself is treated as the only or most important benchmark for successful intervention, while the EU often fails to 'sell' the point about the 'upsurge in civilian crisis management' as the *real* 'success of the ESDP'.⁸⁴ However, the European Union cannot continue to dodge the question whether its own perceived key assets are, in fact, reflected in the operations it carries out. The contributions to this special issue aim to shed light on this.

NOTES

1. Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards, 'Beyond the EU/NATO Dichotomy: The Beginnings of a European Strategic Culture', *International Affairs*, Vol. 77, No. 3 (2001), pp. 587–603; Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards, 'The Strategic Culture of the European Union: A Progress Report', *International Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 4 (2005), pp. 801–820; Stine Heiselberg, 'Pacifism or Activism: Towards a Common Strategic Culture within the European Security and Defence Policy?', IIS Working Paper 4, Danish Institute for International Studies, 2003; Adrian Hyde Price, 'European Security, Strategic Culture and the Use of Force', *European Security*, Vol. 13, No. 4 (2004), pp. 323–343; Per Martin Martinsen, 'Forging a Strategic Culture - Putting Policy into the ESDP', *Oxford Journal on Good Governance*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2004), pp. 61–66; Janne Haaland Matlary, 'When Soft Power Turns Hard: Is an EU Strategic Culture Possible?', *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 37, No. 1 (2006), pp. 105–121; Christoph O. Meyer, *The Quest for a European Strategic Culture: A Comparative Study of Strategic Norms and Ideas in the European Union* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Per Martin Norheim-Martinsen, 'European Strategic Culture Revisited: The Ends and Means of a Militarised European Union', *Defence and Security Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (2007); Sten Rynning, 'The European Union: Towards a Strategic Culture?', *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 34, No. 4 (2003), pp. 479–496; Kerry Longhurst and Marcin Zaborowski, 'The Future of European Security', *European Security*, Vol. 13, No. 4 (2004), pp. 381–391; Jolyon Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2007); Asle Toje, *The EU, NATO and Strategic Culture: Renegotiating the Transatlantic Bargain* (London: Routledge, 2008).
2. Colin Gray, *Out of the Wilderness: Prime Time for Strategic Culture* (Fort Belvoir, VA: Defence Threat Reduction Agency, 2006).
3. Hyde Price, 'European Security, Strategic Culture and the Use of Force' (note 1) Matlary, 'When Soft Power Turns Hard: Is an EU Strategic Culture Possible?' (note 1), Rynning, 'The European Union: Towards a Strategic Culture?' (note 1).
4. Cornish and Edwards, 'Beyond the EU/NATO Dichotomy: The Beginnings of a European Strategic Culture' (note 1); Cornish and Edwards, 'The Strategic Culture of the European Union: A Progress Report' (note 1); Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union* (note 1).
5. This view is in line with the broad understanding of (strategic) culture as the context in which all (strategic) acts necessarily take place. See for example Colin Gray, 'Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back', *Review of International Studies* 25 (1999), pp. 49–69; David Haglund, 'What Good Is Strategic Culture? A Modest Defence of an Immodest Concept', *International Journal*, Vol. 59, no. 3 (2004), pp. 479–502. I return to this discussion below.
6. European Council, 'A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy' (Brussels: endorsed by the European Council, 11–12 December, 2003). Hereafter referred to as ESS.
7. ESS (note 6), p. 11.
8. Sven Biscop, 'The ABC of European Security Strategy: Ambition, Benchmark, Culture', Egmont Royal Institute of International Relations: Egmont Paper 16, 2007; Anne Deighton and Victor Mauer (eds), *Securing Europe? Implementing the European Security Strategy*, Zurich: ETH Centre for Security Studies, 2006; Sven Biscop and Jan Joel Andersson (eds), *The EU and the European Security Strategy: Forging a Global Europe* (London: Routledge, 2008); European Council, 'Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy - Providing Security in a Changing World', Brussels: Adopted by the European Council, 11 December 2008.
9. US Government, 'The National Security Strategy of the United States of America', Washington DC: The White House, 2002.
10. Jack L. Snyder, 'The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations', Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, R-2154-AF, 1977.
11. Ken Booth, *Strategy and Ethnocentrism* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1979); Colin Gray, 'National Styles in Strategy: The American Example', *International Security*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (1981), pp. 21–47; Carnes Lord, 'American Strategic Culture', *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (1985), pp. 269–293; Richard Pipes, 'Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War', *Commentary* 1 (1977), pp. 21–34.
12. Jack L. Snyder, 'The Concept of Strategic Culture: Caveat Emptor', in Carl G. Jacobsen (ed.), *Strategic Power USA/USSR*, (London: Macmillan, 1990), p. 3.
13. For the most notorious account of differing perceptions of security and power on either side of the Atlantic, see Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York: Knopf, 2003); Robert Kagan, 'Power and Weakness – Why the United States and Europe See the World Differently', *Policy Review*, 113 (June and July 2002). pp. 3–28.

14. David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992); Bradley S. Klein, 'Hegemony and Strategic Culture: American Power Projection and Alliance Defence Politics', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (1988); Bradley S. Klein, 'The Textual Strategies of the Military: Or, Have You Read Any Good Defence Manuals Lately?', in James Der Derian and J. Shapiro (eds), *International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics* (Lexington, MA.: Lexington Books, 1989).
15. Rynning, 'The European Union: Towards a Strategic Culture?' (note 1).
16. Simon Duke, 'CESDP and the EU Response to 11 September: Identifying the Weakest Link', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (2002); Julian Lindley-French, 'Terms of Engagement. The Paradox of American Power and the Transatlantic Dilemma Post-11 September', Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Paper No. 52, 2002.
17. Gilles Andréani, Christoph Bertram, and Charles Grant, *Europe's Military Revolution* (London: Centre for European Reform, 2001); Charles Cogan, *The Third Option: The Emancipation of European Defense, 1989-2000* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001); Jolyon Howorth, 'The CESDP and the Forging of a European Security Culture?', *Politique Européenne*, Vol. 8 (2002), pp. 88–109.
18. Christopher Hill, 'The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualising Europe's International Role' *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 31 (1993), pp. 305–328.
19. According to Johnston, behaviour (dependent variable) may causally follow from strategic culture (independent variable), defined as 'a limited ranked set of strategic preference'. In that case, the validity of strategic culture as an explanatory variable is verified, whereas in cases of non-compliance between strategic culture and behaviour, the theory must be discarded. Alastair Iain Johnston, 'Thinking About Strategic Culture', *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 4 (1995), p. 48. See also Elizabeth Kier, *Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997); Jeffrey Legro, *Cooperation under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint During World War II* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995).
20. Gray, 'Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back' (note 5). See also Johnston and Gray's subsequent replies and replies to replies. Johnston's definition of culture has been generally discredited, since it represents a sharp departure from definitions in sociological and anthropological literature. For a detailed discussion, see Iver B. Neumann and Henriikki Heikka, 'Grand Strategy, Strategic Culture, Practice. The Social Roots of Nordic Defence', *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 40, No. 1 (2005), pp. 5–23.
21. Gray, *Out of the Wilderness: Prime Time for Strategic Culture* (note 2), p. ii.
22. Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Alexander Wendt, 'On Constitution and Causation in International Relations', *Review of International Relations*, Vol. 24, Special Issue (1998). See also John Gerard Ruggie, 'The False Premise of Realism', *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (1995).
23. Milja Kurki, *Causation in International Relations: Reclaiming Causal Analysis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 181. See also Colin Wight, *Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
24. Kerry Longhurst, 'Strategic Culture', in Gerhard Kümmel and Andreas D. Prüfert (eds), *Military Sociology: The Richness of a Discipline* (Baden Baden: Nomos, 2000).
25. *Ibid.*, p. 305.
26. Ole Waever, 'Insecurity, Security and Asecurity in the West European Non-War Community, in Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds), *Security Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 71, 75.
27. Longhurst, 'Strategic Culture' (note 24), p.305, my emphasis.
28. Neumann and Heikka, 'Grand Strategy, Strategic Culture, Practice' (note 20).
29. Cf. Ann Swidler, 'What Anchors Cultural Practices', in Theodore M. Schatzki, Karin Knorr Cetina, and Eike von Savigny (eds), *The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory* (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 74–92.
30. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001); Lawrence Freedman, 'The Transformation of Strategic Affairs', Adelphi Paper 379 (London: IISS, 2006); Mary Kaldor, Mary Martin, and Sabine Selchow, 'Human Security: A New Strategic Narrative for Europe', *International Affairs*, Vol. 83, No. 2 (2007), pp. 273–288.
31. Freedman, *The Transformation of Strategic Affairs* (note 30), pp. 22–23.
32. Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (note 14).

33. Cf. John L. Austin, *How to do Things with Words: The William James Lectures Delivered at Harvard University in 1955* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1955); Barry Buzan, Jaap de Wilde, and Ole Waever, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998); Ole Waever, 'Securitization and Desecuritization', in R.D. Lipschutz (ed.), *On Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), pp. 46–86.
34. Martin Ortega, 'Building the Future: The EU's Contribution to Global Governance', *Chaillot Paper No. 100* (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2007), p. 93.
35. Mark Gilbert, 'Narrating the Process: Questioning the Progressive Story of European Integration', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 46, No. 3 (2008), pp. 641–662.
36. Francois Heisbourg, 'Europe's Strategic Ambitions: The Limits of Ambiguity', *Survival*, Vol. 42, No. 2 (2000).
37. Jolyon Howorth, 'Discourse, Ideas, and Epistemic Communities in European Security and Defence Policy', *West European Politics*, Vol. 27, No. 2 (2004), pp. 211–243. Some would, however, question whether Germany is still pursuing the 'federalism' line.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 228.
39. Alyson J.K. Bailes, 'The European Security Strategy. An Evolutionary History', Policy Paper No.10, SIPRI, Stockholm, 2005, p. 1.
40. 'Sarkozy in Drive to Give EU a Global Goal', *Financial Times*, 27 July 2007.
41. European Council, 'Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a Changing World' (note 8), p. 3.
42. US Government, 'The National Security Strategy of the United States of America' (note 9); Alyson J.K. Bailes, 'EU and US Strategic Concepts: A Mirror for Partnership and Difference?', *The International Spectator*, Vol. XXXIX, No. 3 (2004), pp. 19–33; Bailes, 'The European Security Strategy. An Evolutionary History' (note 39); Simon Duke, 'The European Security Strategy in a Comparative Framework: Does It Make for Secure Alliances in a Better World?', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 9 (2004), pp. 459–481; Felix Berenskoetter, 'Mapping the Mind Gap: A Comparison of US and EU Security Strategies', *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (2005); Asle Toje, 'The 2003 European Union Security Strategy: A Critical Appraisal', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 10 (2005), pp. 117–133; Sven Biscop, 'The European Security Strategy. Implementing a Distinctive Approach to Security', Brussels: Royal Defence College (IRSD-KHID), Paper No.82 (March), 2004.
43. Quoted in Toje, 'The 2003 European Union Security Strategy: A Critical Appraisal' (note 42), p. 120.
44. Duke, 'The European Security Strategy in a Comparative Framework: Does It Make for Secure Alliances in a Better World?' (note 42); p. 461; Bailes, 'The European Security Strategy. An Evolutionary History' (note 39), p. 32.
45. Haine and Lindström, quoted in Duke, 'The European Security Strategy in a Comparative Framework: Does It Make for Secure Alliances in a Better World?', (note 42), p. 460.
46. Toje, 'The 2003 European Union Security Strategy: A Critical Appraisal', (note 42), p. 121.
47. Frank Schimmelfenning, *The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), pp. 265–278. However, see Gilbert, 'Narrating the Process: Questioning the Progressive Story of European Integration' (note 35).
48. ESS, (note 6) p. 1. The exception was the accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal, which was a testing ground for the EU's ability to promote stability and democracy in the region. The success of this venture later became an important reference point for Eastern enlargement. See Kristi Raik, 'The EU as a Regional Power: Extended Governance and Historical Responsibility', in Hartmut Mayer and Henri Vogt (eds), *A Responsible Europe? Ethical Foundations of EU External Affairs* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 78.
49. ESS (note 6), p. 1.
50. Hyde Price, 'European Security, Strategic Culture and the Use of Force' (note 1).
51. Peter van Ham, 'Europe's Strategic Culture and the Relevance of War', *Oxford Journal of Good Governance*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2005), pp. 39–43; Peter van Ham, 'Europe's Postmodern Identity: A Critical Appraisal', *International Politics*, Vol. 38, No. 1 (2001), pp. 229–252.
52. Van Ham, 'Europe's Strategic Culture and the Relevance of War' (note 51), p. 40.
53. The fact that neither the Cold War nor the war on terror were wars in the conventional meaning of the term makes references to them as such appear all the more conspicuous in the sense that they create a feeling of urgency and lack of safety, as well as commanding a certain way of dealing with the problem.
54. The 'war against terror' was rebaptized 'the long war' in the 2006 NSS, which signified a somewhat reluctant acceptance of the fact that it was going to be protracted *struggle* rather than a war, with all the costs (the Iraq war was and remains the most expensive ever fought by the United States) and suffering it is bound to incur.
55. ESS (note 6), p. 5, emphasis added.

56. Howorth, 'Discourse, Ideas, and Epistemic Communities in European Security and Defence Policy' (note 31).
57. ESS, p. 1.
58. ESS, p. 1, and NSS, p. 3. Commentators differ on what to make of the frequent use of the term 'global' in the ESS. Bayles sees a 'truly global approach' as a feature it shares with the NSS: Bailes, 'The European Security Strategy. An Evolutionary History' (note 39), p. 15. Duke and Berenskoetter, in turn, recognize the ESS' global outlook, but conclude that it is, nonetheless, primarily concerned with regional security. Duke, 'The European Security Strategy in a Comparative Framework: Does It Make for Secure Alliances in a Better World?' (note 42), Berenskoetter, 'Mapping the Mind Gap: A Comparison of US and EU Security Strategies' (note 42).
59. See ESS, p. 7, and Berenskoetter, 'Mapping the Mind Gap: A Comparison of US and EU Security Strategies' (note 42).
60. See for example Toje, 'The 2003 European Union Security Strategy: A Critical Appraisal', (note 42), p. 121.
61. ESS, p. 7.
62. Berenskoetter, 'Mapping the Mind Gap: A Comparison of US and EU Security Strategies' (note 42).
63. ESS, p. 11.
64. See the debate on the EU as a civilian or normative power. Francoise Dûchene, 'Europe in World Peace', in R. Maine (ed.), *Europe Tomorrow* (London: Fontana/Collins, 1972); Karen Smith, 'The End of Civilian Power EU: A Welcome Demise or a Cause for Concern?' *International Spectator*, Vol. XXXV, No. 2 (2000); Stelios Stavridis, 'Militarising the EU: The Concept of Civilian Power Revisited', *International Spectator*, Vol. XXXVI, No. 4 (2001); Mario Telo, *Europe: A Civilian Power? European Union, Global Governance, World Order* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006); Ian Manners, 'Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 2 (2002), pp. 235–258; 'Normative Power Europe Reconsidered: Beyond the Crossroads', *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2006), pp. 182–199.
65. According to Asle Toje, the EU acts in accordance with what Max Weber refers to as *Wertrationalität* (or value rationality) rather than traditional *Zweckrationalität* (ends/means rationality). Toje, 'The 2003 European Union Security Strategy: A Critical Appraisal' (note 42).
66. See for example James March and Johan P. Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics* (New York: Free Press, 1989).
67. Cf. Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (note 14); van Ham, 'Europe's Strategic Culture and the Relevance of War' (note 51); van Ham, 'Europe's Postmodern Identity: A Critical Appraisal' (note 51).
68. The ESS adds organized crime and regional conflicts to the list. Note also the difference between 'rogue' and 'failed' states. While a failed state is in the ESS seen as a catalyst for other threats to emerge, a rogue state is in the NSS seen as a threat in itself, either by its own direct actions, its sponsorship of terrorists, or failure to prevent these from hurting US interests. Each term anchors fundamentally different opinions about when forceful intervention is considered legitimate.
69. NSS, p. 19.
70. Preventive engagement is described in ESS, pp. 9–11. Solana quoted in Toje, 'The 2003 European Union Security Strategy: A Critical Appraisal' (note 42), p. 128.
71. Barcelona Report, 'A Human Security Doctrine for Europe', Report of the Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities, Barcelona, 15 September 2004, Biscop, 'The European Security Strategy. Implementing a Distinctive Approach to Security' (note 42); Biscop, 'The ABC of European Security Strategy: Ambition, Benchmark, Culture' (note 8).
72. Sven Biscop, 'The European Security Strategy in Context: A Comprehensive Trend', in Sven Biscop and Jan Joel Andersson (eds), *The EU and the European Security Strategy: Forging a Global Europe* (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 13.
73. *Ibid*; Ulrich Schneckener, 'Theory and Practice of European Crisis Management: Test Case Macedonia', *European Yearbook of Minority Issues*, 1 (2002).
74. European Council, 'The Stability Pact for Central and Eastern Europe', Paris, adopted by the European Council, 20–21 March 1995.
75. ESS, p. 7.
76. *Ibid*.
77. Biscop, 'The European Security Strategy in Context: A Comprehensive Trend' (note 72), p. 16.
78. NATO, 'The Alliance's Strategic Vision: The Military Challenge' ACO/ACT, Mons/Norfolk, 2004.
79. ESS, p. 1.
80. See for example Richard Gowan, 'Good Intentions, Bad Outcomes', *E!Sharp*, 1 (2009).

81. See Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power* (note 13).
82. Cf. Gilbert, 'Narrating the Process: Questioning the Progressive Story of European Integration' (note 35).
83. For an in-depth analysis of these operations, see Per M. Norheim-Martinsen, 'Our Work Here is Done: European Union Peacekeeping in Africa', *African Security Review*, Vol. 20, No. 2 (2011), pp. 17–28.
84. Xymena Kurowska, 'The Role of ESDP Operations', in Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaite (eds), *European Security and Defence Policy. An Implementation Perspective*, 25-42 (London: Routledge, 2009), 34.