

Unavoidable Tensions: The Liberal Path to Global NATO

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NATO's discussion over a new strategic concept is shaped by the quest for a redefinition of both the purpose and the strategic identity of the Atlantic alliance. Is the alliance still primarily a transatlantic alliance for collective defence directed against a common threat? Or is it developing into an organization of democratic states based on shared values, which acts wherever it is deemed necessary to assert the validity of the values and concepts of liberal world order? Among the member states of NATO a deep divide has opened up on such issues of strategic importance. It is evident that the alliance lacks a common understanding of NATO's strategic priorities in the 21st century. Hence, the debate on a new strategic concept is fundamentally characterized by dissent within the alliance – most notably regarding NATO's future global role.¹

In the 1990s controversial discussions were still going on between NATO states on the extent to which 'out of area' missions were part of the task of the alliance. This issue at least has become largely obsolete. The alliance has in fact paid the greatest attention to missions outside the immediate geographic area of the alliance in recent years: it maintains an increasingly complex mission in Afghanistan, supports the African Union in Sudan, or has provided humanitarian relief to Pakistan. Far more controversial is the question whether the increasing global commitment of NATO, i.e. the degree to which the alliance globalizes its operational spectrum of tasks and missions (henceforth functional globalization), should be accompanied by an institutional and consequently by a strategic globalization of the alliance as an organization; e.g. the issue of global membership (institutional globalization).² In the United States, in particular, the expansion of NATO to include 'like-minded states', that is liberal democracies in other parts of the world, is frequently understood to be a logical and consistent answer to the changes international order has been subject to since the end of the Cold War. For years United States representatives to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have been pleading for a globalized alliance, one that would develop from being a regional defence alliance into a globally oriented security institution and in principle also be open to liberal democracies outside the North Atlantic area.

In recent past many European states have been very reserved in their reactions to such American ideas. Up to the present most of them have rejected an extension of NATO to other areas of the world, pointing to the wording of the North Atlantic Treaty and the Euro-Atlantic character of the alliance. Before the alliance summit in Strasbourg and Kehl, German Chancellor Angela Merkel argued along these lines in the German parliament:

I cannot see a global NATO. The alliance is and remains primarily concentrated on the collective security of the North Atlantic partners. This of course also means that if need be it must also guarantee security outside the area of the alliance. However, it does not mean that states around the globe can become members, but rather that the member states from the transatlantic area must fulfil this guarantee.³

The argument here is that in the short term it may prove possible for Europeans to put off an in-depth discussion concerning the institutional globalization of NATO. To be sure, Global NATO is an anathema on Boulevard Leopold these days. Given its unpopularity in most of Europe, even supporters of the idea try to avoid the topic. However, this article argues that in the long term European states will have to deal actively with American strategic thought on both dimensions of Global NATO, i.e. the functional *and* institutional globalization of the alliance, if the future of transatlantic cooperation in the framework of a stable multilateral institution is considered to be important. Rather than just being the *idée du jour* of neoconservative thought, the idea of a value-based global alliance is embedded in a central line of tradition of Western security policy. It has gained impetus due to the crisis of (universal) multilateralism and will – in one way or another – almost certainly force its way back on the agenda of Western security policy due to a number of important strategic trends.

The aim of this contribution is, first, to place the recent debate on ‘NATO going global’ in its historical context and to work out the fundamental lines of tradition. The conceptual assumptions about a Global NATO as the breeding ground for or a first step towards a Concert of Democracies can be firmly localized in the tradition of liberal order building, namely of multilaterally oriented security policy cooperation within the framework of a community of liberal democracies whose intention is to extend this community further. It can be understood as the expression of a criticism of and frustration with an inclusive universal multilateralism encompassing both liberal and non-liberal states.

Building on the insights gained the article sheds, second, light on the strategic trends, which will most likely increase the attractiveness of the idea of a Global NATO in the medium and long term. First, changing perceptions of threat and security in Western democracies will mean that security policy becomes oriented less towards defence against military threats of a restricted, mainly regional kind but will develop instead in the direction of global risk management. Second, the transatlantic relationship is undergoing change on account of far-reaching geopolitical shifts in the international system. For the United States, the European continent no longer plays a central role in its security policy. An alliance restricting itself to the European continent will thus be of diminishing importance for American grand strategy. Third, many analysts expect that the rise of non-Western powers will in future also be reflected in the institutions and fundamental rules of the international community. Such a development can be expected to heighten tensions concerning the role of liberal values Western democracies consider to be absolute and contribute to increasing scepticism concerning a United Nations hampered by disagreements among liberal and non-liberal states.

In a third step, the article critically discusses the implications these proposals have for the future of the Atlantic alliance in particular and liberal order-building in general. It argues that the debate on Global NATO can be understood as a 21st-century version of a liberal debate on the way of promoting a liberal world order. As in earlier versions of this debate, there are daunting dilemmas that are inherent in different interpretations of liberal order. Evaluating the possible implications of a global alliance of democracies, the article concludes that totalizing liberal ideas may prove counterproductive to a more liberal order in the long run. Thus, the globalization agenda for the alliance has quite ambivalent implications at best. Western democracies will have to try to again console exclusive and inclusive variants in liberal order-building.

Global NATO, a Concert of Democracies and the Crisis of Universal Multilateralism

The idea of a Global NATO has been taken up regularly for several years now in the debates on the future of the North Atlantic alliance, but often without any clear definition. The concept of a Global NATO is used above all in connection with two leit-motifs – on the one hand the idea of the alliance becoming a global strategic actor (functional globalization) and on the other the notion of a NATO whose membership is in principle global (institutional globalization).⁴ The two dimensions can, however, scarcely be separated from one another but instead are intertwined.⁵ As will be shown, having accepted functional globalization of the alliance, reluctant allies will feel rising pressure to acquiesce in NATO's institutional globalization.

Although some member states still adopt a critical stance towards out-of-area operations, it is generally undisputed that the threats to security facing the alliance can nowadays hardly be delimited regionally, but potentially arise anywhere in the world. The operational level of NATO is thus in principle the entire globe.⁶ Or, as Ivo Daalder, American ambassador to the alliance, succinctly pointed out in Berlin: 'In NATO, we used to speak about "out of area" – that's what was beyond Alliance territory – and "in area" – Alliance territory itself. Well, today out of area is in area. It's the same thing.'⁷

Whereas the debate on regional restrictions for NATO has become obsolete now, a majority of members nonetheless continue to insist on a regional limitation of membership. Although the alliance has in fact initiated a variety of partnership programmes, all attempts hitherto undertaken to institutionalize cooperation have regularly failed – such as American plans in regard to a 'security providers forum' in the run-up to the NATO summit in Riga in 2006. Nonetheless the idea of a Global NATO in the sense of an alliance with global membership has been repeatedly propagated in recent years, particularly in the US. If it is accepted that the new security environment requires global commitment, supporters of this idea argue, then a regional security institution is no longer in keeping with the times. A 'global partnership' with non-European states – a possible middle path – is also seen as at best a first step towards a global alliance: 'Only a truly global alliance can address the global challenges of the day.'⁸ The blurring of distinctions between members and

non-members of NATO within the context of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation in Afghanistan is an indicator that in the wake of the alliances' accelerating functional globalization pressure towards increased co-operation and eventually, in some cases, the extension of membership offers to non-European countries will increase.

Indeed, operations such as ISAF have led a range of observers to argue that functional understandings of security are about to replace regional ones.⁹ This assertion is correct in so far as the idea of accepting new members in NATO can be justified in view of the global scope of NATO. To explain change in the alliance through emphasis on the functional dimension of the alliance, however, fails to recognize an essential point, which characterizes the debate on a 'globalized alliance'. Membership is ultimately not envisaged for those states, which are expected to make a particularly important (military or political) contribution to meeting the challenges of security policy, but rather for liberal democracies in other parts of the world. The decisive criterion for potential members is their democratic character. Global NATO thus refers not only to *functionally* justified cooperation but also to a *value-based* understanding of cooperation in security policy.

Advocates of a transformed NATO with global membership refer to its identity as that of a 'community of democracies'.¹⁰ From this perspective the core identity is the shared value basis and not the regional coherence of a 'Euro-Atlantic security community'. In the words of Daalder and Goldgeier: a 'shared commitment to shared values should be a more relevant determinant of membership than geography. Any like-minded country that subscribes to NATO's goals should be able to apply for membership in the alliance.'¹¹ If one accepts this line of argument an extension of membership to liberal democracies outside the North Atlantic area is only logical. Here the idea of a 'globalized NATO' ties up with the debate on the foundation of a global organization of liberal democracies. It can thus be seen as a first step towards a more ambitious reorganization of the institutional structure of world politics or the nucleus of a potentially universal community of liberal democracies.

Global NATO as a Nucleus of a 'Concert of Democracies'

Barely registered and taken seriously in Europe, a discussion on the foundation of a global organization has been ongoing in the United States under a variety of names, most recently during the electoral campaign for the American presidency in 2008, after the Republican candidate, Senator John McCain, took up the foundation of a League of Democracies as a central issue in his foreign policy agenda.¹² It is striking that some of the most influential proposals for a Concert or League of Democracies during the recent debate (for an overview of the most important proposals, see Table 1) originally came above all from the camp of the liberal internationalists.¹³ The integration of the United States in a cooperative structure with other liberal democracies is here specifically seen as a counter-model to the 'coalitions of the willing' of the Bush administration. Differences between this approach and the (continental) European discourse on the assessment of multilateral action are revealed above all in regard to the issue of universal multilateralism within the framework

of the United Nations: both the vision of a Global NATO and the idea of a global organization of liberal democracies are based on scepticism concerning the effectiveness and legitimacy of a universal organization, in which every state, regardless of its domestic regime, enjoys equal rights. There is at the most a difference in the degree of this scepticism. Rather than representing inherently different approaches to foreign policy, some neoconservatives and liberal internationalists act on a number of very similar assessments of the current deficiencies of international institutions. Their disagreements pertain to different policy options. Some of its advocates see in the proposals for a Global NATO or a global organization of liberal democracies the opportunity for finding a new basis for a multilateral grand strategy of the United States, for which institutionalized cooperation with other democracies is indispensable, but also insufficient. Others, however, understand it as the possibility to dispense the right of non-democratic states to a voice in important questions of international politics. This is nowhere clearer than in one of the central dilemmas of world politics: who can legitimately decide on the use of military force?

For liberal internationalists an organization of liberal democracies – including as far as possible members from all regions of the world – needs to be an option, should the Security Council be unwilling or unable to act. Such a body, they believe, is clearly more legitimate than all the non-institutionalized ‘coalitions of the willing’, when international legitimacy for action is required. Although the Final Report of the Princeton Project on National Security, which was produced under the chairmanship of two of the most prominent representatives of liberal internationalism, G. John Ikenberry and Anne-Marie Slaughter, emphasizes the necessity of a strong American role within the framework of NATO and the United Nations, it nonetheless makes it very clear that the United Nations can only maintain its importance in as far as it shows itself to be capable of reform. If a reform of the world organization proved impossible, it would be necessary to institutionalize a Concert of Democracies, which if need be could also legitimize the use of military force.¹⁴ For the authors of the Princeton Project such a Concert as an alternative body is the second-best option. It does not question the United Nations, in spite of the massive criticism directed against it. Similarly, McCain also emphasizes that the League of Democracies should not replace but only supplement the United Nations.¹⁵ In the end, however, these proposals show the potential consequences of the creation of a surrogate organization. If there is another organization that is seen as more effective and equally legitimate (as its proponents maintain), it is questionable why Western countries should turn to the UN at all.

Together with James Goldgeier, Ivo Daalder also refers to the role of a Global NATO as an alternative body in case the United Nations Security Council should not be willing to take decisions on the use of force. In a text co-authored with Robert Kagan, Daalder makes clear that ‘the decision to intervene . . . must lie with those who take seriously the notion of the responsibility to protect: the world’s democracies’ while criticising the UN Security Council ‘which includes two countries that are governed in ways that are antithetical to everything America stands for’.¹⁶ At this point, it becomes obvious that the proposals for the foundation of a global organization of liberal democracies find support across a wide political

spectrum in the United States, although the reasons behind it are varied.¹⁷ Some on the political right are hostile towards the United Nations and would prefer to see it replaced by an alternative body, in as far as the right of other countries to have a say in American decision-making is at all admitted.¹⁸ The idea of an ‘alliance of democracies’ can therefore also be plausibly communicated to this formation. The conservative publicist Charles Krauthammer succinctly stated this position in all clarity in an interview:

What I like about [the idea of the league of democracies], it’s got a hidden agenda. It looks as if it’s all about listening and joining with allies, all the kind of stuff you’d hear a John Kerry say, except that the idea here, which McCain can’t say, but I can, is to essentially kill the UN.¹⁹

For the political right an organization whose member states are liberal democracies is in any case the only conceivable constellation in which other states can influence the decisions of the United States. If international legitimacy is seen as important, a claim only some conservative thinkers reject, an enlarged alliance welcoming other democracies outside the traditional West or a new institution consisting of democracies from all continents may provide more legitimacy for international action. Thus, it comes as no surprise that proposals mostly refer to the same countries as the ‘usual suspects’ for becoming members of a globalized alliance. In addition to current alliance members, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, and Australia, the four Contact Countries of NATO, are usually mentioned as the first candidates for membership. Regularly, proponents of an enlarged alliance cite Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, India, Mexico, or the Philippines, sometimes also Israel or Colombia as potential members. Including non-Western democracies is seen as a means of countering concerns about a Western imperial agenda. However, it remains unclear whether these countries would be interested in joining such an institution.²⁰ The same is true for the actual structure and functions of the organizations proposed. In this regard, proposals remain very imprecise.

Thus, it seems justified to regard the inherent criticism of universal multilateralism as the unifying force. This is precisely the common ground behind the far-reaching support for increased cooperation of the world’s democracies. Melvyn P. Leffler and Jeffrey W. Legro have already referred to an ‘emerging consensus across the US political spectrum. . . on a Concert of Democracies’.²¹ The critiques of the proposals by a number of prominent scholars notwithstanding, there is good reason to believe that these ideas will continue to be influential in American strategic thought.²² Moreover, changing circumstances in world politics may lead to their resurrection.

The Roots of the Debate: Universal Multilateralism and its Liberal Critics

The kind of value-based multilateral and institutionalized cooperation between democratic states advocated by the proponents of Global NATO is by no means a product of the 21st century. Scepticism about the possibility of cooperation with non-democratic states is after all only the reverse side of liberal advocacy of increased cooperation among members of the ‘free world’. On the one hand,

TABLE 1
 PROPOSALS FOR A GLOBAL NATO OR A 'CONCERT OF DEMOCRACIES'²³

Name	Global NATO	NATO: An Alliance for Freedom	League of Democracies	Concert of Democracies	Concert of Democracies
Proponent(s)	Daalder/ Goldgeier (2006)	Fundación para el Análisis y los Estudios Sociales (2009)	John McCain (2007)	Ikenberry/ Slaughter (2006)	Daalder/ Kagan (2007)
Organizational form	Enlargement of NATO	Enlargement of NATO	New organization (no specification)	New organization (draft of Charter of a Concert of Democracies attached to the report)	New organization (no specification)
Rationale/Purpose	'Global threats cannot be tackled by a regional organization.'	NATO 'must rethink itself', 'NATO must become a veritable Alliance for Freedom, one whose primary objective is to defeat terror.'	'Our organizations and partnerships must be as international as the challenges we confront.' 'linking democratic nations in one common organization: a worldwide League of Democracies.'	'both as a vehicle to spur and support the reform of the United Nations and other global institutions and as a possible alternative to them.'	'alternative to multilateral paralysis and unilateral action—working with our democratic partners in NATO and around the world to meet and defeat the global challenges of our age.'
Scope of membership	'membership should in principle be open to non-European countries'. NATO states plus 'Australia, Brazil, Japan, India, New Zealand, South Africa, and South Korea'.	'free democratic powers, regardless of where they are located, provided they want to contribute to collective security and are able to do so' (Japan, Australia, Israel, South Korea)	'All democratic partners of the United States': NATO states plus 'Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines, and South Korea.'	'the United States, NATO and non-NATO European democracies, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand'; 'new democratic partners like India, South Africa, Brazil, and Mexico'	'not only Western democracies that have long cooperated within NATO and other security alliances but also India, Brazil, South Africa, and other democracies from around the world'

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TABLE 1
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Name	Global NATO	NATO: An Alliance for Freedom	League of Democracies	Concert of Democracies	Concert of Democracies
Functions and tasks	Collective self-defence	Multiple (e.g. preservation of freedom and democracy, combat Islamic jihadism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction)	Multiple (e.g. confrontation of environmental crises, provision of market access, impositions of sanctions, support for struggling democracies)	Enhancing 'security cooperation among the world's liberal democracies'	Authorization of the use of force
Legitimacy and relations to the United Nations	No substitute for the UN, but 'a more capable and legitimate adjunct to the UN by helping to implement and enforce its decisions'. May serve as surrogate institution for authorization of use of force	No reference to the UN, relationship remains unclear.	'This League of Democracies would not supplant the UN or other international organizations but complement them by harnessing the political and moral advantages offered by united democratic action.'	Possible 'alternative body', an 'equally legitimate and acceptable alternative'. In lieu of UN reform, it 'would provide an alternative forum for liberal democracies to authorize collective action, including the use of force, by a supermajority vote.'	More legitimate than the UN: 'Instead of the United Nations, the decision to intervene [...] must lie with those who take seriously the notion of sovereignty as responsibility: the world's democracies.'

shared liberal values are central for the development of a community and collective action; on the other hand, this in-group defines itself against an 'other', the non-democratic out-group.²⁴

The idea of an organization of democratic states can already be found in Immanuel Kant's tract *Perpetual Peace* – as a *foedus pacificum*, a federation for peace of 'free states', to which contemporary authors discussing NATO's globalization regularly like to refer: 'Might the allies someday conceive NATO as a growing federation of democracies, not confined to any particular geographic space, as Immanuel Kant appears to have envisioned in *Perpetual Peace*?'²⁵ Although the Kantian vision of a growing community of democratic states as a stepping-stone towards perpetual peace has inspired peace research up to the present day, it does not provide an 'instruction manual' on how the final goal of a liberal peace order can be achieved. It is not surprising that this 200-year-old tract can be used to justify a wide variety of liberal policies. Whereas some writers emphasize Kant's reference to the prohibition of intervention, others see in his mention of the 'unjust enemy' a precursor of a 'humanitarian intervention' or a 'just war'. It is also a disputed question whether a Kantian version of the United Nations could only consist of democracies. Whereas some argue that Kant's 'pacific federation' also accepts non-democratic states, others declare that this is out of the question.²⁶

Reading the German philosopher of the Enlightenment thus already reveals the ambivalence of liberalism,²⁷ which even today is still a source of essential tension within the liberal tradition and in particular turns upon the question of the way in which the democratic states should cooperate with the non-democratic states outside the zone of democratic peace. Basically two ideal types can be made out: on the one hand the idea that cooperation with non-democratic states within the framework of international organizations is indispensable and that the spread of liberal values should take place within these institutions by means of positive examples and international socialization; and on the other hand the idea that the democracies of the world should form exclusive organizations whose legitimacy and contributions to peace are much greater than those of organizations with mixed membership. Furthermore, these organizations should propagate the spread of liberal values in the non-democratic world, even when this may involve the use of force. One can definitely speak here of an inclusive and an exclusive liberalism when the emphasis is on the scope of membership, or of a 'liberalism of restraint' and a 'liberalism of imposition', when the focus is on the manner in which liberal values are to be spread.²⁸ All versions of liberalism, however, share the idea that liberal values possess a universal character and that the spread of democracy and human rights is a basic condition for a peaceful world order. In addition liberal states are seen on principle as possessing greater value, which on the positive side facilitates the formation of a security community within the framework of the democratic 'in-group' and creates sustainable peace, but on the negative side promotes delimitation in regard to the non-democratic out-group and can tend to encourage conflict.²⁹

This ambivalent character of liberalism can be seen not least in the historical genesis and development of the most important multilateral institutions created by Western democracies. If NATO is understood primarily as an anti-communist

bulwark, whose existence is owed solely to the East–West conflict, there is a danger of overlooking important elements of its previous history. Against the perceptions frequently encountered in public debate, it must be said that ‘Atlanticism’ did not first arise in the middle of the 20th century.³⁰ Ideas on how to bring the ‘experienced democracies’ on both sides of the Atlantic together as a common force already existed at the end of the 19th century and took on a concrete form at the latest shortly before the outbreak of the Second World War with Clarence Streit’s *Union Now*. Streit saw in the formation of an Atlantic Union the first step towards a gradually expanding federation, which would comprise democracies from all parts of the world and ultimately all humanity.³¹ While generally seen as a proponent of universal liberalism, American President Woodrow Wilson had also expressed thoughts for the post-war order after the First World War according to which the League of Nations should be restricted to democratic nations, because they alone were in a position to ensure a peaceful future.³² The logic of the League of Nations did, however, ultimately lead to a universal liberalism, because the organization did not on principle exclude non-democratic states. Two and a half decades later, the representatives of the various forms of liberalism presented conflicting views in the negotiations leading to the foundation of the United Nations. On the one hand it was argued that the aims of the United Nations could only be achieved with a membership limited to democracies; and on the other hand it was emphasized that only an inclusive organization could prevent the twofold division of the world into a zone of law and a zone of chaos.³³ With the formulation that all ‘peace-loving nations’ could become members of the United Nations the representatives of an inclusive liberalism successfully asserted their position, although its limits soon became obvious. Due to the experience made with the League of Nations, the Atlanticists concluded that the weaknesses of the universal system could only be overcome by means of increased cooperation between the democratic states:

Broadly speaking, Atlanticists were those... who believed that the viable solution to the problems of international instability and war was to induce the democratic nations to team up and become the nucleus of world order, the underpinning and supplement for the weaker universal system, and the engine of reform for the rest of the world in the direction of greater political and economic freedom.³⁴

But in contrast to the situation before the Second World War ideas for stronger inter-democratic cooperation were now realized in the form of the North Atlantic Pact. As a form of Atlanticism, NATO clearly saw itself as an organization whose claims passed beyond its existence as a regional defence alliance and justified this position with the weaknesses of the Charter system.³⁵ The ideas expressed at the time on an at first regionally anchored nucleus of a liberal world order, which would be sustained primarily by the Atlantic democracies, are echoed today in the demands for a global organization of democracies – with very similar justifications.³⁶

The alliance already emphasized its character as an organization of liberal democracies in the preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty, the foundation document of NATO: The Parties to this treaty [...] are determined to safeguard the freedom,

common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.³⁷ In this sense the North Atlantic alliance was from the outset not 'just another military alliance' that is held together by a common threat and dissolves again as soon as this threat disappears.³⁸ The character of NATO as the institutional core of that 'pluralistic security community' of liberal democracies can also explain the continuance and the eastern enlargement of the alliance after the end of the Cold War.³⁹ Against the predictions of the advocates of realism, NATO did not break up but developed into the central security institution of the whole of Europe. In the process the shared identity as a community of democratic states was used as a justification for the expansion eastwards and for the realization of the vision of 'Europe whole and free'.⁴⁰ The focus on the construction of an identity as a 'community of democracies' also may serve to explain the interventions in the Balkans since a failure to intervene would have massively called into question the shared liberal identity.⁴¹

However, the role of NATO since the end of the East–West conflict also illustrates the ambivalent liberal approach to cooperation within the framework of inclusive organizations. Indeed, in the first euphoria after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the belief was prevalent that the tension between an inclusively and an exclusively organized order had disappeared. The UN Security Council's authorization of the coalition in the Gulf War also gave cause for hope that a functioning system of collective security could be achieved. Liberal democratic values found expression in the official documents of the United Nations. The Clinton administration emphasized the role of democracy for security and development: National Security Advisor Anthony Lake proclaimed that '[t]he successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of enlargement – enlargement of the world's free community of market democracies', while Secretary of State Madeleine Albright proposed to create the Community of Democracies, a forum for the world's democracies, that should form a Democracy Caucus within the UN.⁴² Liberal democracies provided the lion's share of the troops, particularly for peace missions, and thus acted, so to speak, as the backbone of the 'international community' in the implementation of liberal values.⁴³ In Haiti and Sierra Leone, the Security Council even authorized interventions for the reinstatement of a democratically elected government.⁴⁴ In consequence, some authors already speak of the emergence of a new 'standard of civilization'.⁴⁵

However, the rise of liberal norms in the 1990s also had its limits. In the Kosovo crisis a NATO intervention was blocked in the Security Council by the threat of a Russian veto, so that alliance members finally decided to intervene without the approval of the United Nations. Liberal values perceived to be absolute prevailed over established procedural norms of the international community. Whereas most of the European states hastily denied that the decision could in any way create a precedent, American policy makers made it clear that they regarded the decision of a community of democratic states as perfectly legitimate. Why, the argument ran, should Western democracies accept the veto of authoritarian regimes against the use of force to prevent something worse from happening, particularly as they had reached their decision by consensus?⁴⁶ A few years later, diverging interpretations

of the moral and legal value of a decision by the United Nations Security Council also informed the debate in the run-up to the Iraq war. Contrary to prevailing wisdom in public debate, American foreign policy under the Bush administration was not principally defined by a preference for unilateralism. Rather, as usually, the domestic debate in the United States contrasted different versions of multilateralism.⁴⁷ While American diplomacy was certainly marked by more than a change in style and a new degree of assertiveness, it was based on an old narrative of liberal American exceptionalism that has shaped American identity and thus American foreign policy for throughout the last century. Central to this narrative is America's conceptualization as the 'leader of the free world' responsible for the promotion of democracy and human rights always oscillating between leading by example and active engagement. Often referred to as Wilsonianism, some ideas of the liberal purpose of American power have continuously guided its foreign policy during the 20th century, which historian Frank A. Ninkovich calls the Wilsonian century.⁴⁸ A number of recent studies have underlined that the 'Bush revolution' in foreign policy should not be interpreted as a radical break with the history of American foreign policy, but rather as the radicalization of some of its traditional elements.⁴⁹ To be sure, the means employed were different and the determination to act militarily without the blessings of the wider international community reached unprecedented levels – so that Pierre Hassner referred to it as 'Wilsonianism in boots'.⁵⁰ However, it is remarkable that many liberal internationalists had initially supported the war on Iraq – even without a UN mandate, drawing a comparison between the Kosovo intervention in 1999 and the looming conflict in Iraq 2003.⁵¹ In this regard the self-empowerment of the coalition in the run-up to the Iraq War was only the culmination of a liberal scepticism concerning the procedural limits imposed on the implementation of values that were felt to be absolute. Crucial are normative assumptions about a higher moral value of liberal democracies.⁵²

The tendency of liberal thought to produce some form of 'liberal hierarchy',⁵³ is also evident in proposals for a Global NATO or a Concert of Democracies. In this sense, a Spanish think tank refers to the alliance as a 'moral force of universal scope', while Daalder and Kagan claim that

Democracies know – in a way that nondemocracies do not – that real sovereignty, like real legitimacy, resides with the people rather than with the states. That is why the decision of states to intervene in the affairs in another state can be legitimate only if it is rendered by the people's democratically chosen representatives rather than the personal whims of autocrats or oligarchs.⁵⁴

Proposals for a global organization of democratic states that if need be may provide a seal of legitimacy for military action can thus be understood as the attempt to provide the institutional foundation for an exclusive multilateralism that is thought to defend liberal values. While unilateralists would not accept a binding of American power, proponents of such an organization on the contrary welcome American multilateralism within a community of democracies.

Thus, it is not surprising that prominent adherents of increased institutionalized cooperation among liberal democracies assumed important ranks in the Obama administration, too. While President Obama's position on the issue remains unclear, it is noteworthy that Daalder has assumed the post as America's permanent representative to NATO and Slaughter serves as the head of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff.⁵⁵ As some commentators have already noted, Obama's foreign policy may represent more continuity than often recognized. Specifically, the new administration's stance on international institutions appears to be pragmatic, guided by the idea of 'effective multilateralism'.⁵⁶ Given the liberal origins of Global NATO outlined above, it would come as no surprise if the idea continued to lurk in the background of American foreign policy in the years or decades to come.

NATO's Reformist Tier: 'Going Global or Going out of Business?'

The central role of the United States within the alliance notwithstanding, the idea of an enlarged NATO including liberal democracies from Asia and Oceania would be of limited significance if it were not supported by at least some of its alliance partners. Kagan even concedes that a Concert of Democracies or the like 'will not come into being unless the world's great democracies want it to. This is one idea that the US cannot impose'.⁵⁷ While many countries in the Alliance harshly refuse even minor steps towards a more global NATO, other countries accept the rationale behind the proposals. The debate on NATO's globalization is thus the starkest example of the emergence of a multi-tier alliance, whose member states are unable to agree on a common purpose for the Alliance.⁵⁸ In contrast to those who argue that NATO should return to its roots, that is, re-focus on the European continent, a solid 'reformist tier' supports the increasingly global agenda of the alliance. Seen from this perspective, the agenda preferred by the 'reformist tier' may also be understood as a return to NATO's roots as a capable liberal-minded enforcer of order for the international community in the absence of a functioning universal liberalism. The globalizers, ranging from the United States to the United Kingdom, Denmark, the Netherlands, and – to a certain degree – Canada, 'subscribe to the vision of an Atlantic Alliance intervening and integrating globally'.⁵⁹ Security policy elites in these countries have concluded that the alliance will only remain significant if it is able to take on new tasks on a global scale.⁶⁰ For them, the alliance should be an active provider of global security and liberal order. NATO should serve – in the words of a Canadian senator – as a much needed 'armed global defence and police force with serious strategic capacity'.⁶¹ Not surprisingly, these countries are those allies that have assumed most of the burden in Afghanistan. For them, the Afghan mission is not an exceptional task for NATO but rather a foreshadowing of things to come. It is no coincidence that those NATO members advocating that the alliance become a forceful global strategic actor are prepared to put large contingents at high-level risks whilst those that have adopted a more sceptical perspective on NATO's global ambitions have remained hesitant about putting their forces at risk in Afghanistan. Within the context of the Afghan operation, risk adversity correlates with the lack of strategic ambitions for NATO. Accordingly, the assignment of regional

responsibilities within ISAF has not been accidental. NATO forces assigned to the northern and western part of the country are facing a far lower degree of threat potential than those troops operating in southern and eastern Afghanistan, i.e. regions that constitute the heartlands of Pashtun nationalism and thus of the Afghan insurgency. Those alliance members hesitant of global strategic ambitions for NATO have consciously put their forces at lower degrees of risk than those wholeheartedly supporting the alliances global ambitions: a practice that has put a constant strain on alliance solidarity. Afghanistan has become the culmination point for friction within the alliance about NATO's strategic scope and ambitions.⁶²

The majority of countries supporting a global role for the Alliance are also open to the idea of inviting countries outside NATO's traditional region, although frequently they do not appear to be keen on extending full membership. Consensually they support intensified and formalized global partnerships.⁶³ In their view, the alliance is not so much defined by its geographical bounds, but rather by its common values. As will be shown in the remainder of this article, there are sound reasons to expect these countries to wield growing influence on the reform of the Atlantic Alliance.

Strategic Trends as Catalysts of the Debate on Global NATO

If proposals for a world wide organization of liberal democracies can be said to have a strong liberal pedigree that brings to light dilemmas inherent in liberal thought, a second group of questions immediately emerges: Why is it that advocates of increased institutionalized cooperation among liberal democracies appear to have renewed momentum nowadays? And why should we expect the idea of Global NATO to increasingly gain traction?

To be sure, it is probably counterintuitive to claim that such a project should become influential just when the power of the Western world appears to be in decline. However, combined with a number of long-term developments, both the rise of liberal values and decreasing Western dominance of world politics at the end of the 'liberal moment' will make the formation of such an organization more likely. Alternatively, the liberal order will most likely undergo a thorough process of informalization. Interestingly, countries such as Germany that have made their commitment to 'multilateralism' within common institutions a cornerstone of their foreign policy seem to argue in favour of such a development, i.e. the acceptance of coalitions of the willing as the favoured security instrument outside the North Atlantic region. A statement by a former German ambassador to NATO is telling in this regard:

Germany believes that cooperation should be pragmatic and flexible. We do not want a new 'global partnership' that would develop into an excessive and unwieldy format of more than 50 countries. We want each of our partners to be able to participate in operations and training programmes on a case-by-case basis, depending on the regional and thematic context and in accordance with their own wishes and aims. That is what we agreed on at Riga, and we

consider this to be a satisfactory outcome. To make it very clear and avoid any misunderstanding: *The core of the Alliance remains transatlantic.*⁶⁴

Thus, sticking to the concept of a 'transatlantic' alliance, such viewpoints only accelerate America's endorsement of coalitions of the willing for the solution of global problems. In addition, a range of strategic trends can be identified that will most probably serve as catalysts of the debate on Global NATO.

Conceptual Shift: From Regional Threats to Global Risks

First of all, Western security policy has undergone dramatic changes. For decades, NATO forces were focused on territorial defence against a potential Soviet threat. 'Security' was thus essentially understood in terms of territorial defence and with a predominant military dimension. Today, the defining trend for contemporary Western security policy is a shift from the provision of defence against clearly identifiable regional threats to the tackling of more diffuse global risks. Since risk management is an enduring engagement without clear (temporal, material or geographical) limits, it requires massive financial and military resources. Given the global nature of the challenges identified, a regional alliance may increasingly appear as an outdated framework when other liberal democracies could also reasonably be expected to contribute to burden-sharing on a global scale.⁶⁵ The most relevant risks Western societies today perceive as 'security concerns' for them are non-geographic.

The far-reaching consequence of the shift of Western security policy towards risk management has been subject to thorough scholarly analysis.⁶⁶ The new security environment clearly favours the emergence of flexible 'coalitions of the willing' instead of an institutionalized and often rigid security institution such as NATO.⁶⁷ Given the already present critiques in the United States proclaiming 'the end of alliances',⁶⁸ this background may render Global NATO more attractive to European NATO member states as an 'institutionalized' platform for multilateral initiatives, in which they can at least influence American decisions and institutionally bind the United States. Obviously, however, a NATO with regional focus will only play a minor role in the new security environment.

Geopolitical Shift: From the North Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean

Linked to this more general trend of changing perceptions of security is a second long-term development, which will also put pressure on European members resisting a more global role for the Atlantic Alliance. As the 'reformist tier' has long argued, NATO's continuous health will depend heavily on the worth the United States attaches to it.

Most commentators agree that 'the global center of political and economic gravity is shifting away from the North Atlantic toward Asia and the Pacific'.⁶⁹ While it can be debated whether the rise of new great powers such as China or India is sometimes overrated,⁷⁰ it is clear that the perception of it has already led the US to a substantial shift in focus.⁷¹ President Obama recently described himself as 'America's first Pacific president'.⁷² Europe, in general, has ceased to be a central concern for the United States – not least due to the fact that the continent

is probably more peaceful than ever. Daalder claims '[t]he end of America's Eurocentrism'.⁷³ New security challenges are expected to emerge outside of Europe, partly in the so-called 'crescent of crisis' from the Middle East to South Asia, partly in the Pacific region itself. Consequently, new partners in this region are of vital importance to the United States. Liberal democracies such as Japan, Australia, New Zealand and South Korea would add their political, financial and military capabilities to a 'global alliance'. These countries have already contributed to alliance missions and could increase NATO's leverage in the region. A membership in the alliance might potentially give these countries leverage in return for increased burden-sharing as well.⁷⁴ Although it is far from clear whether potential candidates would actually be interested in applying for membership at all, it is most likely that the by far most influential member state of the alliance, the United States, will continue to shift its strategic focus from the Atlantic to the Pacific area. Thus, if NATO is to remain – or regain the role of – the central alliance for the United States on a global scale, the North Atlantic Alliance will have to deal more actively with the Pacific region.

Ideological Shift: A Re-Ideologization of World Politics at the End of the Liberal Moment?

Thirdly, and probably most importantly, the end of the 'liberal moment' may render the vision of Global NATO more attractive. At first sight, this claim is surprising since the proposals – as shown above – can be understood as the radicalization of an exclusive liberalism. Given the 'rise of the rest' and the decline of the West, it could be argued that Western democracies will lower their ambitions for a more liberal order and renegotiate an international order that takes into account changing power relations. However, a thorough examination of the liberal origins of Global NATO provides a different answer.

Many scholars have referred to the post-Cold War period as the unipolar era with the United States being the sole superpower. While the unipolar moment may have adequately described the unique position of the United States, it overlooks the changing ideological context of world politics.⁷⁵ Above all, the 1990s can be referred to as the 'liberal moment' with an unprecedented acceptance of liberal values that were increasingly understood to be universal.⁷⁶ With the rise of liberal values, however, the impatience of many liberals relating to the procedural limits of realizing a more liberal order within universal institutions increased, too.

Some scholars already warn that the rise of authoritarian great powers will trigger a re-ideologization of international relations.⁷⁷ The influential pundit Robert Kagan has claimed that the new century will be shaped by 'global divisions between the club of autocrats and the axis of democracy'.⁷⁸ So far, the jury is still out on the question whether the liberal international order is able to accommodate or integrate rising (non-democratic) powers. While some theorists are quite optimistic that the liberal order will persist,⁷⁹ others have argued differently. Most realists, for example, expect a traditional great power rivalry between China and the United States – John Mearsheimer is almost certain that China's rise will not be peaceful.⁸⁰ In any case, universal institutions such as the United Nations will be under enormous

pressure. Given liberal scepticism concerning the effectiveness and legitimacy of a universal organization encompassing both democratic and autocratic states, it is likely that institutional frameworks such as a Global NATO or a global organization of democratic states will become more attractive to Western democracies. Since current deficits of the United Nations are often blamed on the participation of non-democracies, more assertive behaviour by rising autocratic states will probably heighten Western frustration with universal institutions. As a result, the idea of a global organization of liberal democracies may regain momentum.

Conclusion: The Vision of Global NATO and the Future of Liberal Order-Building

This article has argued that we need to understand the proposals for increased cooperation of liberal democracies within a common institution such as the Alliance as the contemporary version of one strand of liberal order-building.⁸¹ In a way, liberal frustration with universal multilateralism results in a renewed attempt to pursue a more exclusive liberal grand strategy based on common liberal values. Given the unprecedented rise of liberal values expressed by revolutionary developments in international law and institutions, new frictions in ideology will most likely result in a growing crisis of authority if the new assertiveness of rising authoritarian powers further complicates the implementation of liberal innovations such as the 'responsibility to protect'. Dealing with Iran, the Burmese dictatorship, or the genocide in Darfur already exemplifies tensions that may even become harsher. It is therefore likely that the inherent ambivalence within liberal thought – particularly in regard to the pursuit of exclusive or inclusive models of liberal order – will continue to preoccupy Western grand strategy and may also shape strategic discourse on the future of the alliance. Not least for this reason, a better understanding of the sources, opportunities, and limits of cooperation among liberal democracies is necessary. Given their relevance, proposals for a Global NATO or a Concert of Democracies deserve critical attention.

On the one hand, liberal democracies joining forces will be an indispensable factor for liberal progress. A world order, in which human rights play a central role, has to rely on the expansion and consolidation of liberal democratic governance.⁸² Even critical observers of Western security policy like the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas concede that 'the world organization will only live up to its task when all member states will have stripped off the only nominal democratic character of their constitutions'.⁸³ Empirical research on democracy and international institutions has also shown that in order to promote peace effectively, international organizations must consist of democracies, i.e. they have to be *interdemocratic organizations*.⁸⁴ Such organizations may also serve as a second-best solution for tackling challenges on a global level. As long as 'collective security' in the framework of the United Nations is marked by fundamental deficiencies, it will provoke liberal critique. Can an organization be legitimate, it is asked, which permits the violation of basic liberal norms, and hence acts ineffectively in this respect? And are liberal democracies not obliged to implement values they attribute

universal character to precisely when autocratic states oppose them?⁸⁵ Can the approval of states which, from a liberal point of view, lack legitimacy themselves be in any way decisive for the legitimacy of collective action at the international level?⁸⁶

Making liberal values the central point of departure for a transformed and globalized NATO would potentially revitalize an organization whose continuing existence will be in the interests of all its members. However, whether shared liberal values are sufficient for providing new 'political glue' in a multi-tier NATO, increasingly marked by strategic divergence among its members, is far from certain. NATO members will have to find consensus over a new strategic narrative for the organization: one that would reconcile differing levels of strategic ambition amongst its membership and in particular the degree to which the organization may engage as a global strategic actor, i.e. the extent and limits of the organization's functional and institutional globalization.

On the other hand, as already mentioned, liberal identity construction has always taken place against an 'other' and has thus produced new boundaries.⁸⁷ Too often, international action based on liberal intentions has proven counterproductive when the pursuit of absolute values led to illiberal results.⁸⁸ The project of Global NATO or even a Concert of Democracies may thus also trigger conflict and new boundaries in world politics, which may serve to strengthen coherence within the community of liberal democracies but also would come at the expense of broader international cooperation and thus potentially prove counterproductive: 'great power accommodation must precede liberal order-building. Paradoxically, unrestrained liberal order-building subverts the necessary precondition for its own realization'.⁸⁹ In addition, Western democracies do not have the luxury of always carefully choosing their partners since often cooperation of non-democracies is essential for tackling issues of global security that are vital to the future of international order.

If strategic worldviews of NATO member states continue to drift apart, pushing NATO's functional and institutional globalization will heighten tensions among the different tiers and thus contribute to a further disintegration of the Alliance. Unless member states are able to strike a new balance among the different tiers within the alliance, 'the global agenda which American policy favours could well be NATO's undoing'.⁹⁰ Without the build-up of an institutional set-up that allows for some degree of institutional flexibility while still maintaining a general consensus on NATO's strategic posture, the ambition of transforming the alliance into a global alliance is unlikely to result in a new strategic narrative that would ensure the vitality of the most important Western security institution.

Tensions between exclusive and inclusive variants of liberal order-building are here to stay. Neither a stubborn focus on universal institutions as the only framework for Western security policy will be adequate, nor will the foundation of a Concert of Democracies as the 'better United Nations' advance a more liberal order if it does not take into account its impact on the non-democratic world. Therefore, there will be no alternative to the daunting task of trying to console exclusive and inclusive forms of liberal order-building.

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NOTES

1. See also Jens Ringsmose and Sten Rynning, 'Come Home, NATO? The Atlantic Alliance's New Strategic Concept', DIIS Report 4, Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen, 2009; Andrew Cottey, 'NATO: Globalization or Redundancy?', *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 25, No. 3 (December 2004), pp. 391–408, p. 404: 'Most if not all of the potential global roles for NATO are highly controversial.'
2. The authors would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for urging them to make this distinction explicit.
3. Angela Merkel, 'Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel zum NATO-Gipfel vor dem Deutschen Bundestag am 26. März 2009 in Berlin.' Bulletin der Bundesregierung 39-1, 26 March 2009, authors' translation.
4. For an excellent survey see Trine Flockhart and Kristian S. Kristensen, 'NATO and Global Partnerships – to Be Global or to Act Globally?', DIIS Report 7, Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen 2008, p. 5. See also Emiliano Alessandri, 'Global NATO: Its Place in the Evolving Atlanticist Tradition', *Politics & Policy*, Vol. 37, No. 1 (February 2009), pp. 241–7, p. 241.
5. This can be seen already in the seminal article describing the vision of 'Global NATO': Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Goldgeier, 'Global NATO', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 85, No. 5 (September/October 2006), pp. 105–13.
6. The North Atlantic Council expressed this succinctly in Reykjavik in 2002: 'To carry out the full range of its missions, NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly to *wherever they are needed*, sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives.' NATO, 'Final Communiqué? Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council Held in Reykjavik on 14 May 2002', Press Release M-NAC-1(2002) 59, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-059e.htm> (accessed 16 October 2009), §5, italics added.
7. Ivo H. Daalder, 'Speech of the Permanent Representative of the United States to NATO at the Transatlantic Forum in Berlin, July 1, 2009', http://nato.usmission.gov/Speeches/Daalder_FA_Berlin070109.asp (accessed 16 October 2009).
8. Daalder and Goldgeier, 'Global NATO' (note 5), p. 106.
9. See, for example, Flockhart and Kristensen, 'NATO and Global Partnerships' (note 4), p. 12: 'Instead of geographical location, now functionality becomes the underlying logic.'
10. This is true, for example – independently of the government in power – for all NATO ambassadors of the US in recent years. See e.g. Daalder, 'Speech' (note 7); Kurt Volker, 'NATO is a Democratic Community Anchored in Shared Values', Washington, DC, 29 February 2008, <http://www.america.gov/st/peacesec-english/2008/March/20080307141758dmslahrellek0.2674524.html> (accessed 6 August 2009). This identity construction can, however, also be found among European advocates of a global alliance. See, for example, Fundación para el Análisis y los Estudios Sociales (ed.), *NATO: An Alliance for Freedom: How to Transform the Atlantic Alliance to Effectively Defend our Freedom and Democracies* (Madrid: Fundación para el Análisis y los Estudios Sociales, 2009), pp. 13, 40.
11. Daalder and Goldgeier, 'Global NATO' (note 5), p. 11.
12. John McCain, 'An Enduring Peace Built on Freedom', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 86, No. 6 (November/December 2007), pp. 19–34.
13. See above all G. John Ikenberry and Anne-Marie Slaughter, *Forging a World of Liberty Under Law: US National Security in the 21st Century. Final Paper of the Princeton Project on National Security* (Princeton, NJ: Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, 2006). Relating to NATO, the president of the Progressive Policy Institute argues that 'adding other leading democracies to NATO would reaffirm America's internationalist strategy, which sees our country's safety as tied ineluctably to cooperation with other free societies. It should be part of a broader strategy to update the 1940s-vintage institutions of collective security and liberal internationalism.' Will Marshall, 'Taking NATO Global: Memo to the New President', http://www.pponline.org/ppi_ci.cfm?knlgAreaID=450020&subsecID=900194&contentID=254815, (accessed 10 December 2009).

- See also G. John Ikenberry, 'Liberal Order Building', in Melvyn P. Leffler and Jeffrey W. Legro (eds), *To Lead the World: American Strategy after the Bush Doctrine* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 85–108, pp. 102–3, who argues for the creation of a Concert of Democracies as part of a renewed effort in 'liberal order building' revitalising America's commitment to a rule-based multilateral order.
14. Ikenberry and Slaughter, *Forging a World* (note 13), p. 25: '[We] should work with our allies to develop a new global institution dedicated to the principles underpinning liberal democracy, both as a vehicle to spur and support the reform of the United Nations and other global institutions and as a possible alternative to them.' It is striking that the draft of a Charter for this Concert is the only appendix to the Final Report. See *ibid.*, p. 61.
 15. McCain, 'An Enduring Peace' (note 12).
 16. Ivo H. Daalder and Robert Kagan, 'America and the Use of Force: Sources of Legitimacy', The Stanley Foundation, 2007, pp. 6, 8, respectively.
 17. On the striking bipartisan character of these proposals see Tobias Bunde, 'Das Völkerrecht der Demokratien: Ambivalenzen einer liberalen Weltordnung', in Christian Tomuschat (ed.), *Weltordnungsmodelle für das 21. Jahrhundert. Völkerrechtliche Perspektiven* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009), pp. 99–162, pp. 149–50; Ian Clark, 'Democracy in International Society: Promotion or Exclusion?', *Millennium*, Vol. 37, No. 3 (May 2009), pp. 563–81, pp. 573–8.
 18. For one telling example see Anne F. Bayefsky, 'Good-Bye UN, Hello United Democratic Nations', *The Jerusalem Post*, 18 September 2006.
 19. Charles Krauthammer, 'Interview with Fox News: March 27, 2008', <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,342137,00.html> (accessed 16 October 2009).
 20. Cf. Ronald D. Asmus (ed.), *NATO and Global Partners: Views from the Outside* (Washington, DC: The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2006). Australia, for example, seems rather reluctant to run for full-fledged membership in NATO. See Stephan Frühling and Benjamin Schreer, 'Australia's Last Priority. Lessons for the Future of NATO's Global Partnerships', *Internationale Politik – Global Edition*, Vol. 10, No. 11/22 (November/December 2009), pp. 46–50. In addition, the rejection of the idea of a Concert of Democracies (particularly by non-Western democracies) comes to mind. Cf. Thomas Carothers, 'A League of Their Own', *Foreign Policy*, No. 167 (July/August 2008), pp. 44–9; Kishore Mahbubani, 'The Dangers of Democratic Delusions', *Ethics & International Affairs*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Spring 2009), pp. 19–25.
 21. Melvyn P. Leffler and Jeffrey W. Legro, 'Dilemmas of Strategy', in Leffler and Legro, *To Lead the World* (note 13), pp. 250–76, p. 270.
 22. See e.g. Carothers, 'A League of Their Own' (note 20); Charles A. Kupchan, 'Minor League, Major Problems', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 6 (November/December 2008), 96–109.
 23. The table is based on the following works: Daalder and Goldgeier, 'Global NATO' (note 5); Fundación para el Análisis y los Estudios Sociales, *An Alliance for Freedom* (note 10) (the first version of this report was published in 2005, we refer to the revised edition); McCain, 'An Enduring Peace' (note 12); Ikenberry and Slaughter, *Forging a World* (note 13); Daalder and Kagan, 'America and the Use of Force' (note 16). See also Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, 'Democracies of the World, Unite', *The American Interest*, Vol. 2, No. 3 (January-February 2007), pp. 5–19, and Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, 'An Alliance of Democracies', *The Washington Post*, 23 May 2004, p. B07, respectively (in the latter, the authors refer to an 'Alliance of Democracies', a term that they get rid of later in order to underline that the proposal refers to more than just a military alliance).
 24. On the 'collective identity' construction of democracies see Thomas Risse-Kappen, 'Democratic Peace – Warlike Democracies? A Social Constructivist Interpretation of the Liberal Argument', *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 1, No. 4 (December 1995), pp. 491–517; Colin H. Kahl, 'Constructing a Separate Peace: Constructivism, Collective Liberal Identity, and Democratic Peace', *Security Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 2-3 (Winter 1998), pp. 94–144.
 25. Rebecca R. Moore, *NATO's New Mission: Projecting Stability in a Post-Cold War World* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007), p. 147, italics in the original.
 26. E.g., Fernando Tesón holds that a Kantian version of the UN would only allow democratic states. Cf. Fernando Tesón, 'The Kantian Theory of International Law', *Columbia Law Review*, Vol. 92, No. 1 (January 1992), pp. 53–102. For a critical account of the appropriation of Kant from different directions see Bunde, 'Das Völkerrecht der Demokratien' (note 17), p. 141.
 27. See, for example, Antonio Franceschet, 'Sovereignty and Freedom: Immanuel Kant's Liberal Internationalist "Legacy"', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 2 (April 2001), pp. 209–28; Thomas

- C. Walker, 'Two Faces of Liberalism: Kant, Paine, and the Question of Intervention', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 52, No. 3 (September 2008), pp. 449–68.
28. Georg Sørensen, 'Liberalism of Restraint and Liberalism of Imposition: Liberal Values and World Order in the New Millennium', *International Relations*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (September 2006), pp. 251–72. Similarly but with a more normative line of argument Mlada Bukovansky, 'Liberal States, International Order, and Legitimacy: An Appeal for Persuasion over Prescription', *International Politics*, Vol. 44, No. 2-3 (March/May 2007), pp. 175–93. On the question of the scope of membership Simpson distinguishes between (inclusive) 'Charter liberalism' and (exclusive) 'anti-pluralist liberalism'. See Gerry J. Simpson, 'Two Liberalisms', *European Journal of International Law*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (June 2001), pp. 537–71.
 29. For an excellent literature review scrutinizing the state of the art in democratic peace research see Anna Geis and Wolfgang Wagner, 'From Democratic Peace to Democratic Distinctiveness: A Critique of Democratic Exceptionalism in Peace and Conflict Studies', CLPE Research Paper 39, 2008.
 30. See above all Alessandri, 'Global NATO' (note 4), pp. 245–6.
 31. Clarence K. Streit, *Union Now: A Proposal for a Federal Union of the Democracies of the North Atlantic* (New York & London: Harper & Brothers, 1939). Streit was moreover interested in more than a democratic league; what he wanted was a veritable 'union'.
 32. See Michael C. Desch, 'America's Liberal Illiberalism: The Ideological Origins of Overreaction in U.S. Foreign Policy', *International Security*, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Winter 2007/2008), pp. 7–43, p. 17.
 33. For details see Gerry J. Simpson, *Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 312.
 34. Alessandri, 'Global NATO' (note 4), p. 246.
 35. See in detail *ibid.*
 36. The reference to the fundamental values of NATO in the preamble is often mentioned nowadays by the advocates of a value-based alliance. See, for example, Fundación para el Análisis y los Estudios Sociales, *An Alliance for Freedom* (note 10), p. 46.
 37. The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington, DC, 4 April 1949, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm (accessed 20 October 2009).
 38. Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on US Foreign Policy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 223. See also Mary N. Hampton, 'NATO at the Creation: U.S. Foreign Policy, West Germany and the Wilsonian Impulse', *Security Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 3 (September 1995), pp. 610–56. For a diverging view see David G. Haglund, 'The Case of the Missing Democratic Alliance: France, the "Anglo-Saxons" and NATO's Deep Origins', *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 25, No. 2 (August 2004), pp. 225–51.
 39. See e.g. Frank Schimmelfennig, 'NATO Enlargement: A Constructivist Explanation', *Security Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 2-3 (Winter 1998), pp. 198–234.
 40. There is also substantial literature on this point. See, among others, Frank Schimmelfennig, *The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
 41. For a detailed account see Veronica M. Kitchen, 'Argument and Identity Change in the Atlantic Security Community', *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 40, No. 1 (February 2009), pp. 95–114, pp. 106–10. Cf. only the wording of the Statement on Kosovo. Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, DC, 23–24 April 1999, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-062e.htm> (accessed 16 December 2009): '1. The crisis in Kosovo represents a fundamental challenge to the values for which NATO has stood since its foundation: democracy, human rights and the rule of law. It is the culmination of a deliberate policy of oppression, ethnic cleansing and violence pursued by the Belgrade regime under the direction of President Milosevic. We will not allow this campaign of terror to succeed. NATO is determined to prevail.'
 42. Anthony Lake, 'From Containment to Enlargement', Address at the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) of the Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC, 21 September 1993. On the mixed experiences made with the Community of Democracies see esp. Theodore J. Piccone, 'Democracies: In a League of Their Own? Lessons Learned From the Community of Democracies', Foreign Policy at Brookings Policy Paper, No. 8 (October 2008), Washington, DC; Tobias Bunde, 'The Democratic Community. Institutionalizing a More Liberal Order', *International Affairs Review*, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Fall 2008), pp. 1–29.
 43. On the established democracies as the decisive source of support for the 'international peace operations community' see Donald C. F. Daniel and Leigh C. Caraher, 'Characteristics of Troop Contributors to Peace Operations and Implications for Global Capacity', *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 13, No. 3 (September 2006), pp. 279–315, pp. 303–5; on the liberal orientation of contemporary peace-building

- see Roland Paris, 'International Peacebuilding and the "Mission Civilisatrice"', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 4 (October 2002), pp. 637–56.
44. See Gregory H. Fox, 'Democratization', in David M. Malone (ed.), *The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004), pp. 69–84.
 45. Brett Bowden, 'In the Name of Progress and Peace: The "Standard of Civilization" and the Universalizing Project', *Alternatives*, Vol. 29, No. 1 (January 2004), pp. 43–68. For an English School perspective on the rise of the norm of liberal democracy see the work of Ian Clark who underlines the 'deep-seated tension between "rule-rationality" and "value-rationality" in international society' and the challenge of 'a solidarist view of rightful membership' and the "pluralist procedures for sanctioning collective international action'. Clark, 'Democracy in International Society' (note 17), p. 566.
 46. In the case of Kosovo, then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright argued that NATO would always act in accordance with the principles of the UN, while handling the question of authorization by the UN Security Council on a case-to-case basis. See Mary E. O'Connell, 'The UN, NATO, and International Law After Kosovo', *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (February 2000), pp. 57–89, p. 79.
 47. Martha Finnemore, 'Fights About Rules: The Role of Efficacy and Power in Changing Multilateralism', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 31, Supplement 1 (December 2005), pp. 187–206, p. 203.
 48. Frank. A. Ninkovich, *The Wilsonian Century: US Foreign Policy Since 1900* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999). See Jonathan Monten, 'The Roots of the Bush Doctrine', *International Security*, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Spring 2005), pp. 112–56, p. 155: 'Despite what the recent public debate over Iraq might lead one to believe, democracy promotion is not a new idea in US foreign policy; in fact, it is probably the oldest.'
 49. Cf. Desch, 'America's Liberal Illiberalism' (note 32); Monten, 'The Roots' (note 48).
 50. Pierre Hassner, 'The United States: The Empire of Force or the Force of Empire?', Chaillot Paper 54, Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2002, p. 43.
 51. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, 'Good Reasons for Going Around the UN', *The New York Times*, 18 March 2003, p. A33. For Slaughter's refusal to refer to Bush's foreign policy as Wilsonian and her defence of a liberal internationalist Wilsonianism, see Anne-Marie Slaughter, 'Wilsonianism in the Twenty-first Century', in G. John Ikenberry *et al.* (eds.), *The Crisis of American Foreign Policy: Wilsonianism in the Twenty-first Century* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), pp. 89–117, p. 91.
 52. For an analysis of the personal beliefs of Tony Blair and George W. Bush see Jeremy Moses, 'Liberal Internationalist Discourse and the Use of Force: Blair, Bush and Beyond', *International Politics*, Vol. 47, No. 1 (January 2010), pp. 26–51.
 53. Christian Reus-Smit, 'Liberal Hierarchy and the Licence to Use Force', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 31, Supplement 1 (December 2005), pp. 71–92.
 54. Fundación para el Análisis y los Estudios Sociales, *An Alliance for Freedom* (note 10), p. 48; Daalder and Kagan, 'America and the Use of Force' (note 16), p. 8. See also Thomas S. Mowle and David H. Sacko, 'Global NATO: Bandwagoning in a Unipolar World', *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 28, No. 3 (December 2007), pp. 597–618, p. 612. This is an interpretation that is prominent not only in the US. See e.g. the Statement of Principles of the Henry Jackson Society based in London, arguing for a 'forward strategy' of promoting liberal values. A belief in the moral superiority and the necessity of military strength appears to be central. Cf. <http://www.henryjacksonsociety.org/content.asp?pageid=35> (accessed 14 January 2010). Some authors hold that these beliefs could be central for the foreign policy of newly elected Conservative UK prime minister David Cameron. See Klaus Dodds and Stuart Elden, 'Thinking Ahead: David Cameron, the Henry Jackson Society and British Neo-Conservatism', *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, Vol. 10, No. 3 (August 2008), pp. 347–63.
 55. See http://nato.usmission.gov/Bio/Ambassador_Daalder_Bio.asp; <http://www.state.gov/s/p/115437.htm> (accessed 14 January 2010).
 56. On the differences between prevailing conception of 'multilateralism' in Europe and the US see e.g. Bruce Jones, 'The Coming Clash? Europe and Multilateralism under Obama', in Álvaro de Vasconcelos and Marcin Zaborowski (eds), *The Obama Moment: European and American Perspectives* (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2009), pp. 63–77.
 57. Robert Kagan, 'The Case for a League of Democracies', *Financial Times*, 13 May 2008.
 58. See in detail Timo Noetzel and Benjamin Schreer, 'Does a Multi-tier NATO Matter? The Atlantic Alliance and the Process of Strategic Change', *International Affairs*, Vol. 85, No. 2 (March 2009), pp. 211–26.
 59. Ringsmose and Rynning, 'Come Home NATO?' (note 1), p. 18. It should be noted that they do not include Canada. While Canada has refused to send troops to Iraq, it is one of the most important contributors to ISAF.

60. This becomes evident in a report by the House of Commons Defence Committee, 'The Future of NATO and European Defence: Ninth Report of Session 2007–08', The Stationery Office Limited, London, 2008, p. 17: 'Given the global nature of the threats we face, we believe there is no alternative to the Alliance fulfilling a global role. Its willingness and ability to act on a global basis to tackle threats where they arise is fundamental to NATO's continued relevance. If NATO limits itself to a regional role in defence of the territory of the North Atlantic area alone, its value will be diminished, particularly to the United States, and its future will be in doubt.'
61. Hugh Segal, 'Renovating and Updating the NATO Charter and Strategy: A Realistic Build on Strength', Ottawa, 6 October 2009, <http://sen.parl.gc.ca/hsegal/speech.php?ID=180> (accessed 5 November 2009).
62. See also Timo Noetzel and Benjamin Schreer, 'NATO's Vietnam? Afghanistan and the Future of the Atlantic Alliance', *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 30, No. 3 (December 2009), pp. 529–47.
63. Cf. House of Commons Defence Committee, 'The Future of NATO' (note 60), p. 70.
64. Edmund Duckwitz, 'NATO after the Riga Summit. Speech by Ambassador Dr. Edmund Duckwitz at a dinner roundtable discussion hosted by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation', Brussels, 6 December 2006, http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_9735-544-2-30.pdf, accessed 6 August 2009, emphasis in the original.
65. Daalder and Goldgeier, 'Global NATO' (note 5), p. 109.
66. See Mikkel V. Rasmussen, 'Reflexive Security: NATO and International Risk Society', *Millennium*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (June 2001), pp. 285–309; Christopher Coker, *Globalisation and Insecurity in the Twenty-first Century: NATO and the Management of Risk*. Adelphi Paper 345 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Michael J. Williams, *NATO, Security and Risk Management: From Kosovo to Kandahar* (London: Routledge, 2009).
67. See Williams, *NATO* (note 66), p. 7. NATO's limited role in the fight against terrorism is a case in point. See Renée de Nevers, 'NATO's International Security Role in the Terrorist Era', *International Security*, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Spring 2007), pp. 34–66.
68. Rajan Menon, *The End of Alliances* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). See also Ted G. Carpenter, 'NATO at 60: A Hollow Alliance', Cato Institute, Washington, DC, 2009.
69. Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, 'An Agenda for NATO: Toward a Global Security Web', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 88, No. 5 (September/October 2009), pp. 2–20, p. 11.
70. For a critical discussion see Christopher Layne, 'The Waning of US Hegemony – Myth or Reality? A Review Essay', *International Security*, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Summer 2009), pp. 147–72.
71. A good illustration for this perception can be found in the NIC report, which identifies the rise of new great powers as a major trend for US security policy. See National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2008), pp. 29–36.
72. Barack Obama, 'Remarks by President Barack Obama at Suntory Hall', Tokyo, 14 November 2009, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-suntory-hall> (accessed 14 November 2009).
73. Ivo H. Daalder, 'Are the United States and Europe Heading for Divorce?', *International Affairs*, Vol. 77, No. 3 (July 2001), pp. 553–67, p. 558. See also Daalder, 'Speech' (note 7): 'The North Atlantic area is no island. It is submerged in a globally integrated world. Today, the right lens for transatlantic relations is not so much American or European – it is global. And NATO, too, must increasingly view itself not only from a transatlantic perspective, but a global perspective.'
74. Increasing cooperation will almost certainly raise the issue of a reformed NATO decision-making structure. See Anders Fogh Rasmussen, 'Remarks by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the Second Strategic Concept Seminar', Brdo, 13 November 2009, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_59065.htm (accessed 16 November 2009): 'As partners take on more demanding and dangerous missions, they obviously seek more involvement in NATO's planning, consultation and decision shaping. Is our political-military framework to involve partners still adequate to the task?'
75. Charles Krauthammer, 'The Unipolar Moment', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 70, No. 1 (1990/1991), pp. 23–33.
76. On the 'liberal moment' see Ian Clark, *The Post-Cold War Order: The Spoils of Peace* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
77. Azar Gat, 'The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 86, No. 4 (July/August 2007), pp. 59–69.
78. Robert Kagan, *The Return of History and the End of Dreams* (London: Atlantic Books, 2008), p. 76.
79. See especially G. John Ikenberry, 'The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 1 (January/February 2008), pp. 23–37.
80. John Mearsheimer, 'The Rise of China Will Not Be Peaceful at All', *The Australian*, 18 November 2005.

81. On 'liberal order building', see above all Ikenberry, 'Liberal Order Building' (note 13).
82. On the relationship between the guarantee of human rights and liberal democracy see Anthony J. Langlois, 'Human Rights without Democracy? A Critique of the Separationist Thesis', *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol. 25, No. 4 (November 2003), pp. 990–1019; Bruce J. Bueno de Mesquita, 'Thinking Inside the Box: A Closer Look at Democracy and Human Rights', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 49, No. 3 (September 2005), 439–57.
83. Jürgen Habermas, *Der gespaltene Westen* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2004), p. 139, authors' translation.
84. See Andreas Hasenclever and Brigitte Weiffen, 'International Institutions Are the Key: A New Perspective on the Democratic Peace', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 4 (October 2006), pp. 563–85; Jon C. Pevehouse and Bruce M. Russett, 'Democratic International Governmental Organizations Promote Peace', *International Organization*, Vol. 60, No. 4 (October 2006), pp. 969–1000.
85. As an example for such a demand see, for example, the recently discussed theses of Daniel J. Goldhagen, 'Ending Our Age of Suffering', *The New Republic*, 21 October 2009, pp. 26–8, p. 28, who calls upon 'the world's democracies, led by the United States' to undertake bombardments in cases of genocide, because he regards the United Nations as being fundamentally incapable of reform.
86. For a detailed account see Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane, 'The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions', *Ethics & International Affairs*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (December 2006), pp. 405–37, above all p. 413. For a criticism of the 're-hierarchization' of the international community see Reus-Smit, 'Liberal Hierarchy' (note 53). One can by all means consider the proposals for a global organization to be the spearhead of this development. Since an evaluation of these proposals is not the focus of this article reference is made here to the following critical treatments: Bunde, 'Das Völkerrecht der Demokratie' (note 17); Mahbubani, 'The Dangers of Democratic Delusions' (note 20); Thomas Carothers, 'Is a League of Democracies a Good Idea?', Carnegie Endowment of International Peace, Washington, DC, 2008.
87. On the normative dilemmas of identity building see Bahar Rumelili, 'Interstate Community-Building and the Identity/Difference Predicament', in Richard M. Price (ed.), *Moral Limit and Possibility in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 253–80.
88. See Christopher Daase, 'Democratic Peace – Democratic War: Three Reasons Why Democracies Are War-prone', in Anna Geis, Lothar Brock, and Harald Müller (eds), *Democratic Wars. Looking at the Dark Side of Democratic Peace* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 74–89. It can be questioned that democracies behave 'better' than non-democracies in general. See José E. Álvarez, 'Do Liberal States Behave Better? A Critique of Slaughter's Liberal Theory', *European Journal of International Law*, Vol. 12, No. 2 (April 2001), pp. 183–246.
89. Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, 'The Unravelling of the Cold War Settlement', *Survival*, Vol. 51, No. 6 (December 2009), pp. 39–62, p. 55.
90. Mark Webber, 'NATO. The United States, Transformation and the War in Afghanistan', *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, Vol. 11, No. 1 (February 2009), pp. 46–63, p. 47.