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Publisher Routledge

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Contemporary Security Policy

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:

<http://www.informaworld.com/smpj/title-content=t713634773>

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Online Publication Date: 01 August 2009

To cite this Article Krause, Keith and Milliken, Jennifer(2009)'Introduction: The Challenge of Non-State Armed Groups',Contemporary Security Policy,30:2,202 — 220

To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/13523260903077296

URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13523260903077296>

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Introduction: The Challenge of Non-State Armed Groups

KEITH KRAUSE AND JENNIFER MILLIKEN

Non-state armed groups pose a direct challenge to the Westphalian project of constructing sovereign states that possess both the Weberian legal and practical monopoly over the legitimate use of force within a given territory. They have traditionally been considered relevant to scholars and to the international community only when a group becomes capable of directly challenging this monopoly. This restricted vision of the scope and significance of armed groups is essentially limited to 'state-like' actors engaged as insurgents in a civil war-like context, and is increasingly distant from the reality of contemporary armed groups and the conflicts in which they engage.¹ The world is populated by armed groups that do not mount direct challenges to the Weberian state, but that are still relevant for their violent and destructive capabilities, the predatory and rent-seeking behaviour in which they engage locally, regionally, and trans-nationally, and the damage that they inflict on human rights, public security, the rule of law, and prospects for inclusive social and economic development. Many so-called 'non-state' armed groups are also deeply entangled with state power and state agents in complex ways. Thus, the label 'non-state' represents a barrier to understanding their multiple roles and functions.

From a social science perspective, the research agenda for armed groups should thus be broadened not only in regards to which groups to study, but also how – with what frameworks, methods and approaches – we should study them. Current work, by scholars such as Stathis Kalyvas and Jeremy Weinstein, focuses mainly on micro-level and modelling approaches to the dynamics of armed groups.² There are, however, other approaches in our social science toolbox. Ethnographic fieldwork can give us insights into how armed groups build support, operate, and use violence, adding depth to more conventional approaches. Process reconstruction within a sociological framework can enrich our knowledge of the political context of armed group formation, and how different contexts support the emergence of different types of armed groups. A political economy approach can help us understand better how the 'sinews of war' are brought together by non-state armed groups. And grasping the broader implications of armed groups for contemporary warfare requires an historical perspective on the state's relationship to armed groups.³ Only if we can grasp how armed groups are related to the states in which they take form, and how states are shaped through conflict with non-state armed actors, can we have gain perspective on the evolution of conflict and future trends in armed violence, and, perhaps most importantly, how these trends could be accentuated, checked, or reversed.

The different contributions to this volume represent these various approaches, and touch on a variety of specific themes, including non-state armed groups and the

changing nature of warfare, case studies of non-state armed groups, the economic dimensions of contemporary armed conflicts, and forms of engagement with armed groups. They are diverse in subject matter, method and approach, which is not surprising given the different disciplines and approaches brought to bear by the authors. But they share a common view that the study of non-state armed groups should be expanded and expansive, in order to foster a better understanding of some of the dynamics that underpin the use of force and violence in contemporary world politics. This introduction will survey some of the central themes, highlight their significance for our understanding of the dynamics of armed groups, and provide an overview of contributions to the volume.

Non-State Armed Groups: Broadening the Scope of Inquiry⁴

The basic definitions of non-state armed groups – both as objects of study and subjects for engagement – differ between international lawyers, social scientists from different disciplines, and practitioners from international governmental and non-governmental organizations. Among scholars, traditional definitions revolve around the idea that an armed group is ‘an armed, non-state actor in contemporary wars . . . [with] a minimal degree of cohesiveness as an organization (to be distinguished as an entity and to have a name, to have some kind of leadership) and a certain duration of its violent campaign’.⁵ This understanding finds an echo in (and is conceptually linked to) the equally narrow legalistic focus on groups that can be considered subject to international humanitarian law (IHL). IHL, which ‘imposes obligations on certain parties to an internal armed conflict irrespective of any recognition granted by the state they are fighting against or by any third state’, is crucial for determining which armed groups can be treated as subject to IHL.⁶ The threshold conditions that are generally accepted include: the armed forces or organized armed groups are under responsible command; they are able to exercise control over territory to carry out sustained and concerted military operations; and they are able to implement Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions. The effect of these threshold conditions is to restrict formal engagement to armed groups fighting in internal wars. The jurisprudence on the issue explicitly excludes ‘internal armed conflict’ banditry and other criminal acts such as riots, internal disturbances, and unorganized and short-lived insurrections.⁷

Nonetheless, other definitions can be found, both among practitioners and scholars. For example, the working definition used by the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), which is responsible for organizing the disarmament and disbanding of armed groups, estimates that there are 1,800 armed groups operating in Afghanistan alone, most of which would not meet the narrow definitions above.⁸ In Indonesia, a large proportion of armed groups are effectively paramilitary organizations affiliated (loosely or tightly) with different political factions; sometimes working with state actors, sometimes in opposition to the state.⁹ It is hardly surprising therefore that there is no consensus on a definition of non-state armed groups, or on which groups are of interest (and to whom).¹⁰

At the risk of over-simplification, discussions on which armed groups should be of interest can be summarized in terms of five categories of armed groups: (1) insurgent groups; (2) militant groups; (3) urban gangs and warlords; (4) private militias, police forces and security companies; and (5) transnational groups.¹¹ Although a taxonomy is not a definition, it is a step towards a broader conceptualization of armed actors.

Insurgent Groups

While the category of insurgent does not carry binding force in international law, both practitioners and researchers working on armed groups still mainly focus on groups having effective control over some part of a state's territory, and possessing the organizational means to carry out sustained attacks against state forces. This traditional concept of armed groups is also associated with notions of armed groups as 'proto-states' or 'states-in-formation': these groups seek to defeat the regime against which they are fighting, or through secession in a national liberation movement. It also covers armed groups which may not be seeking state takeover or secession, but which are engaged in an 'internal war', or a violent mass confrontation with a certain continuity and participation of the forces of a state on one side.

Militant Groups

These are groups that are seeking to redress perceived political and economic injustices through violent means. They endure organizationally and in terms of quasi-regular attacks against the state (and often, other groups). But they may not have effective ongoing control over a base region. The level of killing in which they are involved does not exceed (or has not yet exceeded) the violence threshold by which insurgencies are usually demarcated.

Warlords, Urban Gangs and Criminal Networks

Groups whose main purpose appears to be the pursuit of illicit profits through control over natural resources, drugs, trafficking in people, kidnapping, etc., have traditionally been left to the field of criminologists. They have, however, become increasingly significant in internal war situations, as well as in so-called non-war contexts where the levels of violence involved can approach or surpass the threshold of deaths in war and armed conflicts.¹²

Private Militias, Police Forces and Security Companies

Both powerful and weak states alike are increasingly turning to private security companies to supplement, or sometimes practically to replace, state militaries and police forces. This accompanies the growing recourse by the private sector to 'security for hire' actors who provide security to company or private property and operations. What is often neglected in this analysis, however, are the local and community based militias and police that are also being formed in crime- and conflict-ridden areas. As is noted by the contribution of Susanne Schmeidl and Masood Karokhail to this volume, there has even been experimentation in Afghanistan to promote a traditional form of community police, the *Arbakai*, in order to provide the public order that the Afghan state cannot achieve.

Transnational Groups

This category includes al Qaeda and similar armed groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah that profess millennial, religious and other ideological goals, and which are networked across different states and territories in their operations. The violence perpetrated by these groups is intentionally spectacular and terror-provoking, even if in actual numbers of deaths the groups are far less destructive than traditional insurgents.

Traditional interest in insurgent groups has many roots, including the 20th century transition to internal war as the dominant mode of warfare, the brutality of some internal wars, and the post-Cold War turn towards human security and 'the responsibility to protect' by Western governments, UN agencies, and non-governmental organizations.¹³ Why, however, should we broaden the agenda beyond insurgent groups in the way this taxonomy implies?

A first reason is that the human security consequences of the 'other' forms of organized violence are actually now more significant than those created by internal wars. The largest global estimate of recorded instances of violent death in war (international and intrastate combined) is 52,000 persons per year. Meanwhile, on average approximately 500,000 persons die each year in non-war violence, and a large proportion of these deaths involved non-insurgent armed groups of one sort or another.¹⁴ In Central America, for example, urban gang violence (including gang killings, state repression, and gang responses to such action) is responsible for most of the region's violent deaths. The levels of violence in the region are also as high as during the internal wars of the 1980s.¹⁵

Second, case studies of different types of armed groups indicate that fundamentally, the dynamics that fuel the resort to violence do not necessarily differ across different types of armed groups. Almost always, at the root is a crisis in the state, out of which particular alienated groups exit (or are kicked out) and turn to violence. Alternatively, those groups in political opposition, or those groups excluded from the political system, mobilize with arms. As Anthony Vinci points out, 'As the state weakens, armed groups – non-state organizations that have the capacity for systematic military action – can become relatively more powerful.'¹⁶ The similarities and interconnections between different types of armed groups and their use of violence can only be understood, however, if the scope of inquiry into armed groups is broadened beyond traditional (and relatively large-scale) insurgent groups. Such understanding is not only academic; it can have considerable relevance for policies and programs of early warning, disarmament, post-conflict reconstruction, and development assistance.

Third, there are good reasons to explore the adequacy of contemporary international legal frameworks in addressing the humanitarian and human rights obligations (or not) of different kinds of non-state armed groups. The recent American use of the category 'unlawful enemy combatant' to cover many individuals detained by US forces highlighted the difficulties encountered in using the traditional framework and distinctions in the circumstances of contemporary conflict.¹⁷ Finally, there are also practical reasons for attempting to understand whether and how the nature, scope and aims of a non-state armed group shape the conditions under which one

should or could engage with it to promote crisis prevention, conflict management, and demobilization, or broader efforts to address the causes and consequences of armed violence and promote development.¹⁸

Studying Armed Groups

Contributors to this volume include urban sociologists, development scholars, anthropologists and political scientists (with parenthetically American, British, and Continental European training). As a genuinely inter-disciplinary and plural group, they are committed to a broadened agenda to the study of armed groups, and their contributions reflect this plurality. Although there was no agreed-upon research agenda, the different articles in this volume identify a set of research issues, frameworks and methods that represent the starting point for a broadened agenda. These include:

- Ethnographic field work on culture and social rules;
- Process reconstruction and the formation of armed groups;
- Political economy of armed groups;
- Historical sociology of the changing relations between armed groups and the state.

The remainder of this introduction briefly presents the contributions, organized around these four themes.

Ethnographic Fieldwork: Culture and Social Rules

Most of the work on armed groups in political science is based on or develops rationalist models of individuals' motivations, or of the strategic choices of groups (in target selection and tactics, for example).¹⁹ These represent 'outside' approaches in the sense that they do not study the social understandings of the members of armed groups. Instead, if a study addresses the issue at all, the reasons for certain behaviours by armed groups are posited by the researcher, often in the name of parsimonious or generalizable explanation. For many contributors to this volume ethnographic fieldwork is a useful corrective and/or a preferred orientation to externalized approaches. Ethnographic study can involve informal interviews with armed groups or government officials in order to uncover their understanding of a situation, and/or to validate external interpretations of the meaning of certain acts. It can also be used to reconstruct the socio-cultural meanings and rules of action for armed groups, as these are defined by the groups and the broader society.²⁰ In any of its variants the approach is demanding and potentially dangerous when applied to armed groups. But it can also yield significant insights that are not evident from an outside perspective.

A good example comes from the contribution by Susanne Schmeidl and Masood Karokhail on the Arbakai, the tribal police operating with some success to keep order in Loya Paktia province in Afghanistan.²¹ Outsiders to the Afghan context usually view the Arbakai as a form of Afghan militia. But Schmeidl and Karokhail explain how, from an insider's perspective, the Arbakai are significantly different from other Afghan militias. While both are irregular non-state armed actors, the

Arbakai are a very old Pashtun tradition with their roots in the pashtunwali justice system. The social constitution of the group ties the Arbakai to a clear chain of command, makes them relatively stable, reliable and predictable, and embeds them in society. Militias in Afghanistan, by contrast, are a more recent form of armed group that has 'no traceable link to any kind of justice system'. They tend to rule through coercion and by instilling fear in the population. With an organization based on a 'person-cult' of the militia leader, and the extending of protection and benefits, militias can be 'rather erratic and unpredictable, especially when leaders are removed'.²²

Based on this ethnographic examination, Schmeidl and Karokhail provide a clear explanation for why, in a state with such rampant insecurity, the Arbakee have been effective at fulfilling security mandates. Their account focuses on the social rules for mobilizing the Arbakee, selecting men for duty, and determining their mandate and duration of engagement. It emphasizes how, for example, Arbakee 'are raised for *specific* purposes, and the size of the Arbakai and duration of engagement [are] usually matched to the task at hand'.²³ Also of note is that the 'men selected to perform Arbakee duty remain in their own jurisdiction, that is, each group of men is responsible for his own village and the areas associated with the village', creating 'a chain of responsibility' for a village and its jurisdiction.²⁴ Schmeidl and Karokhail's insider conclusions about what makes the Arbakai effective also informs their cautions about expanding the Arbakai's role in policing Afghanistan. Several proposals for this have been advanced in policy circles, including by Britain in its concept of 'neighbourhood defence teams'. In Schmeidl and Karokhail's judgment, however, if the Arbakee were used outside of the Loya Paktia region they would lose their accountability structure, risking empowering warlords and their militias. Even within Loya Paktia, there are important potential limitations. One of these is that the Arbakee serve the community interest, not that of a provincial or federal government. In terms of self-defined purpose and geographical understanding, much would have to change to obtain an effective policing network beyond the village jurisdiction.

Teresa Koloma Beck also challenges conventional wisdom in her study of UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) in Angola. Most research on UNITA argues that the armed group sustained its membership mainly through tribal ties. Yet Koloma Beck's field interviews indicate that the most loyal followers were the young boys and girls who were forcibly recruited into the movement. When UNITA was driven in 1976 to retreat to the *mata*, the uninhabited regions of the deep south of the country, the movement's leaders realized they had to create 'a social life in this unsociable environment'.²⁵ They not only built up a veritable city in the territory that they came to control, complete with schools and hospitals, but also promulgated a social structural framework to guide the teenaged recruits' actions. The guiding idea seems to have been 'to guard ... against the derailing of violence ... Yet ... this project of behavioural regulation was not limited to the immediate situations of battle and confrontation, but aimed instead at all domains of the combatant's life'. In addition to participating in military campaigns, UNITA soldiers 'had to attend school and to work on the fields for defined

periods of time'. UNITA troops did not live together as male bands, but 'each one was urged, or indeed coerced, to marry and have children . . . These social structures were framed by a draconian jurisdiction, within the framework of which, for example, adultery or the abuse of women could be severely punished'.²⁶ After UNITA was defeated at the polls in 1992, the leadership shrank to a small circle of people from Jonas Savimbi's Bailundo clan. Yet among UNITA troops, loyalty to the movement remained strongest among those recruited and socialized into the organization.

UNITA and the Arbakai could be discounted as exceptional instances of social orderliness among armed groups. Yet urban gangs also follow social rules, as is demonstrated by the research of Dennis Rodgers, and the contribution to this volume by Dennis Rodgers and Robert Muggah. Far from being a manifestation of anarchic violence, as many portray gangs in Central America, Rodgers' study of the *pandillas* in Managua indicates that they have followed highly regular, even ritualized, practices of violence. Gang wars 'revolved around either attacking or protecting a neighbourhood, with fighting generally specifically focused either on harming or limiting damage to both neighbourhood infrastructure and inhabitants, as well as injuring or killing symbolically important *pandilleros*'.²⁷ Fighting escalated in regular and easily recognizable ways, and gang members also fought in a particular fashion. This idea of 'living in the shadow of death' meant:

flying in the face of danger and exposing oneself purposefully in order to taunt the enemy, taking risks and displaying bravado, whatever the odds and consequences, daring death to do its best. It meant not asking questions or calculating chances, but just going ahead and acting in a cheerfully exuberant manner, with style and panache.²⁸

Rodgers concluded that *pandilla* wars were 'scripted performances' which in fact circumscribed the unpredictability of violence and created a 'safe haven' for locals by driving out rival gangs from other neighbourhoods.²⁹

Muggah and Rodgers document the way in which these scripted performances are changing, as the *pandillas* are transforming into drug gangs that no longer feel responsible to 'love' their neighbourhood.³⁰ As their contribution shows, the transformation of behaviour of these gangs throughout Central America (mainly in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua) makes them resemble in some way other armed groups. Although Central American gangs do not fit the traditional understanding of armed groups (as organizations with the explicit purpose of obtaining direct control over state institutions), they do challenge the state's practical monopoly of the use of force (if not with a political agenda). They also have the capacity to progressively undermine or assume certain state functions, and shape the state's relationship with its citizens around the provision of security as a public good. Given this, gangs should be conceived as important armed groups, which – instead of forming out of an ambition to overthrow the state – 'often emerge as a result of state weakness, as gangs seek to potentially fill in for the absence of certain state functions'.³¹

Rodgers and Muggah also point out that most gang members join gangs out of a feeling of exclusion (both socially and economically), and out of a perceived need for

security. This poses particular challenges for the way in which states (and international actors) approach the phenomenon of gangs. They argue that the approach of a state to a given group is often based on imputed motives, and in particular defining the group as posing either a political or criminal threat. The recent labelling of Central American gangs by states ‘as an enemy “other” in a manner very similar to its treatment of more conventional non-state armed groups such as rebel or insurgent organizations’³² arguably has had the dangerous by-product of actually encouraging, and not limiting, violent behaviour. Pre-existing feelings of exclusion among gang members are potentially further exacerbated by the repressive policies of the state. This provides insight into the changing nature of gang activity, especially in terms of the increase in violent behaviour noted in Rodgers’ research into the *pandillas* in Managua,³³ which can be at least partially explained as a reaction to changes in state policy. This increase in violence³⁴ can be traced back to the so-called ‘War on Gangs’, as manifested in the ‘*Mano Dura*’ (‘Iron Fist’) of El Salvador, the ‘*Cero Tolerancia*’ (‘Zero Tolerance’) of Honduras, and the ‘*Plan Escoba*’ (‘Operation Broom sweep’) of Guatemala. These heavy-handed policy responses – which include extended jail sentences for gang members, provisions allowing minors to be treated as adults, and the deployment of military troops to combat the problem – has been unable to address the root causes of gang perpetuation.

State policies towards gangs, which address only surface issues of gang perpetuation, are partly responsible for the increased violence. In the specific cases of Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, Rodgers and Muggah point out that the policies of state-led enforcement operations and coercive regulation serve to conceal the deeper underlying political, social, and economic challenges manifested in gang formation and perpetuation.³⁵ Although the phenomenon of gangs in Central America is most definitely linked to deep-rooted issues such as the legacy of war in the region, the availability of small arms, and the pervasiveness of *machismo* in Central American societies, it is also a consequence of increasing inequality and exclusion rather than specific political objectives. It is thus important that state and international policy responses address all of these aspects. The actions taken towards gangs have the capacity to have a significant impact (either positive or negative) on the future behaviour, formation and perpetuation of these groups. This point is echoed in the discussion below on the changing relationship between armed groups and the state, and the contributions by Diane Davis and William Reno. Importantly, however, the new ‘exclusive’ and more violent order in Central America is still simply that – an order of ‘practical and symbolic rules and norms’, which provides individuals and groups within neighbourhoods with a framework for interaction.³⁶

Process Reconstruction and the Formation of Armed Groups

Inherent in the work of Susanne Schmeidl and Teresa Koloma Beck is the identification of action patterns for armed groups that abstract general conclusions based on research observations. This activity, which can also be termed ‘process reconstruction’, is in sharp contrast to the rationalist modelling of groups, in which patterns of

behaviour are taken to reflect the choices made by individuals as they try to maximize their benefits and minimize their costs. There is therefore no need to reconstruct action patterns or to examine processes empirically; all of 'the action', so to speak, is in the choice calculus.

Rationalist models currently dominate in the literature on armed group formation and motivation – a subject of some importance for policymakers as well as scholars. Much work on armed groups has, for example, been focused around the 'greed versus grievance debate'. The 'greed' side, exemplified in the work of Paul Collier and his colleagues, argues that competition over rents and rent-seeking behaviour leads elite leaders to consider armed rebellion as a viable course of action. The movement gains followers when the rebellion is financially viable (especially supported by natural resource-based rents and/or sympathetic diasporas) and also when a 'poverty trap' exists which makes soldiering more attractive.³⁷ The 'grievance' side, in contrast, emphasizes that relative deprivation linked to ethnic and nationalist identities underlies the motives and actions of most contemporary armed groups. Identity matters as a force for amalgamating groups by differentiating them along lines of race, language, religion, or tribal or regional affiliation.³⁸

Contributors to this volume recognized that rent competition and predatory opportunism are part of the story of how and why violent organizations emerge. But there are also good reasons to seek a more differentiated explanation of armed group formation.³⁹ In some cases, armed groups like the Arbakai provide protection for local communities, even when from an outside perspective they could benefit more from concentrating on profiteering opportunities in their resource-rich areas. In other cases, one finds more predation in resource-poor areas, and less in resource-rich regions (for example, Northern versus Southern Somalia, or Northern Uganda).⁴⁰ Similarly, if greed was the main reason for the formation of armed groups, we would expect opportunistic organizations to dominate in all times and places where resources (or the population) were easily exploitable. Yet Sub-Saharan Africa only became the unfortunate poster child for this thesis in the 1990s, whereas elsewhere at the same time, the thesis fits poorly (Lebanon, Palestine, and Southeast Asia). Grievance arguments suffer from their own limitations. Group amalgamation does not necessarily neatly follow lines of tribe, ethnicity, etc., as is demonstrated by the study of Koloma Beck. Armed violence would also be significantly more prevalent if anger and frustration were its main cause. After all, there are large reservoirs of people in the global South who face stagnant or falling incomes and state violence and corruption.

To improve our understanding of armed group formation, the contributions of both Jennifer Hazen and Klaus Schlichte to this volume also chose a political sociology approach. Hazen uses social movement theory to develop an explanation of the rise of the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF) in Nigeria, exploring why the NDPVF turned to violence, and how it was able to develop into a sustainable militant group. Schlichte's study is part of a large comparative project on armed group formation based on a data set of 80 insurgent groups. He uses Weberian social theory, especially the work of Norbert Elias on figuration, to develop his research strategy.⁴¹

Hazen's social movement approach situates the NDPVF's development in a political opportunity structure and competition between political groups. The NDPVF movement did not come from nowhere, but rather emerged in a democratic Nigeria where patronage politics remains at the core of the political system. Elections are a key moment for patrons to access money and resources, or to lose access, making them the fulcrum for violence and intimidation. In the run-up to the 2003 elections, political candidates provided arms and cash to various groups to create their own personal militias. After the elections many candidates failed to retrieve the weapons, and elected officials failed to fulfil the promises that had been made during the campaign. This left a number of organized groups armed and disgruntled. Mujahid Asari Dobuko, the leader of the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), sought in this context to have his organization pursue a more radical agenda. Losing within the IYC on radicalization, he left to form the NDPVF. Asari was able to draw on his reputation and skilfully manage the media to tap widespread local grievances in the Delta and build substantial popular support for his new group.

But why did the NDPVF opt for armed violence when it could have continued to pressure for change as a militant social movement? Hazen focused on the need for the NDPVF to distinguish itself from other social movements, starting with the IYC. The NDPVF also faced 'a serious threat to its survival and to the lives of its leaders' from the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV) group, also operating in the Ijaw area, as well as the Nigerian government. The latter not only stood behind the NDV as it attacked the NDPVF, it 'initiated its own efforts to eliminate Asari and disband the NDPVF'.⁴² Hazen's explanations are processual – they tell us how greed and grievance are brought together in contentious politics. They also point to the inadequacy of the 'non-state' label for armed groups, since in this case, the groups are inextricably intertwined with the formal quest for power in Nigeria.

Schlichte also uses process reconstruction to ground the case studies in his data set. But unlike Hazen, Schlichte abstracts from his cases to specify a set of three ideal types for different patterns of processes of armed group formation. These are worth noting, as they illustrate the ability of an approach like this to generate empirically rich yet parsimonious theoretical categories.⁴³ They are:

Ad hoc Mechanism

Political crisis in neo-patrimonial systems => selective exclusion from political class => leader initiative => search for military expertise => armed rebellion.⁴⁴ Examples would be the National Patriotic Front of Liberia or the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone.

Repression Mechanism

Rapid social change => overstressed regime => political exclusion => organized opposition => repression => radicalization => armed rebellion.⁴⁵ Examples would be the Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines or the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka.

Spin-off Mechanism

War => informalized state => delegation of violence => own reproductive base => own momentum => separation.⁴⁶ Examples would be the Serbian Volunteer Guard or RENAMO in Mozambique.

Schlichte's categories explain not only a group's formative process, but also the likely outcomes: whether different groups will successfully institutionalize and 'turn their violent power into domination'.⁴⁷ His summary conclusion of the odds of success for ad hoc groups, for example, is that they:

usually have weaker [social] ties from the beginning. They usually consist of connections that are products of circumstances rather than relations cultivated over time. Consequently, their internal functioning is precarious. Shared interest alone does not suffice to create stable organization, and ad hoc groups are therefore more prone to fragmentation and decay. In propitious settings, such as strong support by other states, they can institutionalize and defeat government armies.⁴⁸

Theoretical claims like this can be used in other comparative studies, tested, probed, and refined – an accomplishment for research of this kind on armed groups. And while Schlichte's project only addresses insurgent groups, the approach might also be applicable to other types of groups as well. Certainly Hazen's presentation of the NDFVF includes all the elements of the ad hoc mechanism, while her observations on the possible fate of the group clearly echo Schlichte's fragmentation pathway thesis.

The Political Economy of Armed Groups

In addition to insider accounts of armed groups action repertoires and motivations, it is also important to consider the material foundations for, and constraints on, armed groups. Achim Wennmann examines how armed groups pay for and profit from conflict, a topic that has become a major policy issue in recent years. Significant attention has been given to how diamonds, oil, timber, and other resources have fuelled violence in states such as Angola, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Natural resources such as 'conflict diamonds', however, are only one of the means by which armed groups can finance their operations, and Wennmann's project attempts to create a more comprehensive mapping of revenue sources, including developing tools for survey research in this area.⁴⁹

His 'accounting approach' is particularly innovative for its inclusion of other means of conflict finance such as taxation, diaspora funding, and kidnapping. Going further, it also distinguishes between the effectiveness of different sources in funding a major or minor conflict. He concludes that some methods of financing, such as easily exploitable resources (diamonds, drugs, and external support) provide easily centralized control and prospects for rapid (and significant) revenue streams, and tend to be highly effective. By contrast, methods such as local taxation or diaspora financing are more difficult to exercise central control over; although they offer a consistent revenue stream, it is usually less lucrative, and therefore of only

moderate effectiveness. At the lower end, we find ‘taxation’ of humanitarian relief, kidnapping, looting, and individual contributions, which offer the lowest possible revenue streams, and although of limited effectiveness, it still provides the possibility of sustaining a low-intensity conflict.⁵⁰

Wenmann’s analysis illustrates that the conditions for starting and sustaining an armed conflict vary considerably, and that there is no necessary linear relationship between the prospects of resource capture and the formation of armed groups (or their violent behaviour). Along with mapping different revenue sources, he develops a tool for estimating the cost of conflict, distinguishing between the costs of starting and of perpetuating the use of force. On this account, it costs substantially more to continue than to start a major war, while low-intensity conflicts have both lower barrier-to-entry and ‘operating’ costs. Overall, the incentives (and disincentives) for launching an armed conflict thus must be conceived of dynamically, ‘depending on the conflict intensity, the rate of replacement for soldiers and materiel and the development of prices of weapons, ammunition and other items’.⁵¹ Armed groups may not be able to finance escalation to a war, but many will be able to fund a conflict ‘start up’ and to keep operating as gangs, militant groups, etc. ‘Cutting off marginal sums of money seems wishful thinking when considering the illicit opportunities for money making in conflict or post-conflict societies, or in the global illicit market place.’⁵²

A study of conflict financing like this can provide an important complement to insider approaches, especially when it comes to explaining why certain armed groups succeed or fail. For example, from a conflict financing perspective on UNITA, it was not only the organization’s methods of sustaining membership which determined its ability to keep fighting: an equally important factor was its diamond-based conflict funding. UNITA ‘was unable to maintain the armed conflict because diamonds did not generate enough revenue to escalate the conflict between 1993 and 1999. It was also unable to control alluvial diamond mines once attacked by the government, and with its financial backbone undermined, UNITA’s functioning as an armed group was affected.’⁵³

The Sociology of Changing Relations between Armed Groups and the State

The internal conflicts that erupted after the end of the Cold War generated a series of studies reflecting on structural, political, and socio-economic change and its effects on states and armed groups. The ‘New Wars’ literature brought to the forefront the roles of transnational networks, economic globalization, and the fragmentation of the legitimacy and political authority of states as important contextual factors for the emergence of new armed groups and their resilience vis-à-vis weak Southern states.⁵⁴ This literature might now seem outdated, since the incidence of internal wars has been reversed or stabilized. But the impetus to think about historical changes in the relations between armed groups and the state has remained as a scholarly preoccupation. These concerns are reflected in the contributions of Diane Davis, Aaron Karp, and William Reno to this volume.

One line of reflection concerns the value of an historical conception of the state as a form of political order formed and reformed in response to war-making, technological

change, and resource extraction struggles and bargaining between groups. This approach is most often associated with the work of Charles Tilly, but with the proviso that most states in the global South do not fit the ideal type of the modern Western nation state.⁵⁵ The European process of state formation yielded states that broadly provide public goods: domestic order, security from foreign attack, education, health, welfare, and economic development. Many Southern states can only provide such public goods in a limited way, and important basic services are often in practice privatized through political arrangements developed by ruling elites in order to stay in power and capture monopoly rents. By encouraging comparative historical analysis, a state formation perspective can illuminate the development trajectories and roles of new armed groups in this context of states-in-formation.

Diane Davis, for example, links the growing role of private police in many Southern states to the 'war' that authoritarian states had made on their rebellious citizens during the Cold War era.⁵⁶ Seeking to advance as late industrializers, state elites enforced compliance from labour through repression and violence carried out by police, militaries, and paramilitaries. Democratization ended some of this, but left a legacy of corruption and impunity. Meanwhile, the neo-liberal turn increased social and income polarity dramatically, creating a context in which private police have become increasingly important as guards for corporate assets and to 'act on behalf of citizen clients, protecting their homes, workplaces, and transport routes'.⁵⁷ What public policing remains provides order for the wealthy, leaving the poorest to fend for themselves.

The issue for Davis is that while in some states such as South Africa, the public and private police may be working together and in the process strengthening the commitment to rule of law and democracy, in other states such as Mexico, the already-eroded legitimacy of the state continues to degrade. In border areas and the cities, private police mix with gangs and so-called mafias to 'sell' security selectively and unevenly. This does not occur in isolation from, or competition with, the state, since the networks of non-state armed actors are often well connected with state actors, with police officers moonlighting as private security agents, or ex-police or military directly employed as private police. As a result, however, 'when the same individuals or networks of armed professionals move back and forth between the state and civil society, sharing knowledge and personal relations, it is harder for citizens to leverage institutional accountability, and abuse of coercive power is more likely to continue'.⁵⁸ Echoing the New Wars arguments, Davis predicts that the state's complicity in violence networks will delegitimize it further, even while encouraging the proliferation of more non-state armed actors. The ultimate result of the 'oligopolization of the means of violence' will be 'new compromises or complicities between state and non-state coercive actors' that 'driv[e] a vicious cycle of state de-legitimization and the appearance of alternative imagined communities of reciprocity, many of which are protected by their own non-state armed actors'.⁵⁹

Building upon this, Will Reno's contribution delves into the subject of violence within collapsed states. Instead of following an explanatory mechanism that focuses on individual interests – actors engaging in violent hostilities in search of short-term (often economic) gain – Reno argues that such approaches only provide a partial

understanding of the behaviour and understandings of insurgents. He argues that state collapse is in fact a consequence, and not a cause, of certain coercive and predatory behaviours. Essentially, Reno posits that to understand violent behaviour by armed groups, it is important to account not only for the potential motives of the armed actors, but for the particular social structures in which actors are located. Specifically, he argues that the extremes of predation are better understood as a consequence of certain political strategies and local political economies that they created in patronage-based political systems. In this interpretation of insurgent behaviour, 'context matters a lot, particularly the manner and degree to which local networks of authority control the uses of resources and those who benefit from them'.⁶⁰

In this way, Reno's argument for the importance of context in understanding transnational and non-state armed group formation and behaviour ties in nicely with the findings presented by Schmeidl and Karokhail's contributions, as well as that of Koloma Beck. It also echoes the assertion of Rodgers and Muggah that Central American gang violence is better understood not as simply existing within the non-state armed group distinction, but as related to a specific social context, usually defined by elements of social and economic exclusion. All of these scholars argued for the importance of context specific analysis in studying this topic.

A different historical perspective on the state in relation to armed groups comes from Aaron Karp's examination, through the lens of military history, of the epochal transformations in war-making and military technology.⁶¹ Karp's starting point is that increasingly the United States and its allies decide to go to war and prosecute conflicts based on 'post-modern, humanitarian sensibilities'. War has to be made acceptable to domestic and international audiences, and therefore the successful use of force is defined as 'minimal death and destruction', rather than the total crushing of the power of the enemy.⁶² State-of-the-art technologies thus paradoxically serve not to assure victory, but rather to make it impossible for insurgents to win militarily – while reducing the risks to Western forces.

The political limitations that Western powers place on warfare contrast for Karp with the freedom of action of many contemporary armed groups. While they cannot defeat their opponents outright, the adversaries of Western states in the Middle East and Afghanistan face few legitimacy obstacles in choosing strategy or innovating in weapons and tactics. This 'migration of military-technical initiative' to armed groups enables them to use guerrilla warfare to try and 'inflict enough pain and humiliation to convince the adversary to give up'.⁶³ When sniping and suicide bombing lose their impact, the insurgents change their approach, controlling the pace of innovation on the battlefield. In Iraq, for example, sniper and rifle attacks were first replaced in tactical leadership terms by suicide bombings and then by the increased use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to attack coalition forces. A similar process in Lebanon and Gaza resulted in rocket attacks being used as the tactical innovation. The *al-Qassam* rockets used by Hamas in Gaza 'are hardly impressive . . . Except for an explosive warhead of 2–5 kg, they are little different from large hobby rockets popular among North American enthusiasts . . . [But] as primarily political weapons, they only have to work well enough to encourage Palestinian unity and keep pressure on Israel for political concessions.'⁶⁴

Are insurgents and terrorists likely to continue to hold the advantage in tactical innovation, especially of a low-tech variety, over the United States and its allies? Karp placed developments in the Middle East and Afghanistan in the context of the transition from 'third generation' to 'fourth generation warfare'.⁶⁵ Third generation warfare is industrial and network-centric warfare (as in recent US military doctrine for fighting in Iraq). Fourth generation warfare is guerrilla warfare, whether the classic variant (such as in Maoist doctrine) or contemporary approaches in which guerrillas need never try to defeat the opponent militarily. For Karp, the rise of fourth generation warfare may be part of the process of overturning the utility of war planning and war as an instrument of statecraft. More immediately, it gives a new advantage to insurgents, 'the ability to pick dominant weapons', making it more likely for armed conflicts to become 'stalemated, continuing without much hope of resolution'.⁶⁶

Conclusion

If we align Aaron Karp's and Diane Davis's historical arguments with the political economy conclusions of Achim Wennmann, we arrive at a fairly bleak picture for the future of global armed violence. Major civil wars may be increasingly less frequent, but it is also increasingly easy for armed groups of all stripes to keep conflicts going as low-intensity contests, whether primarily political or primarily economic in nature. Southern states are ill-equipped to prosecute these wars. And militarily more powerful Western states will probably not be able to achieve military victory, given their self-imposed political limitations and the difficulties in countering asymmetric tactical innovations. Social violence meanwhile appears to be on the rise outside of what are defined conventionally as conflict zones, and the line between different sorts of armed groups, and different forms of armed violence, is increasingly blurred.⁶⁷

Although some states could develop the means to check the expansion of armed groups in their cities and regional hinterlands, in too many cases social violence seems likely to continue or expand, as a result of the declining ability of the state to manifest in practice its theoretical Weberian monopoly on the legitimate use of force. At the root of this may be the relative lack or long-term decay of the public good of security, which opens spaces into which new predatory or protective actors emerge. A complete picture of these historical trends, and the role of armed groups in them, is still beyond our grasp. As Will Reno also points out, more knowledge needs to be gained by examining violence (in its predatory form) by looking at those states that are exceptions to the rule rather than those that affirm it. These states can serve as important counterfactual examples to the overarching assumption that such things as natural resource wealth, or weak or absent state structures (especially in the case of Africa), create the necessary and perhaps even sufficient conditions for armed violence. As Reno points out, we need not to take for granted the state or to naturalize such categories as 'weak state' or 'failed state'.

Rather, researchers must map out how state institutions actually work to provide public order and security (or not), and how states interact with potential and actual

challengers to the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. This is not just a good rule for studying Southern states. It is also a useful perspective to adopt in the broader project of expanding the research agenda on armed groups, and for theorizing the relationship between armed groups, states, and state formation processes. We may not arrive at a less bleak picture of the future for armed violence worldwide. But we may develop a somewhat more nuanced account of its potential manifestations, be able to identify new and emerging violent social formations, and be better able to recognize their prospects as well as their limitations.

NOTES

1. For a good overview of the controversies surrounding the definition of non-state armed groups from a legal perspective, see Andrea J. Dew and Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, 'Empowered Groups, Tested Laws, and Policy Options: The Challenges of Transnational and Non-State Armed Groups' (Boston, MA and Geneva: Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, Harvard University, and Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, 2007); Pablo Policzer, 'Neither Terrorists Nor Freedom Fighters', Working Paper 5, Armed Groups Project, University of Calgary, March 2005.
2. See, for example, Jeremy Weinstein, 'Resources and the Information Problem in Rebel Recruitment', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 49, No. 4 (August 2005), pp. 598–624; Stathis Kalyvas and Matthew Adam Kocher, 'How "Free" is Free Riding in Civil Wars: Violence, Insurgency and the Collective Action Problem', *World Politics*, Vol. 59, No. 4 (January 2007), pp. 177–216; Stathis Kalyvas, 'Wanton and Senseless? The Logic of Massacres in Algeria', *Rationality and Society*, Vol. 11, No. 3 (1999), pp. 243–85.
3. See Diane E. Davis and Anthony Pereira, *Irregular Armed Forces and their Role in Politics and State Formation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Janice Thomson, *Mercenaries, Pirates and Sovereignty* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).
4. Articles in this volume were (with two exceptions) originally presented at an April 2008 conference, 'Transnational and Non-State Armed Groups: Legal and Policy Responses', sponsored by the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva and the Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, Harvard University.
5. Stefan Malthanner, 'The "Armed Groups Database": Aims, Sources, and Methodology', Junior Research Group, 'Micropolitics of Armed Groups', Working Papers Micropolitics No. 2/2007, 11-12, available online at: http://www.ipw.ovgu.de/forschung/inhalt/projekte_konferenzen/mikropolitik/publikationen.html. This is the same database that underlies the study by Klaus Schlichte in this volume.
6. Andrew Clapham, 'Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors in Conflict Situations', *International Review of the Red Cross*, Vol. 88, No. 863 (September 2006), pp. 491–523, p. 493.
7. For more on this issue, see International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), *Rules of International Humanitarian Law and Other Rules Relating to the Conduct of Hostilities* (Geneva: ICRC, 2005).
8. See the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) website (<http://www.diag.gov.af/diagproject>) and strategy. DIAG defines an illegal armed group 'as a group of five or more armed individuals forming an association outside of the lawful state security organs, drawing its cohesion from (a) loyalty to the commander, (b) receipt of material benefits, (c) impunity enjoyed by members, (d) shared ethnic or social background'.
9. Ian Douglas Wilson, 'Continuity and Change: The Changing Contours of Organized Violence in Post-New Order Indonesia', *Critical Asian Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 2 (2006), pp. 265–97.
10. Most of the debate on legitimacy, however, turns on legal versus sociological concepts of legitimacy (roughly, the legitimacy of actors and courses of action for the international society of states versus the legitimacy of states vis-à-vis their citizens).
11. For a different taxonomy (insurgents, terrorists, militias, organized criminal groups) see Shultz, Richard H., Douglas Farah & Itamara Lochard, 'Armed Groups: A Tier-One Security Priority' Colorado, USAF Institute for National Security Studies, Occasional Paper 57, 2004.
12. For recent contributions on warlordism see William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999), pp. 1–44; Kimberly Marten, 'Warlordism in Comparative

- Perspective', *International Security*, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Winter 2006-2007), pp. 41–73; Daniel Brió, 'The (Un)bearable Lightness of Violence: Warlordism as an Alternative Form of Governance in the "Westphalian Periphery"', in *State Failure Revisited II: Actors of Violence and Alternative Forms of Governance*, INEF Report 89/2007, pp. 7–49.
13. See 'The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty' (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001), available online at <http://www.iciss.ca/report-en.asp>.
 14. Geneva Secretariat, *The Global Burden of Armed Violence* (Geneva: Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2008), p. 2. An additional 200,000 persons on average die in conflict zones from non-violent causes (such as malnutrition, dysentery, or other easily preventable diseases). The report is available online at <http://www.genevadeclaration.org/pdfs/Global-Burden-of-Armed-Violence.pdf>.
 15. Dennis Rodgers, 'Living in the Shadow of Death: Gangs, Violence, and Social Order in Urban Nicaragua, 1996–2002', *Journal of Latin American Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 2 (2006), pp. 267–92.
 16. Anthony Vinci, 'Anarchy, Failed States, and Armed Groups: Reconsidering Conventional Analysis', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 52, No. 2 (2008), p. 299.
 17. For an example of the American government's perspective before recent Supreme Court rulings forced changes in American practice, see Scott Reid, 'Terrorists as Enemy Combatants: An Analysis of How the United States Applies the Law of Armed Conflict in the Global War on Terrorism', Naval War College, 2004, available online at <http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/reid.pdf>.
 18. See Jörn Grävningholt, 'Engaging Armed Groups in Development Cooperation', Paper presented at the conference, 'Exploring Criteria and Conditions for Engaging Non-State Actors (NSAs) to Respect Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law', Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, Switzerland, June 2007.
 19. Kalyvas and Kocher, 'How "Free" is Free Riding in Civil Wars' (note 2); Weinstein, 'Resources and the Information Problem in Rebel Recruitment' (note 2); See also Robert Pape, 'The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 97, No. 3 (August 2003), pp. 1–19.
 20. See, for examples, Maria Eriksson Baaz and Maria Stern, 'Making Sense of Violence: Voices of Soldiers in the Congo (DRC)', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 46, No. 1 (2008), pp. 57–86; Benedict R. O'G Anderson (ed.), *Violence and the State in Suharto's Indonesia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001); and for the larger debate, Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, *Culture Troubles: Politics and the Interpretation of Meaning* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2006).
 21. Susanne Schmeidl and Masood Karokhail, 'Armed Non-State Actors and "Community-based Policing" – An Exploration of the Arbakai (Tribal Police) in South-eastern Afghanistan', *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (August 2009), pp. 318–42
 22. *Ibid.*, p. 331.
 23. *Ibid.*, p. 322.
 24. *Ibid.*, p. 325.
 25. Teresa Koloma Beck, 'Staging Society: Sources of Loyalty in the Angolan UNITA', *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (August 2009), pp. 343–55.
 26. *Ibid.*, 351.
 27. Rodgers, 'Living in the Shadow of Death' (note 15), pp. 276.
 28. *Ibid.*
 29. *Ibid.*, pp. 278, 277.
 30. *Ibid.*, p. 281.
 31. Dennis Rodgers and Robert Muggah, 'Gangs as Non-State Armed Groups: The Central American Case', *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (August 2009), p. 11.
 32. *Ibid.*, p. 312.
 33. Rodgers, 'Living in the Shadow of Death' (note 15).
 34. For a further discussion on the increase in violent behavior that accompanied the movement towards more headline policies by these governments towards gangs, see R. Gutierrez, 'Central America: Harsher Measures Don't Cut Crime', Inter Press Service News Agency (IPS News), 1 November 2006, available online at: <http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=35337>.
 35. Rodgers and Muggah, 'Gangs as Non-State Armed Groups' (note 31).
 36. *Ibid.*
 37. See, for example, Paul Collier, *Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2000); Paul Collier and Anke Hoefler, 'Greed and Grievance in Civil War', *Oxford Economic Papers*, Vol. 46, No. 4 (2004), pp. 563–95 and Paul Collier, *The Bottom Billion: Why The Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

38. See, for example, Ted R. Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970); Ted R. Gurr, *Peoples versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century* (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace Press, 2000); Roger Peterson, *Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Lars-Erik Cederman and Luc Girardin, 'Measuring Grievance: Ethno-Political Exclusion and Civil War Onset', Paper presented at the International Conference organized by the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Zurich, Switzerland, 15–17 September 2005, 'Mapping the Complexity of Civil Wars', available online at <http://www.icr.ethz.ch/mccw/papers/cederman.pdf>.
39. For scholarly treatment of some of the weaknesses of the debate, see Christopher Cramer, 'Homo Economicus Goes to War: Methodological Individualism, Rational Choice and the Political Economy of War', *World Development*, Vol. 30, No. 11 (2002), pp. 1845–64, and Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman (eds), *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003). Will Reno also provides a critique of the debate in a paper aiming to advance the rationalist framework: 'Explaining Patterns of Violence in Collapsed States', Paper presented at a seminar of the Program on Order, Conflict and Violence, Yale University, 30 January 2008, available online at http://www.yale.edu/macmillan/ocvprogram/papers/Reno_OCV.pdf.
40. On predation in resource poor environments, see Anthony Vinci, 'Existential Motivations in the Lord's Resistance Army's Continuing Conflict', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 30, No. 4 (April 2007), pp. 337–52.
41. Jennifer Hazen, 'From Social Movement to Armed Group: A Case Study from Nigeria', *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (August 2009), pp. 281–300; Klaus Schlichte, 'With the State against the State? The Formation of Armed Groups', *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (August 2009), pp. 246–64.
42. Hazen, 'From Social Movement to Armed Group', (note 41), p. 292.
43. Another notable feature of Schlichte's research is his sociological examination of what Eric Wolf called 'fields of leverage': places where frustrated people can be organized and ideologues can instill a commitment to fight. Two of the most important fields for leaders to develop are universities and militaries. Many armed group leaders have a university education (55.4 per cent in Schlichte's study), and/or a military training (66 per cent in the same study). Followers, in contrast, come first from the countryside (being categorized as peasants) but they may also have a student background (52.1 per cent) or come from the urban subclasses (41.1 per cent) and already be a member of another violent group when recruited (32.9 per cent).
44. Schlichte, 'With the State against the State?' (note 41), pp. 253–55.
45. *Ibid.*, pp. 250–53.
46. *Ibid.*, pp. 256–59.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 260.
48. *Ibid.*
49. Achim Wennmann, 'Grasping the Financing of Non-state Armed Groups: A New Perspective on Conflict Dynamics', *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (August 2009), pp. 265–80.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 274.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 268.
52. *Ibid.*, p. 276.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 273.
54. See, for example, Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), Herfried Münkler, *The New Wars* (Cambridge: Polity, 2005); Mark Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security* (London: Zed Books, 2001).
55. Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1992* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992). On the applicability of his approach, see Brian Taylor and Roxana Botea, 'Tilly Tally: War-Making and State-Making in the Contemporary Third World', *International Studies Review*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (March 2008), pp. 27–56; Georg Sorensen, 'War and State-Making: Why Doesn't it Work in the Third World?' *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 32, No. 3 (2001), pp. 341–54; Michael Niemann, 'War Making and State Making in Central Africa', *Africa Today*, Vol. 53, No. 3 (Spring 2007), pp. 21–39.
56. Diane Davis, 'Beyond the Democracy-Development Mantra: The Challenges of Violence and Insecurity in the Contemporary Global South', Unpublished paper, 2008; Diane Davis, 'Non-State Armed Actors, New Imagined Communities, and Shifting Patterns of Sovereignty and Insecurity in the Modern World', *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (August 2009), pp. 221–45. The basis for Davis's arguments is developed further in Diane Davis and Anthony W. Peirera (eds),

Irregular Armed Forces and their Role in Politics and State Formation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

57. Davis, 'Non-State Armed Actors' (note 56), p. 237.
58. *Ibid.*, p. 240.
59. *Ibid.*, p. 226.
60. William Reno, 'Explaining Patterns of Violence in Collapsed States', *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (August 2009), pp. 356–74.
61. Aaron Karp, 'The Changing Ownership of War: States, Insurgencies and Technology', *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (August 2009), pp. 375–94.
62. *Ibid.*, p. 377.
63. *Ibid.*, p. 382.
64. *Ibid.*, p. 387.
65. For more on this concept, see William S. Lind, John F. Schmitt, Joseph W. Sutton and Gary I. Wilson, 'The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation', *Marine Corps Gazette* (October 1989), pp. 22–6 and Robert B. Polk, *Fourth Generation Warfare and its Impact on the Army* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth KS School of Advanced Military Studies, 2000).
66. Karp, 'The Changing Ownership of War' (note 61), p. 389.
67. See Michael Brzoska, 'Collective Violence Beyond the Standard Definition of Armed Conflict', in Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI Yearbook 2007* (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2007), pp. 94–106.