

# Global NATO: Bandwagoning in a Unipolar World<sup>1</sup>

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The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) staggers on, nearly 20 years after its original *raison d'être* withered away. Like the fabled blind men's elephant, NATO may be described from many vantages: some see good news, while others see bad news. NATO has expanded its mission in Afghanistan, but it cannot raise the troops to support them. NATO has full participation in that mission, but many members have imposed crippling limits, called caveats, on the deployment of their forces. NATO has enlarged its membership, but members new and old ignore calls for increased capabilities. NATO has concluded a cooperative framework with the European Union (EU), but that framework is viewed as hollow by all but those closest to it. NATO is the cornerstone of American foreign policy, but the cornerstone grows moss while the United States cobbles together coalitions that are only possible because NATO exists. While the many changes in NATO structure and missions support the notion that it is an alliance 'renewed',<sup>2</sup> the renewal does little to mask the alliance's 'continuing decline'.<sup>3</sup>

One explanation for the differing opinions about NATO's continued viability may be that its purpose is no longer entirely clear. During the Cold War, the United States and Western Europe shared a common interest in deterring and defending against a Soviet invasion – though even this clarity did not prevent policy disagreements. Today, that founding risk seems less, except to the NATO members closest to the Russian border, who are generally supportive of the United States but troubled by NATO's shift of focus to new and distant missions. For other new (and potential) members, NATO was a stepping-stone to respectability and the EU, but now it is a nag calling for unwanted expenditures. For the long-term members identified as transatlantic, a shifting group that reliably includes the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Portugal, NATO limits the deepening of European/French control over their sovereignty, but these links to the United States also undercut their bona fides in the EU. For the more Eurocentric long-term members, especially France, NATO gives Europeans a voice in American foreign policy, but only at the cost of having to sometimes support that policy or risk losing the audience. Meanwhile, the American interest in NATO now is to maintain a pool of military power that can operate with its own in coalition, while trying to avoid restrictions on the use of its own power.

If NATO is to survive as a meaningful institution, it must change so it more clearly meets the current and future interests of its membership. NATO's continued strength is in the interests of both the United States and its other member states, and also promotes global stability. For the United States, the alliance enhances its

power.<sup>4</sup> NATO defence planning creates the ability for the United States to lead a coalition of willing and able states. Allies and partners develop their militaries to be interoperable in both equipment and operations.<sup>5</sup> Without peacetime planning and training, multilateral military operations would be inefficient or ineffective. A NATO operation also diffuses resistance toward the West as a whole, rather than leaving it targeted at the United States. The consensus of 26 members of the North Atlantic Council confers a legitimacy to NATO operations that can never be achieved by an American-led alternative coalition. The latter will always be seen as nothing more than the United States and its cronies, while a NATO coalition indicates the mutual agreement of the leading free states of the world, and in emergencies such as Kosovo it can even offer an alternative mandate to that of the United Nations (UN).

In return for these benefits, the United States pays relatively little. The United States maintains forces in Europe, but at this point these are mostly pre-positioned for contingencies elsewhere in the world. The primary military savings without NATO would be not providing a Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) or contributing to the staff at Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). The United States must expend political capital to maintain good relations with allies and partners, but much of this diplomacy would need to be conducted even without NATO – and would be less efficient in the absence of the organization. The United States also absorbs greater costs if it elects to disregard an ally's views than it does if it disregards those of non-allied states.

Many of these benefits accrue to the other members of NATO as well. NATO created the environment for 50 years of European pacification and unification, ending what in the 1940s seemed a chronic source of warfare. While the European peace is now self-sustaining, NATO remains the keystone to transatlantic ties. Without NATO, the relationship between the United States and the European Union (EU) and its Member States would be no different than the relationship between any other set of states with interests that are not always aligned. Most importantly, NATO diplomacy, in concert with the EU, reinforces common liberal values advocated by all their members. Proceeding after working to achieve a common position among competing views demonstrates liberal values in action, while striking out based on raw capabilities with the assistance of those who already agree demonstrates illiberal values.

Both the EU and United States acknowledge these points. The EU does so on the first page of its European Security Strategy (ESS), adopted in December 2003: 'The United States has played a critical role in European integration and European security, in particular through NATO'.<sup>6</sup> The American National Security Strategy of 2002 (NSS02), concurs, 'There is little of lasting consequence that the United States can accomplish in the world without the sustained cooperation of its allies and friends in Canada and Europe'.<sup>7</sup> Sustaining NATO is in the long-term interests of all of its members, a point sometimes lost among the attention given to the single flashpoint of Iraq and the long-running personal conflict between US President George W. Bush and former European leaders like French President Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. Sustaining NATO also promotes international peace and stability in general, though not of course the interests of the few states opposed to international stability.

None of these goals can be met, however, without changing the way NATO does business. The remainder of this article describes a version of a 'Global NATO' (GNATO), which would address concerns both realists and liberals have about world order over the next several decades. From the realist perspective, GNATO offers the United States a looser alliance structure while expanding the pool of countries able to assist it. From that same perspective, it offers partners – and members – a way to continue to support American initiatives on a more a la carte basis. From the liberal perspective, GNATO offers a shift away from reliance on a United Nations that once again has become ineffective. GNATO thus moves closer to ratifying Kant's separate peace among liberal states, tying the industrialized democracies together. Ultimately, this article makes no predictions about the likelihood of implementing such a GNATO, but argues that the logic favouring it from both the realist and liberal points of view is compelling.

### Global NATO and the Transatlantic Context

NATO has been steadily expanding its membership and partnerships since the end of the Cold War. NATO membership had already been diluted a bit by the way station of the Partnership for Peace (PfP), which gave an ear, if not also a voice, to countries far removed from any likely NATO expansion. PfP membership, however, was limited to European countries and now-independent portions of the former European power, the Soviet Union. GNATO as proposed here would have no such geographic limits or coherence. An organization founded on realist defence and deterrence would move beyond any conceivable single state enemy; an organization founded on consensus would add more potentially dissenting views. On the other hand, consensus would be easier to achieve if commitments were made more voluntary. Countries would participate in NATO missions of their choosing, with a voice in NATO decisions but not a veto over them. Added members also could be considered security providers, more capable than many formal members or partners.

GNATO as proposed in this article is rather different than the 'Global Partners' initiative announced by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer on 4 February 2006. He called for 'building closer links with other likeminded nations beyond Europe – nations such as Australia, New Zealand, South Korea or Japan' as well as 'a pragmatic, strategic relationship with the EU'.<sup>8</sup> This version of Global Partners was initiated by those Pacific states; Sweden, Brazil, and South Africa have also been mentioned as possible members of a 'Security Provider's Forum'.<sup>9</sup> Scheffer later emphasized that the proposal would simply add to NATO, 'with Article V as the foundation'.<sup>10</sup>

Scheffer's proposal was strongly opposed by France. Defence Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie wrote

It would be desirable to improve the practical modalities of their association with NATO operations without changing the essence of the organization, which I believe should remain a European–Atlantic military alliance. The development of a global partnership could in fact . . . dilute the natural solidarity between Europeans and North Americans in a vague ensemble.<sup>11</sup>

She further noted,

Reconstruction missions must necessarily fall under the authority of competent organizations, particularly the United Nations and the European Union. Transforming NATO into an organization whose mission is to rebuild both democracy and a nation's economy corresponds neither to its legitimate mandate nor to its means. We must be very careful not to dilute the alliance through poorly defined missions in which it would lose both its soul and its effectiveness. NATO is already complaining that it doesn't have the resources to carry out its military missions. It would be irresponsible to push it into missions that exceed its means.<sup>12</sup>

By the Riga Summit in November 2006, the four most prominent countries named had backed strongly away from any formal relationship with NATO.<sup>13</sup> Instead, the Summit adopted the concept of 'Contact Countries', distinct from members of the Partnership for Peace. The summit declaration lauded the value of 'strong relationships with countries of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD), and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), as well as with Contact Countries'. These 'contribut[e] to stability and security across the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond'. The heads of state and government called on the North Atlantic Council to 'increase the operational relevance of relations with non-NATO countries, including interested Contact Countries; and in particular to strengthen NATO's ability to work with those current and potential contributors to NATO operations and mission, who share our interests and values'. They also recommended *ad hoc* meetings with relevant regional states 'using flexible formats for consultation meetings of Allies with one or more interested partners ... and/or interested Contact Countries, based on the principles of inclusiveness, transparency and self-determination'.<sup>14</sup>

This 'Contact Countries' approach is a long way from a NATO with global membership. This scaled-down version, however, better meets most members' interests. The flexible geometry is reminiscent of the old European Security and Defence Initiative (ESDI) within NATO. ESDI was first proposed at NATO's Rome summit in November 1991, as a 'European security identity and defence role' within NATO. In January 1994, ESDI was given shape in the form of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs), which would be 'coalitions of the willing' operating under European command. ESDI was eventually superseded by the EU's own European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), and the Berlin Plus arrangements to give the EU access to certain NATO assets. A GNATO based on flexible geometry not only would allow Europeans to take action when the United States did not wish to, it would also allow the United States to act in a formal coalition with some Europeans, even if others preferred not to participate. This would ease the consensus that is now so difficult to reach, because not all NATO members would have to contribute to missions. In short, this article's concept of GNATO flows directly from the Riga Summit Declaration: the alliance would be open to cooperation with all countries interested, with participation in missions other than collective self-defence optional for all members. For such renewed coalitions of the willing, a supermajority – somewhere

from 60 per cent to 75 per cent support – should replace the consensus standard: no single member (or partner) should be able to block action by others.

GNATO may gain some momentum from changes in the geopolitics of transatlantic relations, changes that have been obscured by the deep popular differences over Iraq and handling terrorism in general. Russia, successor to NATO's old adversary, has been behaving in a manner that is increasingly troubling to Europeans. The winter 2006 interruption of natural gas through Ukraine (nearly repeated in January 2007 with Belarus) and the suspicious explosions on the pipelines supplying Georgia have reminded Western Europeans that energy security is a vital common concern. The unsolved murders of Anna Politkovskaya and Alexander Litvinenko have further reminded the West that their intra-bloc differences are less important than their external dangers. Russia, joined by China, has also been less than fully cooperative in addressing security issues from Iran to Darfur. Concerns about Russia crystallized on 10 February 2007, when Russian President Vladimir Putin criticized Europe and NATO along with the United States. On missile defence, he commented, 'Plans to expand certain elements of the anti-missile defence system to Europe cannot help but disturb us'.<sup>15</sup> On NATO expansion, he noted,

I think it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have any relation with the modernisation of the Alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust. And we have the right to ask: against whom is this expansion intended?<sup>16</sup>

Finally, in a sharp jab against apparent European hypocrisy, he observed, 'countries that forbid the death penalty even for murderers . . . are airily participating in military operations that are difficult to consider legitimate'.<sup>17</sup> Lately, in the space of one month, Putin redeployed Russia's nuclear bomber capability, threatened to reopen a naval base in the Mediterranean, executed joint war games with China and had a Russian flag planted in the polar seabed.

In addition to increased tension with Russia, remarkable quiet progress has been made on some of the other issues that have split the alliance. While European publics remain hostile to American policies – and probably will retain that attitude until Bush leaves office in early 2009 – public disagreements have been tempered. The United States supported European diplomatic initiatives designed to reduce Iranian aspirations toward nuclear technology. The United States allowed the UNSC to refer the Darfur crisis to the International Criminal Court, after threatening in 2002 to block all peacekeeping efforts if the ICC were allowed jurisdiction. The EU has even come to agree that meaningful action on climate change will require imposing global obligations, including on China and India – a position held by the United States from the start.

Perhaps most significantly, the United States has cured its allergy to the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). As noted above, the post-Cold War preference of the United States was for ESDI and CJTFs as coalitions of the willing; the initial American response to ESDP was rather negative, a view which held through the ill-fated Tervuren proposal.<sup>18</sup> In recent years, however, the EU has nevertheless taken the lead on peace initiatives from Congo to Aceh, with American blessing. As a

result, the long-wrangled Berlin Plus accords are 'dead', in the view of everyone except those at SHAPE most closely involved in them. Berlin Plus established a process for EU access to NATO assets for missions where NATO chose not to be involved. In practice, the EU has chosen to use its own capabilities everywhere except in the Balkans. This meets the French preference, and reflects the consequences of Turkish obstinacy. The Turks refused to allow any joint discussion of any issues that might invoke Berlin Plus unless Cyprus was excluded; the EU refuses to tolerate the stigmatization of one of its members. The only possible future Berlin Plus mission would occur in Kosovo. This is not to say that Berlin Plus is not working – it is, and very well, in Bosnia. The working relationship has progressed far beyond those formal structures, and the EU's own capabilities have made it less than necessary. The new informal borderline of complementarity between the organizations has been to assign the large-scale operations to NATO and smaller-scale (but growing) operations to the EU. Scale is not a measure of intensity, but of planning complexity.

Practical institution building has developed through the European Defence Agency (EDA). The EDA integrates member states' procurement strategies with industry. This has no formal tie to NATO, and the organizations' focus tends to be a bit different, but given that states will want their own military units to be interoperable, and that NATO mandates interoperability among most European states at the upper level of capability, the practical effect of EDA has been to move toward increasing interoperability at all levels of operations. Another consequence of requirements coordination has been increasing movement toward niche capabilities. The lack of air patrol in Iceland and the Baltic states, for example, is longstanding and perhaps to be expected given their small size. Czech specialization in chemical warfare developed from the Warsaw Pact era. More recently, the Dutch have also decided to disband military patrol aircraft, focusing instead on sealift and land support by its navy. The Danes have sacrificed their blue-water navy in favour of increasing their deployability and brown water capacities.

### **Realist Perspective**

For the primary analysis of the GNATO concept, this paper adopts the perspective of the realist paradigm of international politics. In its most succinct form, realism assumes that the most important actors in international politics are sovereign states, that the interests of those states inherently come into conflict with each other, and that those conflicts are resolved through material power.<sup>19</sup> This paper further adopts the structural version of realism, which directs our attention to the distribution of power in the anarchic international system rather than to the idiosyncrasies of individual leaders or states.<sup>20</sup> Within that version of realism, this paper sides with those who argue that the fundamental interest of states is power, not security – since if all only want security, then states could discover their common interests, while if some want power and others want security then we would need to redirect our attention to leaders or individual states.<sup>21</sup>

Structural realism begins with an assessment of the distribution of capabilities in the world. The system today is unipolar. Unipolarity is sometimes confused with hegemony or domination, but the concepts are very different<sup>22</sup>. Although many scholars equate hegemony with the concentration of power in one state,<sup>23</sup> the concept also assigns a particular role for the lead state, a role that is accepted both domestically and by international actors.<sup>24</sup> While a hegemonic system requires the acquiescence of other actors, a unipolar system does not. The only condition of unipolarity is for power in the international system to be concentrated in one state. For realists, great powers are fundamentally defined by their capabilities. Kenneth Waltz stipulates that power is primarily a function of a state's capability in several key areas, including population and territory, resources, economic robustness, military strength, political stability and competence. States are superpowers if they excel in all these areas. Waltz stipulates that eminence in one but not the others is useless.<sup>25</sup> Randall Schweller says 'to qualify as a pole, a state must have greater than half the military capability of the most powerful state in the system'.<sup>26</sup> Thus a unipolar power is a great power, a superpower, *hyperpuissant* in Hubert Védrine's memorable *bon mot*.<sup>27</sup>

Today, the United States is the only pole in the international system. This conclusion can be reached from either of two directions. The simplest is to start with the end of the Cold War. The world was bipolar in the 1980s. The Soviet Union collapsed, the United States retained its power, and none of the second-tier powers of the era have caught up with the United States.<sup>28</sup> Thus the United States achieved unipolar status in the only way that is likely: not by outracing everyone else, but by having all of its rivals be defeated or collapse over the course of the 20th century. If this assessment seems to be simple, one may also examine polarity by looking at the standard realist measures of international capabilities.<sup>29</sup> The United States has the most capable military in the world – its military spending is nearly 50 per cent of the world total, and it is six times its nearest competitor, the United Kingdom.<sup>30</sup> It also has the single largest GDP in the world, with a per capita GDP that is among the world's highest. China at some point may rival the United States, but not yet; the only other possible match to the United States is the European Union taken as a whole. The EU, however, does not yet act as a single diplomatic unit, especially in security policy. The United States is the leading state in a unipolar system.

Two effects of this unipolar structure are particularly relevant to NATO. The first is that a unipolar power has less interest in maintaining a tight alliance structure than a bipolar one does. The second is that weaker states have an incentive to bandwagon with the unipolar power, rather than balance against it. The remainder of this section explains the derivation of these structural effects, and discusses how a GNATO would accommodate these systemic effects.

Unipolarity reduces the perceived value of alliances to the great power. In a bipolar world, alliances are tight and valuable because every ally might be needed in a conflict with the other pole. Defections are particularly feared. NATO, along with less-significant Cold War alliances, provided bases for American power, contributed forces to deter or defeat the bipolar rival, and equally importantly denied those countries from the Soviets' own alliance system. The collapse of bipolarity eliminated

most of these reasons for maintaining alliances. The United States still needed bases for projecting its military power, but the strategic value of Western Europe had dropped. The Balkan crises of the 1990s artificially prolonged the apparent utility of NATO bases, since the Wars of Yugoslav Secession occurred on alliance members' borders. American intervention in those wars was largely predicated on the need to maintain NATO's credibility – a need that only existed because NATO existed. Without NATO, Bosnia and Kosovo would truly have been Europe's problem. This may be seen in a variety of comments made under both the first Bush administration and the Clinton administration, such as Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger's observation in September 1992, 'Until the Bosnians, Serbs, and Croats decide to stop killing each other, there is nothing the outside world can do about it'<sup>31</sup> and Secretary of State Warren Christopher's observation in April 1993, this was 'a problem from hell'. Only after the French began calling for stronger action in May 1995 was NATO unity placed on the table – and only then did the United States begin to take serious action.<sup>32</sup>

Unipolar powers do not need strong alliances as much as great powers do in other systems. The unipolar power is not trying to balance or block the power of near-equals. The unipolar power is not worried about countries joining a rival's camp, because there are no state rivals and because unipolarity creates a preference for bandwagoning rather than balancing. A unipolar power has few restrictions on its ability to go to war, and it certainly does not need much material help (again, other than access to bases) to do so. Allies are likely to only slow down and complicate operations, while contributing little to the effort. On the other hand, allies may drag each other into undesired wars. This is a risk particularly salient when the alliance has so little value to the unipolar power.

The latter effect was noted in the Yugoslav wars. While it was never very likely that the Yugoslav Wars would escalate into direct attacks on any NATO member, the conflict nevertheless violated Europe's concept of acceptable behaviour and threatened to unleash both further wars in the region and refugees on NATO members. France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom were particularly active in their contributions to the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) that tried to enable humanitarian relief for Bosnians. They, and Italy, also contributed to the Western European Union's enforcement of a naval blockade on the former Yugoslavia. Several peace proposals would have ended the war with some form of Bosnian partition. All of these were rejected by the Clinton administration as rewarding aggression, and the United States soon stopped enforcing the blockade and allowed Croatia to build up the military force that would ultimately drive the Serbs to the table at Dayton. American advocacy of 'lift and strike' undermined the Europeans' diplomacy, prolonged the war, and resulted in a peace very similar to those rejected three years prior.

European embarrassment over Bosnia contributed to the Europeans' drive for their own security policy. The plan announced at St. Malo in December 1998 was met with hostility from the United States, hostility that only diminished when the Bush administration began wanting to free up more of its forces for use in Afghanistan and Iraq. The American lesson from Bosnia was that it should control

policy within the alliance – and thus the Kosovo war of 1999 was fought very much under American direction. Oddly enough, while Europeans felt that NATO had done nothing to limit American action, the United States concluded that NATO placed far too many restrictions on its actions. During this same time, the United States insisted that its preferred candidates – and no others – be admitted to full NATO membership. This overruled the French advocacy of Romania, Italy's preference for Slovenia, and Danish calls for a Baltic accession.<sup>33</sup>

American disregard for NATO took on a new dimension in September 2001. The alliance had never before invoked its Article V common defence provisions, but the North Atlantic Council voted that the 11 September terrorist attacks qualified. The United States rejected this offer because, in the words of Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, 'the mission determines the coalition, and we don't allow coalitions to determine the mission'.<sup>34</sup> The Americans preferred to launch their counterstrike on Afghanistan outside NATO parameters to avoid the diplomatic complications they remembered from Kosovo. NATO contributions to the American mission were limited to freeing American forces by conducting air patrols over US territory and replacing American troops that had been serving in Bosnia or Kosovo. These contributions were largely unacknowledged by American leaders.<sup>35</sup>

Two years after the American invasion of Afghanistan, NATO took command of the United Nations-authorized International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) stabilization mission. While at least 32 European countries have contributed to ISAF,<sup>36</sup> NATO has had trouble staffing its Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson noted in October 2003, 'Setting aside the United States, 18 countries with standing armies of 1.4 m soldiers and 1 m reserves must be able to field more than today's 55,000 troops on multi-national operations without being overstretched'.<sup>37</sup> The United States did not lead by example. As of 2005, only 100 Americans served in ISAF, about 1 per cent of the total. At the same time, over 10,000 Americans were in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the counterterrorism mission. In essence, there were two complementary missions in Afghanistan, one run by NATO and the other by the United States. Non-NATO, non-PfP contributors to ISAF have included Australia, New Zealand, Argentina, Jordan, and Malaysia.<sup>38</sup>

This pattern changed in 2006. The NATO stabilization mission expanded in stages to include the entire country, as opposed to only Kabul and its immediate vicinity. Parts of the OEF mission migrated to ISAF, though the primary counterterrorism mission remained with the United States and its *ad hoc* coalition. American troops also began to come under NATO authority in more significant numbers. In general, however, the Afghan war follows the trend begun in the Balkans. The United States prefers to fight under its own rules, minimally constrained by allies. European and other allies then take on a greater share of the burden as the conflict dies down or as American attention is diverted by other crises.

NATO has been involved only minimally in Iraq, continuing the trend set by the earlier conflicts. The invasion and occupation were conducted by a very small coalition of the willing, with NATO's contribution so far only to conduct a training mission, mostly outside Iraq. Before the war, NATO participated only in the provision of air defence missiles, reconnaissance aircraft, and chemical and biological

protection gear as requested by Turkey. This precautionary request was blocked in February 2003 in the North Atlantic Council by France, Germany, and Belgium, who argued that it would undermine diplomacy. Turkey's request was diverted to the Defence Planning Group, which did not include France, where it was approved.<sup>39</sup> Non-NATO, non-PfP contributors to the Iraq coalition have included Australia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Japan, Mongolia, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Philippines, South Korea, Thailand, and Tonga.<sup>40</sup>

For all this neglect of formal NATO structures, one must also note that most NATO members, as well as many other countries, contributed troops to both missions. This illustrates the other great structural effect of unipolarity on NATO: a tendency for bandwagoning. This concept is perhaps the most difficult to accept, largely because some scholars have muddled the definition of balancing beyond recognition. For that reason, a somewhat extended discussion of balancing and bandwagoning is in order.<sup>41</sup> Most simply, balancing is 'opposing the stronger or more threatening side in a conflict'.<sup>42</sup> In other words, it is a set of policies or actions that try to match, exceed, or block the power of a stronger state.<sup>43</sup> This may be internal, through trying to gain more strength, or external, as when a state joins or forms a coalition that opposes and excludes the balanced state. Bandwagoning, on the other hand, is best defined as 'joining the stronger coalition'.<sup>44</sup> Bandwagoning is a way of increasing one's power through sharing in the spoils of a winning side, or of demonstrating support for a dangerously powerful state. A bandwagoning state may hope that it will win favours from the stronger state, and may fear that trying to block the stronger state will bring only punishment.

The most common view among realists is that balancing will soon occur against the United States, producing a multipolar distribution of capabilities.<sup>45</sup> This belief is particularly strong among those who assume that states balance against power,<sup>46</sup> and it persists despite very little supporting evidence.<sup>47</sup> One of the foremost scholars of realism has recently argued, 'The recurrent formation of balances of power is crucial to Waltz's theory and, to a lesser extent, to traditional realism. If this is called in question, the theory's predictions will be off the mark, and its prescriptions may prove disastrous' in a unipolar system.<sup>48</sup> It is not at all clear that balancing must be so central to the realist perspective, though a full discussion of that argument is best left for other works.<sup>49</sup>

The most ambitious effort to address the question of balancing today, a collection of essays edited by John Ikenberry, suggests several possible explanations.<sup>50</sup> One is that states balance against threats<sup>51</sup> rather than power.<sup>52</sup> This approach suggests that balancing has been delayed because the United States does not seem dangerous to other countries. The United States is not geographically proximate to other major states, and other states believe that even though the United States has preponderant power, it can be counted upon not to do so. In addition to past behaviour, institutions constrain the exercise of American power and create American obligations to commit its forces to others. Institutional constraints help to overcome anarchy, as states change their preferences based on revised assumptions about the urgency of self-help behaviour.<sup>53</sup> Balancing would occur, in this view, only if the United States became more threatening.<sup>54</sup> Most realists reject such a role for institutions,<sup>55</sup> which are tools that allow a great power to 'lock in' its advantages.<sup>56</sup> The survival and

enlargement of NATO, and the decision by former Soviet states and satellites to abjure nuclear weapons in favour of closer ties to Western institutions support this argument.<sup>57</sup> Theory aside, the United States has not acted as if it were constrained by institutions. The United States has not been the most reliable member of institutional arrangements over the past decade, and the Europeans are well aware of that. They do not believe the United States respects institutional limits on its power. For non-liberal states such as Russia and China, liberal institutions are even less reassuring.<sup>58</sup>

A second explanation in Ikenberry's anthology for the absence of balancing focuses on the 'array of practical, everyday benefits that the American unipolar presence spreads around the world'.<sup>59</sup> Realists argue that this cannot last, because Americans will tire of providing those benefits. The extension of these benefits in the 1990s, and even the initial response to global terrorism only increased the gap between American ambition and public preferences, making a retraction of those benefits and a return to multipolarity even more likely.<sup>60</sup> This claim about waning American support seems non-falsifiable: either the United States stops providing public goods, or it continues to provide them, making it all the more likely that it is about to stop providing public goods. In any case, just as with the constraining role of institutions, there are those who would disagree that American unipolarity provides such benefits. One would expect them to balance.

The third explanation advanced in Ikenberry's anthology for the absence of balancing holds that balancing is actually occurring, but via different means than in the past. For example, balancing today may take the form of status and prestige – although status and prestige did not help the European Union resolve the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s without American military power.<sup>61</sup> Joseph Joffe suggests that there are three types of balancing, two of which were somewhat unrecognized up to this time. While there has been very little 'military-strategic' balancing, we are seeing 'politico-diplomatic' balancing in the lack of support for American initiatives and attempts to bind the United States with international institutions. Most of all, we see 'psycho-social' balancing, as states try to block the seduction of American soft power by claiming that the United States is morally, socially, and culturally retrograde.<sup>62</sup> Neither of these last two involves material capabilities, which is why they have been labelled 'soft' balancing.

Soft balancing more generally includes 'measures that do not directly challenge U.S. military predominance but that use nonmilitary tools to delay, frustrate, and undermine aggressive unilateral U.S. military policies'.<sup>63</sup> Some of these tools are 'international institutions, economic statecraft, and diplomatic arrangements'.<sup>64</sup> In another version, 'states that engage in soft balancing develop diplomatic coalitions or ententes with one another to balance a powerful state or a rising or potentially threatening power. The veto power that these states hold in the UN Security Council is pivotal to this strategy' because it 'den[ies] legitimacy to [US] policies they perceive as imperial and sovereignty limiting'.<sup>65</sup> In yet another version, soft balancing 'accepts the current balance of power but seeks to obtain better outcomes within it', manifesting itself via diplomatic coordination.<sup>66</sup>

These arguments should seem like abominations to a realist. For the most part, these are non-material forms of balancing, and thus lie outside the bounds of realism. There is a large difference between non-cooperation and balancing,

especially when the non-cooperation does not prevent action by the unipolar power.<sup>67</sup> These behaviours could have many causes, such as economic self-interest, domestic preferences, or merely being by-products of diplomacy.<sup>68</sup> They could even reflect mere conflicts of interest, normal politics for a realist.<sup>69</sup> Even states that are bandwagoning try to find the best result for themselves. In any case, non-cooperation can go both ways. Since the United States finds it 'much easier for it to walk away from agreements than other countries', relative power may be understood as the 'differential costs of noncooperation'.<sup>70</sup> Most importantly, 'soft balancing' threatens to stretch the concept of balancing to the point where it becomes non-falsifiable.<sup>71</sup>

In keeping with the traditions of realism, this article looks only for 'hard balancing', or for bandwagoning. Bandwagoning is not exactly the opposite of balancing, which would be 'supporting the stronger or more threatening side in a conflict'. Such bandwagoning borders on capitulation, which is rarely a good strategy for gaining either power or security. Bandwagoning is not surrender; bandwagoning is pursuing one's goals by following another's banner. Bandwagoning is better defined as 'joining the stronger coalition'.<sup>72</sup> States bandwagon because they wish to be on the winning side, as at the end of World War II and in the global turn toward economic liberalism in the 1990s. Sometimes bandwagoning and balancing mirror each other, and it is hard to be sure which dominates. When Western European countries joined NATO, for example, they were simultaneously balancing against the Soviet Union and bandwagoning with the United States. In the absence of a Soviet threat, however, NATO becomes more clearly an agent of bandwagoning.

In some cases, especially when another power is addressing the threats perceived by both, states have a strong incentive to adopt the weak form of bandwagoning known as bystanding or buckpassing – allowing the unipolar power to bear the primary cost of actions that benefit everyone. This collective action problem arises because the benefits of defeating the threat cannot be restricted to those who help defeat it. Other benefits, however, may be excludable. The unipolar power can provide a share in the spoils, or preferential access to other sources of power, to those states that join its efforts.<sup>73</sup> Thus the bandwagoning powers achieve gains beyond the defeat or containment of the mutual threat – and thus gain relative to the major powers that bystand instead. Bandwagoning is even a useful strategy for minor powers with respect to the danger posed by the unipolar power itself. Association with the unipolar power may allow a state to at least keep pace with the unipolar state's power, leaving it in a better position for the future than if it fell further behind. Europeans and their leaders do not seem to like American policy, but they have nearly all supported it and have done very little of any substance to block it. This has been apparent under both the Clinton and Bush administrations.

The absence of balancing is the easiest to demonstrate. Keeping in mind that realism addresses only material factors, balancing consists of some combination of the following: the formation of military alliances that exclude the balanced state, military spending that at least keeps pace with the balanced state, the development of weapons systems that target the balanced state, and taking actions that physically frustrate the balanced state's use of power. None of these has occurred with respect to Europe, with the single exception of Turkey's denial of its territory for a northern

front in the invasion of Iraq. European defence spending has declined relative to the United States,<sup>74</sup> NATO remains intact, and there are no European weapons systems targeted at the United States, as far as we know.

Far from balancing, European states have bandwagoned with the United States, allying with it and assisting it in its use of power. Not only has NATO remained intact, it has added 10 members since the dawn of unipolarity. Central Europeans have actively joined the United States, and the rest have stayed with it. Europeans have also made it easier for the United States to exercise its power. NATO and the European Union each took on roles in stabilizing Bosnia and Kosovo, despite European disgruntlement with the way the United States handled those crises. Macedonia and Bosnia have become proving grounds for the Europeans' own security policy, as EU forces have replaced NATO in both places. The net effect of these missions, which of course also serve European interests, has been to free up American forces for the invasions and occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq.

The pattern of assisting American power has persisted into the Bush presidency. Thirty-two different European countries have supported the US-initiated, NATO-led operations in Afghanistan. The 2006 mission shift came just as violent opposition to NATO and the United States began to increase, so it resulted in increased casualties among NATO members. From the initial attacks in October 2002 through the end of 2005, the United States sustained nearly 80 per cent of the coalition losses in Afghanistan – 259 of 325. Of the 191 coalition deaths in Afghanistan in 2006, the United States suffered 98, just over half of the total. Particularly hard-hit were Britain and Canada, which have suffered over five-sixths of their fatalities during the war since March 2006.<sup>75</sup>

Even with respect to the Iraq war, European opposition to the United States was less than is sometimes recalled. While perhaps France and Germany engaged in 'soft balancing' by helping deny the United States a UNSC mandate for the policy it would nevertheless follow, those countries were in the minority. Other European countries broke with them, most dramatically in the 30 January 2003 joint statement by the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Denmark, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. They argued, in a clear statement of bandwagoning, 'Today more than ever, the transatlantic bond is a guarantee of our freedom ... The transatlantic relationship must not become a casualty of the current Iraqi regime's persistent attempts to threaten world security.' Furthermore, they said, 'Our goal is to safeguard world peace and security by ensuring that this regime gives up its weapons of mass destruction'. Without disarmament, 'the Security Council will lose its credibility and world peace will suffer as a result'.<sup>76</sup> A few weeks later, the European Council reached a common position that had much in common with American policy.<sup>77</sup>

While bandwagoning did not include much European participation in the invasion of Iraq, before long 21 European countries joined the coalition in Iraq, at least for a while.<sup>78</sup> Even Germany, which did not send forces to Iraq, made the American task easier by assuming security duties on American bases in Germany – freeing US forces for Iraq or other duties. All NATO members at least minimally support the training mission in Iraq. These policies are even more remarkable given the near-universal public opposition to the war and the United States. From 1999 to 2006,

favourable opinions of the United States have dropped from 83 per cent to 56 per cent in the United Kingdom; from 78 per cent to 37 per cent in Germany; from 62 per cent to 39 per cent in France; and from 50 per cent to 23 per cent in Spain.<sup>79</sup> In all of these countries, at least 60 per cent felt that the war in Iraq had made the world more dangerous.<sup>80</sup>

Late in 2005, an even greater revelation of European bandwagoning broke into public awareness. Allegations were published that countries – perhaps Poland and Romania – had hosted secret prisons for terrorist suspects. Details were also published of European nationals being transported by the CIA to prisons in distant countries, where they were subject to very harsh treatment. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe concluded in June 2006 that ‘these incidents . . . were made possible either by seriously negligent monitoring or by the more or less active participation of one or more . . . Council of Europe member states’.<sup>81</sup> European governments declined to cooperate in the investigation or show much concern with it. In a January 2007 report, a special committee of the European Parliament (EP) severely chastised the European Council and its Member States, concluding ‘that it is unlikely that certain European governments were unaware of the extraordinary rendition activities taking place in their territory’.<sup>82</sup> It singled out the United Kingdom, Italy and Germany for being particularly egregious violators of European standards by participating and then deceiving the EP, and also Poland and Romania for hosting and refusing to investigate ‘secret detention facilities’.<sup>83</sup> The EP noted lesser problems with Sweden, Austria, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Cyprus, Denmark, Belgium, Turkey, Macedonia, and Bosnia – not all of whom are usually counted among the American allies most supportive of its current defence policy.<sup>84</sup> The committee condemned ‘the acceptance and concealing of the practice, on several occasions, by the secret services and governmental authorities of certain European Countries’ and the wilful disinterest in learning what the American programme entailed.<sup>85</sup> Perhaps more than any other incident, cooperation with renditions shows the depth of bandwagoning.

Nevertheless, popular antipathy towards the United States is a brake on the extent of European–American cooperation. Italy and Germany have since brought charges against CIA agents. As Fraser Cameron of the European Policy Center has pointed out, there is no political gain for any current European leader in being seen as ‘pro-Bush’.<sup>86</sup> Those leaders have noted the change in American attitudes, in particular the apparent silencing of Vice President Dick Cheney and then-Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, whose well-known inflammatory comments had not made the relationship easier. The working relationships are strong, at all levels of EU–US relations, but the public is not interested in additional defence spending. Even the Afghanistan mission is perceived negatively, as it becomes more difficult; the public does not see the American approach to terrorism as helpful, despite or perhaps because of the ‘Islamic incidents’ affecting Europe. Most relevant to the issue at hand, a tendency toward bandwagoning does not mean support for every American-supported initiative: thus Global Partners was watered down at Riga.

A GNATO building upon Riga would neatly address realist concerns and principles. A looser form of alliance would allow the United States to receive most of

the benefits of NATO – interoperability and additional forces – while perhaps being less constrained by the consensus of the formal organization. In a unipolar world, no tighter alliance is likely to survive. For other states, GNATO thus makes it more likely that the alliance survives with the United States as a member, as opposed to fading away. A GNATO also makes it easier for the alliance to be used as a vehicle for bandwagoning with the United States – laundering the unpopular direct cooperation through the institution. GNATO better hides the bandwagoning than the traditional transatlantic version. Thus the revised alliance would be an easier vehicle for consolidating the power of like-minded states around the United States. Since these countries also happen to share the same liberal political and economic ideology as the United States, this newly ordered NATO would also end up being intriguing from the liberal perspective, to which we shall now turn.

### Liberal Perspective

Realism's great competitor in terms of theories of international politics is liberalism, the notion that conflicts between states can be effectively mediated through the intervention of institutions like law, democracy, trade, or shared values.<sup>87</sup> Realists acknowledge that institutions may channel state interests and ease cooperation. Stephen Krasner took a stronger line, arguing that the institutions he called regimes can have a feedback effect on state preferences. They may 'alter actors' calculations of how to maximize their interests, . . . may alter interests themselves, . . . become a source of power . . . , [or] alter the power capabilities of different actors'.<sup>88</sup> Such institutions can have two types of effects. The first is that states will apply the institution, once it is created, to serve new purposes, as we see with NATO since the 1990s.<sup>89</sup> This reflects a certain reluctance to dismantle an institution that seems to have outlived its original purpose, since it might turn out to be useful in the future.<sup>90</sup> The second effect is that the institution may constrain action, and perhaps even consideration of options, to such an extent that its members become self-bound by the institution.<sup>91</sup> If this occurs, then non-material factors would be explaining a part of international behaviour, placing the institution in the realm of liberalism rather than realism. Two considerations are most important for such institutions: legitimacy and effectiveness.

One of the critical problems for international institutions is how to achieve legitimacy for their actions. For the past 60 years, the United Nations has enjoyed presumptive legitimacy, based on its universal membership. Even the UN can be critiqued, however. Its Security Council, the body that addresses threats to international peace, includes only 15 non-representative states. Five large states, victors in the Second World War, can veto any UNSC measure. While a bias for inaction prevents illegitimate actions from taking place, it obstructs the liberal goal of progress toward resolving some of the world's ills. Some could point to how China and Russia can and have blocked effective resolutions on the Darfur genocide and Iranian nuclear development; others could point to American vetoes of resolutions aimed at Israel. That said, as Alliot-Marie has pointed out, a GNATO might also 'send a bad political message: that of a campaign launched by the West against those who don't share their

ideas. What a pretext we would offer to those who promote the idea of a clash of civilizations.<sup>92</sup>

Legitimacy is often in tension with effectiveness. The achievement of liberal goals through international institutions requires the establishment of institutions whose member states are reasonably committed to liberal goals. The European Union is comfortable with that role for itself. As one close advisor to the Council noted, while the United Kingdom, Germany and France could engage in diplomacy with Iran, they could not legitimately impose sanctions on their own – only the EU could do that (and, presumably, the UN).<sup>93</sup> When the UN declined to authorize the use of force during the Kosovo crisis, EU members accepted the substitution of NATO for the UN. The United Nations often fails to take action because it is too inclusive of states that do not share liberal goals. The ‘least common denominator’ policy on issues like Darfur or Iran, to give only current examples, is tiny. An alliance of democracies would, however, evoke Kant’s pacific union of liberal republics, forming a separate compact as a step toward ‘perpetual peace’.<sup>94</sup>

A GNATO has the potential to approach the UN in legitimacy while having far more effectiveness at maintaining international stability. The GNATO, especially with the flexible geometry of coalitions of the willing, would be more likely to agree to act against a threat to international security than the UN would be – to put it another way, it is difficult to imagine a GNATO member blocking something that would get through the UN. The GNATO members would have an overwhelming proportion of usable global military and economic power. Legitimacy is more difficult to achieve, but would be enhanced if non-Western liberal states like South Africa and India were willing to join. This notion would no doubt have its opponents – Putin in February criticized the Italian defence minister for implying that the EU or NATO could substitute for the UN<sup>95</sup> – but with a sufficient membership this may be surmountable. The legitimacy of such an organization would certainly be higher than that of the United States acting alone or with an ad hoc coalition of the willing, or even of NATO as currently constituted. As an organization of liberal states, it would also be able to compete with the United Nations, where authoritarians judge human rights and aggressors weigh dangers to peace.

With a unipolar distribution of power, the collective action problem posed by flexible coalitions within NATO also is made less salient. During the Cold War, NATO’s security guarantee presented a minimal collective action problem. The good of collective defence was clearly excludable. Under Article 5, the Soviets could invade non-members Hungary and Czechoslovakia with impunity. In theory, at least, members that did not live up to their alliance commitments could cease to be protected.<sup>96</sup> Likewise, Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty specified a geographic area for protection, thus excluding the protection of overseas colonial territories like Portuguese Goa or British Falklands when they were invaded by India and Argentina, respectively.<sup>97</sup> Furthermore, the particular means of providing security, nuclear deterrence, was essentially non-rival in consumption. A single nuclear deterrent, maintained by the United States and supplemented by the United Kingdom and France, could provide security simultaneously to all members.<sup>98</sup>

The good provided by NATO’s more recent missions, like those of the EU, on the other hand, seems to be rival and non-excludable, which presents serious problems for

collective action. Maintaining or establishing civil order in the Balkans, for example, provides benefits such as reducing refugees, creating trading partners, and reducing the chance that the conflict would spill over into a more direct security threat. These benefits are diffuse in that they go to the entire region, without excludability. Furthermore, conventional and non-traditional forces are needed in the country to execute the peace operation. Their consumption is clearly rival, both in the brutally literal sense that soldiers may lose their lives during the mission, and in the more general sense that forces are limited. As a result, peace operations will tend to be underprovided and overconsumed.<sup>99</sup> There is a great incentive to 'free ride' on others' intervention: allow them to provide the forces and put their citizens' lives at risk, and then enjoy the trade and stability that results. Furthermore, there will be a tendency for an individual state to try to steer the available forces towards conflicts of greatest national interest, or to preserve them from being dedicated to a more distant crisis. States will become reluctant to act because of others' free riding, or even because of the possibility that others will take advantage of them. One might expect that a GNATO, with global missions, would make this problem worse.

This assessment, however, assumes that the only good provided by NATO to non-American members is the provision of peace. NATO also provides a means of bandwagoning with the United States while seeming to be supporting an international institution, and also a means of trying to influence American policy. In return, the United States can offer rewards for cooperation: preferential treatment in military basing, the prestige of being a respected ally, and greater attention to the preferences of cooperative allies. Such rewards would be easy to exclude from free riders – indeed, they would be easier to exclude in practice than the benefits of shared defence, since the United States would suffer little from restricting the distribution of such benefits to the more cooperative allies. While the gains from military basing, such as they are, would be rival in consumption, prestige would be non-rival, and the influence of such allies over American power would actually increase with greater participation. In a unipolar world, GNATO need not face much of a collective action problem; the difficulty today is the mandate for consensus as opposed to flexible participation.

## Conclusion

This article has discussed a proposal that officially is no longer being proposed. This would seem to diminish its value, but the history of recent European and transatlantic politics suggests that no idea is ever truly dead. GNATO obviously would not solve every problem facing its membership. Relatively few international security problems have direct military solutions – Iranian nuclear enrichment, for example. Furthermore, GNATO would not fully be able to overcome charges of illegitimacy. Among other things, one might view GNATO as simply a roadmap for the expansion of American power. It is not. There are several factors that inherently limit the prospect of global American hegemony. First of all, GNATO would need to resolve the fundamental problems of free riding discussed above. Such a rational incentive structure would always constrain GNATO. American power has value to

the international system, but only to a point. GNATO would meet the various material interests of liberal states, and help to resolve the institutional dilemma of promoting international peace. GNATO would serve the American interest in having a flexible pool of allies upon which it could rely without being excessively committed to a single group, and enhance the structural reflex towards bandwagoning. GNATO would serve other liberal states' interests in keeping the United States in an alliance, rather than running free and unilateral, and also their interest in bandwagoning with the United States while laundering that cooperation through an institution. GNATO would create a more effective international organization with a more plausible claim to legitimacy than any organization short of the UN itself.

## NOTES

1. The views expressed in this article are those of its authors, and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the United States government, Department of Defence, or any of its subordinate organizations, especially the United States Air Force Academy. Portions reprinted, with permission, are arguments from the authors' book *The Unipolar World: An Unbalanced Future* (New York: Palgrave, 2007).
2. So described in Sten Rynning, *NATO Renewed: The Power and Purpose of Transatlantic Cooperation* (New York: Palgrave, 2005). Others with similar views include: Daniel Hamilton (ed.), *Transatlantic Transformation: Equipping NATO for the 21st Century* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004); Franz Oswald, *Europe and the United States: The Emerging Security Partnership* (New York: Praeger, 2007); Colin L. Powell, 'A Strategy of Partnerships', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.83, No.1 (Jan./Feb. 2004), pp.22–34; Robert B. McCalla, 'NATO's Persistence after the Cold War', *International Organization*, Vol.50, No.3 (Summer 1996), pp.445–75; Stephen M. Walt, 'Why Alliances Endure or Collapse', *Survival*, Vol.39, No.1 (Spring 1997), pp.156–79; Anthony Forster and William Wallace, 'What is NATO For?', *Survival*, Vol.43, No.4 (Winter 2001–02), pp.107–22; Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Steve Weber, 'Shaping the Postwar Balance of Power: Multilateralism in NATO', *International Organization*, Vol.46, No.3 (Summer 1992), pp.633–80; James B. Steinberg, 'An Elective Partnership: Salvaging Transatlantic Relations', *Survival*, Vol.45, No.2 (Summer 2003), pp.113–46; Celeste A. Wallander, 'Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War', *International Organization*, Vol.54, No.4 (Autumn 2000), pp.705–35; Wallace J. Thies, *Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2003); Mark R. Brawley and Pierre Martin (eds), *Alliance Politics, Kosovo, and NATO's War: Allied Force or Forced Allies?* (New York: Palgrave, 2000); and John S. Duffield, 'NATO's Functions after the Cold War', *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol.109, No.5 (Winter 1994/95), pp.763–87.
3. So described in Richard E. Rupp, *NATO after 9/11: An Alliance in Continuing Decline* (New York: Palgrave, 2006). Others with similar views include: Laurent Cohen-Tanugi, *An Alliance at Risk: The United States and Europe since Sept. 11* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003); Heinz Gärtner (ed.), *European Security and Transatlantic Relations after 9/11 and the Iraq War: A Force in the Road* (New York: Palgrave, 2005); Elizabeth Pond, 'The Greek Tragedy of NATO', *Internationale Politik (Transatlantic Edition)*, Vol.4, No.1 (Spring 2003), pp.1–10; Peter van Ham, 'Security and Culture, or Why NATO Won't Last', *Security Dialogue*, Vol.32, No.4 (2001), pp.393–406; Ronald D. Asmus, 'Rebuilding the Atlantic Alliance', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.82, No.5 (Sept./Oct. 2003), pp.20–31; Philip Gordon, 'Bridging the Atlantic Divide', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.82, No.1 (Jan./Feb. 2003), pp.70–83; Dominique Moisi, 'Reinventing the West', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.82, No.6 (Nov./Dec. 2003), pp.67–73; Strobe Talbott, 'From Prague to Baghdad: NATO at Risk', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.81, No.6 (Nov./Dec. 2002), pp.46–57; Michael Brenner, 'Multilateralism and European Security', *Survival*, Vol.35, No.2 (Summer 1993), pp.138–55; Kenneth N. Waltz, 'The Emerging Structure of International Politics', *International Security*, Vol.18, No.2 (Fall 1993), pp.44–79; Elizabeth Pond, *Friendly Fire: The Near-Death of the Transatlantic Alliance* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004); Christopher Layne, 'Death Knell for NATO? The Bush Administration Confronts the European Security and Defense Policy', *CATO Institute Policy Analysis*, No.394 (4 April 2001); Ted Galen Carpenter, *NATO's Empty Victory: A Postmortem on the Balkan War* (Washington, DC: CATO Institute, 2000);

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4. See, for example, 'Defending Freedom, Fostering Cooperation, and Promoting Stability', Statement of General James L. Jones, Jr., Commander, United States European Command, to the Senate Armed Forces Committee, 10 April 2003.
  5. Australia, the most prominent other state to join such coalitions, uses these standards as well.
  6. *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy*, Dec. 2003, p.1.
  7. *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, Sept. 2002, p.25.
  8. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, speech at the 42nd Munich Conference on Security Policy, 4 Feb. 2006.
  9. Scheffer, speech at the joint meeting between the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and the North Atlantic Council, Paris, 30 May 2006. The most prominent published discussions of the concept include Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier, 'Global NATO', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.85, No.5 (Sept./Oct. 2006); and Ronald D. Asmus (ed.), *NATO and Global Partners: Views from the Outside* (Washington, DC: The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2006).
  10. Scheffer, speech at the Canadian War Museum, Ottawa, 15 June 2006, author's translation.
  11. Michèle Alliot-Marie, 'Don't Diminish NATO's Effectiveness', published in *The Washington Times*, 20 Oct. 2006, and *Le Figaro*, 30 Oct. 2006. Text obtained from French Embassy to the United Kingdom, available at <<http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Michele-Alliot-Marie-s-writes-in.html>>.
  12. Alliot-Marie, 'Don't Diminish NATO's Effectiveness'.
  13. Mark John, 'U.S. "Global NATO" Plan to Get Summit Thumbs-Down', *Reuters*, 24 Nov. 2006, available at <<http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L24223908.htm>>.
  14. Riga Summit Declaration, 29 Nov. 2006, paragraphs 11–13.
  15. Vladimir Putin, speech at the Munich Conference on Security Policy, 10 Feb. 2007, accessed at the President of Russia website, <[http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2007/02/11/0138\\_type82914\\_type84779\\_118135.shtml](http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2007/02/11/0138_type82914_type84779_118135.shtml)>.
  16. Ibid.
  17. Ibid.
  18. For full discussion, see Thomas S. Mowle, *Allies at Odds: The United States and the European Union* (New York: Palgrave, 2004), pp.126–34; Michael Quinlan, *European Defense Cooperation: Asset or Threat to NATO?* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001); Anand Menon, *France, NATO and the Limits of Independence, 1981–97: The Politics of Ambivalence* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan, 2000); John Borawski and Thomas-Durell Young, *NATO after 2000: The Future of the Euro-Atlantic Alliance* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001); and Pierre Henri-Laurent, 'NATO and the European Union: The Quest for a Security/Defense Identity', in S. Victor Papacosma, Sean Kay and Mark R. Rubin (eds), *NATO after Fifty Years* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 2001).
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  20. The classic works are Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979); and Mearsheimer, *Tragedy of Great Power Politics*.
  21. A point initiated by Randall L. Schweller, 'Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In', *International Security*, Vol.19 (1994), pp.72–107.
  22. Barry Posen, 'Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony', *International Security*, Vol.28 (Summer 2003), pp.5–46, is one who makes this clear.
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26. Schweller, *Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p.17.
27. Hubert Védrine, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, ‘Into the Twenty-First’, speech at the opening of the IFRI Conference, Paris, 3 Nov. 1999.
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30. Unless otherwise noted, data in this paragraph are from *SIPRI Yearbook 2004: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp.340–65, 628–46.
31. Richard C. Holbrooke, *To End a War*, rev. ed. (New York: Modern Library, 1999), p.23.
32. See Mowle, *Allies at Odds*, pp.118–23, Holbrooke, *To End a War*, pp.65–7.
33. See Mowle, *Allies at Odds*, pp.123–6; Ronald D. Asmus, *Opening NATO’s Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), pp.134–174, 238–245.
34. Donald Rumsfeld, *Statement on Face the Nation*, 23 Sept. 2001.
35. See Tom Lansford, *All for One: Terrorism, NATO and the United States* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002).
36. ISAF website, <<http://www.afnorth.nato.int/ISAF/index.htm>>.
37. Lord George Robertson, Introductory Statement at press conference, Colorado Springs, 9 Oct. 2003.
38. ISAF website.
39. Richard Bernstein with Steven R. Weisman, ‘NATO Settles Rift over Aid to Turks in Case of a War’, *The New York Times*, 17 Feb. 2003, available at <<http://www.nytimes.com>>.
40. Global Security, available at <[http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq\\_orbat\\_coalition.htm](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_orbat_coalition.htm)>.
41. Much of this section excerpts Mowle and Sacko, *Unipolar World*, pp.30–5, 65–71.
42. Schweller, *Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p.66.
43. These definitions are congruent with those in Schweller, ‘Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing’, *International Security*, Vol.29 (Fall 2004), p.166.
44. Schweller, *Deadly Imbalances*, p.67.
45. For the earliest views on the subject, see Christopher Layne and Benjamin Schwarz, ‘American Hegemony – Without an Enemy’, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.92 (Fall 1993), pp.5–23; Layne, ‘Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise’, *International Security*, Vol.17 (Spring 1993), pp.5–51; and Waltz, ‘Emerging Structure’. The expectation is sustained through the other realists discussed in this section.
46. Michael Mastanduno, ‘Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War’, *International Security*, Vol.21 (Spring 1997), pp.53–63; and Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels, ‘Mercantile Realism and Japanese Foreign Policy’, in Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno (eds), *Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), p.184.
47. Michael Mastanduno and Ethan B. Kapstein, ‘Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War’, in *Unipolar Politics*, pp.5–6.
48. Schweller, ‘Realism and the Present Great Power System’, in *Unipolar Politics*, p.37.

49. Mowle and Sacko, *Unipolar World*, pp.35–42. John A. Vasquez, 'The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative versus Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing Proposition', *American Political Science Review*, Vol.91 (Dec. 1997), p.903, asserts the non-centrality of balancing as well.
50. G. John Ikenberry, 'Introduction', in Ikenberry (ed.), *America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), pp.5, 23–5.
51. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), p.5.
52. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p.126. Wohlforth, 'The Perception of Power: Russia in the Pre-1914 Balance', *World Politics*, Vol.39 (April 1987), pp.353–81, argues that states cannot react to the actual distribution of power, but only to their leaders' perceptions of power. Hans Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Knopf, 1960), pp.227–33, says this 'not only makes the balance of power incapable of practical application but leads also to its very negation in practice'.
53. Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), *International Regimes* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983). Versions of this argument are advanced by Robert A. Pape, 'Soft Balancing against the United States', *International Security*, Vol.30 (Summer 2005), pp.9, 13–15; and T.V. Paul, 'Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy', *International Security*, Vol.30 (Summer 2005), pp.53–7.
54. Walt, *Taming American Power*, pp.124–6.
55. Mearsheimer, 'False Promise'; Joseph Grieco, 'Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism', *International Organization*, Vol.42 (Summer 1988), pp.485–507.
56. Ikenberry, 'Democracy, Institutions, and American Restraint', in *America Unrivaled*, pp.214–23.
57. Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, 'Realism, Structural Liberalism, and the Western Order', in *Unipolar Politics*, pp.103–37; Mark Kramer, 'Neorealism, Nuclear Proliferation, and East–Central European Strategies', in *Unipolar Politics*, pp.385–463.
58. John M. Owen IV, 'Transnational Liberalism and American Primacy; or, Benignity is in the Eye of the Beholder', in *America Unrivaled*, pp.239–59.
59. Ikenberry, 'Introduction', p.24.
60. Charles A. Kupchan, 'Hollow Hegemony or Stable Multipolarity?', in *America Unrivaled*, pp.77–8.
61. Schweller, 'Realism and the Present Great Power System', pp.42–9.
62. Josef Joffe, 'Defying History and Theory: The United States as the Last Remaining Superpower', in *America Unrivaled*, pp.172–7.
63. Pape, 'Soft Balancing', p.10.
64. *Ibid.*
65. *Ibid.*, pp.10, 58–9.
66. Walt, *Taming American Power*, p.126.
67. Walt, 'Keeping the World "Off-Balance": Self-Restraint and U.S. Foreign Policy', in *America Unrivaled*, pp.125–8.
68. Stephen G. Brooks and Stephen G. Wohlforth, 'Hard Times for Soft Balancing', *International Security*, Vol.30 (Summer 2005), pp.72–108.
69. Keir A. Lieber and Gerard Alexander, 'Waiting for Balancing', *International Security*, Vol.30 (Summer 2005), pp.130–3.
70. Ikenberry, 'Introduction', p.25.
71. Brooks and Wohlforth, 'Correspondence: Striking the Balance', *International Security*, Vol.30 (Winter 2005/06), pp.186–91; Lieber and Alexander, 'Correspondence: Striking the Balance', *International Security*, Vol.30 (Winter 2005/06), pp.191–6.
72. Schweller, *Deadly Imbalances*, p.67.
73. Neil McFarlane, 'Realism and Russian Strategy after the Collapse of the USSR', in *Unipolar Politics*, pp.228–31, describes how bandwagoning serves the interests of Russia and its leaders; his discussion implies that it would apply to China as well.
74. See *SIPRI Yearbook 2004*, pp.340–65, 628–46.
75. The UK lost 41 of its total war losses of 46 soldiers since March, including the only two recorded coalition deaths in 2007 (as of 8 Feb.), and Canada 36 of its 44. The only prior case of a country (other than the United States) suffering more than 10 deaths in one calendar year was Spain, which lost 18 in 2005. Numbers calculated from data maintained at <<http://www.icasualties.org/oef/>>.
76. Quoted from the version printed as "The Transatlantic Bond is Our Guarantee of Freedom": Declaration of Eight European Leaders in Support of United States on Iraq', *Washington Post*, 30 Jan. 2003, available at <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/>>.

77. Conclusions of the Extraordinary European Council, Brussels, 17 Feb. 2003, Council of the European Union document number 6466/03.
78. Global Security, available at <[http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq\\_orbat\\_coalition.htm](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_orbat_coalition.htm)>, lists Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom.
79. PEW Global Attitudes Project 15-Nation Survey, 13 June 2006, p.1. These countries' views of Americans, as opposed to the country, have stayed much more positive during this period.
80. PEW Global Attitudes Project 15-Nation Survey, p.13.
81. 'Alleged Secret Detentions and Unlawful Inter-state Transfers Involving Council of Europe Member States', Committee of Legal Affairs and Human Rights of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 7 June 2006, p.8.
82. 'Report on the Alleged Use of European Countries by the CIA for the Transportation and Illegal Detention of Prisoners', Temporary Committee of the European Parliament, Report A6-9999/2007, 26 Jan. 2007, p.11.
83. *Ibid.*, pp.11–6, 23–7.
84. *Ibid.*, pp.16–23.
85. *Ibid.*, pp.10–1.
86. Personal interview in Brussels, July 2007.
87. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 'Neorealism and Neoliberalism', *World Politics*, Vol.40 (Jan. 1988), p.246.
88. Stephen D. Krasner, 'Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous Variables', in Krasner (ed.), *International Regimes* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), p.361; Robert O. Keohane, 'Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research', *International Journal*, Vol.45, No.4 (Autumn 1990), pp.731–64, at p.737.
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90. Arthur Stein, 'Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World', *International Organization*, Vol.36 (Spring 1982), pp.294–314.
91. Jervis, 'Understanding the Debate', pp.58–9.
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94. See Michael W. Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace* (New York: Norton, 1997), pp.253–8.
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96. The Treaty text does not explicitly provide for this, however.
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99. Leggold, 'Collective Action Problem', p.96.