

Book Reviews

Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons. Joseph Cirincione. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007, pp. 224. \$27.50 (hardback).

This excellent book presents a balanced assessment of the nuclear threat in the post-11 September era. Joseph Cirincione, Vice President for National Security at the Center for American Progress in Washington DC, uniquely combines a first-rate overview of 60 years of 'living with the bomb', with a theoretical and policy-oriented analysis of the challenges we face today as we enter a second nuclear age. Informed by Cirincione's long experience in non-proliferation, the book is a very important contribution to a much-needed national debate on the nuclear predicament.

The goal of nuclear abolition has been on the back burner for so long that as Mikhail Gorbachev notes, 'it will take a true political breakthrough and a major intellectual effort to achieve success in this endeavour'. This book is an important contribution to that intellectual effort. It examines why countries go – and do not go – nuclear and argues that the world is less dangerous now than it was during the Cold War. The author identifies four nuclear threats in the post-9/11 era: the danger of nuclear terrorism; the challenge of existing nuclear arsenals with thousands of warheads on hair-trigger alert; the danger of new nuclear weapon states emerging; and the real risk that the entire non-proliferation regime could collapse. He rightly notes that 'it is difficult, if not impossible' for the United States to convince other states to give up nuclear weapon ambitions when it reasserts the importance of nuclear weapons for its own security (p. 106).

The author notes that one of the reasons the domestic political debate in the United States has not moved forward is that security experts have a stake in keeping the US nuclear arsenal alive and well. 'For those who made their careers [during the Cold War] as defense experts it was never totally safe to be on the left of a strategic debate, and in a time when the country was in a conservative mood, it was downright dangerous (p. 134)'. He also notes that the Democrats are particularly vulnerable to accusations that they are 'weak on defense' (*ibid.*). Talking seriously about nuclear disarmament is still taboo in academic and policy-making circles, although the issue is no longer monopolized by 'the left'. Even former officials of Republican administrations, such as Henry Kissinger and George Schultz, are making a 'realist' case for a world free of nuclear weapons, calling for US leadership to move in that direction (see George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, 'A World Free of Nuclear Weapons', *The Wall Street Journal*, 4 January 2007).

Cirincione acknowledges that Bush administration non-proliferation policies have achieved 'a number of nonproliferation successes' (p. 115). Yet these policies, including the US–India nuclear deal that he rightly criticizes have reversed more than a quarter-century of American declaratory policy, while seriously damaging the non-proliferation regime (pp. 105–8). Moreover, some of Bush's non-proliferation 'wins' are not clear-cut. Libyan President Muammar Qaddafi may have renounced

nuclear weapons for economic and prestige reasons, rather than as a response to US military actions in Iraq. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) has been criticized for violating international law, hampering international commerce, and allowing greater powers to the US military. The new US policy focuses on 'eliminating regimes, not arsenals' (pp. 112–15). Yet the Iraq war – 'the most significant and direct application of [Bush's] new approach to nonproliferation' – has failed to accomplish the administration's objectives (p. 117). Cirincione examines 'ten key failures' of Bush's new nonproliferation policy, including an increasing danger of nuclear terrorism, the acceleration of Iran and North Korea's nuclear efforts, and the end of negotiated reductions in US–Russian nuclear arsenals (pp. 119–20). Arguably, the basic flaw of the current American policy is the total absence of any serious strategy to make progress toward the abolition of nuclear weapons, the most effective way of preventing the threat of nuclear terrorism.

Cirincione argues that the best American nonproliferation strategy is 'the right combination of force and diplomacy' (p. 116) and calls for a compromise between 'those who believe that international security is best achieved through multilateral institutions' and 'those who believe that maintaining absolute American superiority is the only reliable defence strategy' (p. 137). A 'compromise approach' would combine the best elements of the US-centric, force-based approach, with the traditional multilateral, treaty-based approach, in order to achieve '*universal compliance* with the norms and rules of a toughened nuclear non-proliferation regime' (p. 136). The problem with this eclectic approach is that many non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT are very suspicious of US intentions because of its lack of commitment to making real progress toward global nuclear disarmament. Moreover, implementing the book's strategy would require amending the NPT, which is very difficult due to the requirements in Article VIII of the treaty.

Can a balance between 'enforcement of non-proliferation commitments' and 'implementation of disarmament commitments' (p. 136) be achieved? Can force and diplomacy be always effectively combined? Who determines what the right combination of force and diplomacy is? Cirincione correctly argues that the United States must play a leading role in global non-proliferation efforts, but he also argues that 'it may sometimes be necessary [for the US?] to resort to military force outside the United Nations. Such enforcement mechanisms should be in support of the treaty regime, not a replacement for it' (pp. 123–4). Yet who would determine when those 'enforcement mechanisms' would be activated? The United States? This strategy could lead to a slippery slope of 'exceptional' US military interventions. The European Union's 'Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction' clearly states that 'coercive measures *in accordance with the UN charter*' should only be adopted 'as a last resort' (quoted on p. 123).

The challenge is how to achieve a synthesis between both approaches (normative and coercive) without giving a blank cheque to the United States to unilaterally enforce the non-proliferation regime. The Bush administration has arguably abandoned a treaty-based non-proliferation strategy in favour of *ad hoc* 'coalitions of the willing' that are resented by the majority of the international community, as shown by the negative reaction to the Iraq war. The book shows that the problem of nuclear proliferation

has been exaggerated. The number of countries with nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon programs has significantly diminished – from 23 in the 1960s to ten in 2006 (p. 127). There also are fewer ballistic missiles and fewer biological and chemical weapons programs. If the United States plays a leading role in marginalizing nuclear weapons from international politics the four nuclear threats discussed by Cirincione will be adequately addressed and it will be possible to make progress on the long road towards a world without nuclear weapons. This book is highly recommended for scholars and practitioners, and is an invaluable resource for undergraduate and graduate courses on nuclear proliferation and US non-proliferation policy.

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Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy. Colin Dueck. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006, pp. 224. \$29.95 (hardback).

In *Reluctant Crusaders*, Colin Dueck, assistant professor of political science at George Mason University, provides an important contribution to the study of grand strategy. Dueck's central thesis is that the United States has, since Woodrow Wilson, pursued a grand strategy that is classically liberal in its foundations – but that a strategic culture of 'limited liability' constrains American over-investment into its foreign policy commitments. Juxtaposing realist and constructivist assumptions about state power and strategic culture, Dueck identifies core foundations of the uniquely American approach to strategic adjustment. Dueck does not ignore systemic affects on strategic choice – but instead integrates cultural aspects of grand strategy with neoclassical realism with culture as a supplement, not a substitute to realist models of strategic choice.

Though grounded in realism, Dueck shows that the United States often acts in ways that realism would not predict. Dueck surveys liberal foundations of the American creed including those who argue that America should crusade for its ideals versus those who argue that it should lead through example at home. Dueck notes both sides share the same strategic objective, but differ on tactics. These liberal objectives are, nonetheless, constrained by a desire to limit the liability of international commitments. Consequently, the United States actually plays less of an international role than might seem commensurate to its power and its liberal culture. Dueck demonstrates that strategic adjustments will be driven by international conditions. Nonetheless, the domestic political climate will also be a key variable in determining which strategic sub-culture will most affect American strategic choices – internationalist, nationalist, progressive, or realist.

In the period following World War I, Dueck shows that cultural commitments to Woodrow Wilson's liberal worldview made it nearly impossible for the United States to pursue strategic disengagement, while at the same time liberal assumptions made it hard for realist-thinking leaders to advocate for a simple balance of power set of

alignments. Ironically, domestic dynamics precluded the United States from adopting a limited and realistic engagement with Europe after the war as realism violated the Wilsonian ideal, while the Wilsonian ideal violated a growing desire to secure limited liability.

After World War II, the United States adopted a policy of Soviet containment, which advanced a liberal commitment focused on free trade, self-determination, and democracy as a response to international communism. The expansive rhetoric behind containment posed serious costs – which the US was facing considerable domestic pressure to keep under control through the late 1940s. Indeed, as Dueck notes, limited liability goals faced serious challenges with the advent of the Korean War and the expansion of the Cold War in the 1950s.

Dueck's work is at its best in assessing the Clinton and Bush years – from 1992 onward. Again, the United States was faced with evolving international dynamics and contentious domestic pressures. But ironically, little changed in American foreign policy, as the United States became even more expansive and interventionist under the Clinton administration. Indeed, the strategy of 'enlargement of engagement' appeared specifically inclined toward a preservation and expansion of American ideals in the evolving international system. Ultimately, Dueck characterizes the Clinton years as generally reflecting liberal internationalism – but also with a strong dose of primacy. Yet, simultaneously, despite the rhetoric and commitment to international institutions like NATO, the Clinton administration chose to implement its liberal commitments very selectively. Limited liability continued in the implementation of NATO enlargement, the avoidance of intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1991–1995, and a war in Kosovo that was fought without a ground invasion. Important to Dueck's thesis, much of this limited liability stemmed from strong domestic pressures – lack of public support for costly foreign policy adventures, military opposition to new missions in the post-Vietnam era, a high aversion to casualties, and a strong desire to hold down dollar costs of foreign policy commitments.

The administration of George W. Bush came to office with what appeared to be a strong realist approach, but ultimately adopted a liberal worldview, disagreeing on tactics, not strategy, with the Clinton years. Had the Bush team adopted a purely realist worldview, they might have moved quickly passed the 9/11 terrorist attacks and adopt a strategy of restraint and great power management. But it did precisely the opposite, invading Iraq and adopting a 'liberty doctrine' of exporting democracy into the Middle East and committing the US to a global war against terrorism. Yet, at the very same time, the Bush team continued simultaneously to resist a strong commitment to nation-building – despite having invaded and occupied Iraq – committing the United States to the largest nation-building project since World War II. In the end, Dueck's assessment of the relationship between expansive ideals and limited liability commitments remained confirmed by the Bush administration's world view.

In *Reluctant Crusaders*, Colin Dueck offers an excellent contribution to the proliferating and important literature on American strategic choice. Indeed, this book will find its place as a 'must read' on course syllabi and is essential reading for anyone who will be burdened by the responsibility of decision-making in government. What is missing, however, from Dueck's work is a bolder sense of

where American grand strategy is headed in a post-Iraq international and political environment. Americans clearly confront another moment of choice, and various options are available. Liberal expansion continues to compete with isolationist pressures. Presidential candidates critique decisions, but offer little alternative – while others merely critique the implementation of the war in Iraq, not the actual decision to intervene. What is missing is a clear articulation of a realist option for the next period of American strategic engagement. How such an alternative will emerge from the existing domestic environment remains to be seen. Dueck offers an exceptionally strong framework for understanding the context of such choices – but the United States as a country must make very hard choices for the future.

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Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order. Jeffrey W. Legro. Ithica, New York: Cornell University Press, 2007, pp. 272. \$19.95 (paperback).

The power of ideas in the construction and application of foreign policy remains a significant debate within the field of international relations theory. Jeffrey Legro, professor of politics at the University of Virginia, makes a significant contribution to our understanding of how ideas influence the ways in which great powers ‘approach international society’ (p. 8). This is similar to prior conceptions of ‘grand strategy’ or ‘strategic culture’, in that it describes the ideational foundation of foreign policy for security-seeking states. However, Legro’s goal is to examine something quite unique: ‘the degree to which a state sees its interests as served by one of three ideal (i.e., abstract or pure) positions – integrationism, separatism, and revisionism – that is, by joining, remaining outside of, or overturning the extant international society’ (p. 9).

His central question is ‘Why do the foreign policy ideas of specific nations show continuity in some instances and change in others?’ (p. 10). Legro argues that change in foreign policy ideas is a two-step process: collapse and consolidation. Previous studies have tended to focus solely on the issue of collapse: identifying the source of an external or internal shock that radically alters fundamental perceptions and beliefs. He takes a broader conception of collapse by not necessarily tying it to a singular dramatic event, but rather to a sharp disconnect between expectations and reality. This allows him to account for cases of gradual changes such as Japan in the second half of the 1800s and the Soviet Union in the 1980s, both of which underwent a revolutionary foreign policy transformation in which the old foreign policy ideas were discarded and they sought integration into the international system.

Understanding the sources of collapse is not enough, however. In order to fully explain a great power’s ‘new thinking’, one must consider how foreign policy ideas become consolidated within a society and form the new basis of foreign policy strategy. Legro argues that consolidation will be more likely to occur if the

number of alternatives for the prior 'dominant orthodoxy' is low and a specific replacement has initial successes (p. 35). If there are no or many viable alternatives, change will be difficult, regardless of the efficacy of the replacement ideas. If a prominent alternative emerges, however, there are two options: if it is perceived to be a failure, there is a 'counterrevolution' and continuity with the past idea is more likely; if it shows success, then change will occur (p. 36).

Four case studies are examined: the United States, Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union. The US and Germany each receive a separate chapter that covers the continuity in both state's foreign policy ideas after World War I and World War II. For the US, Legro explains why the US returned to its isolationist (i.e., separatism) policy after WWI, but became internationalist (integrationism) after WWII. Similarly, Germany's pre-WWI policy of territorial expansion (revisionism) was repeated during WWII, but was rejected in the postwar period and replaced by an active embrace of Western international institutions (integration). Japan and the Soviet Union were mentioned above and constitute a single chapter which illustrates how the book's central arguments apply some time both before and after the world wars and in the absence of such an obvious and dramatic shock as great power war.

While this argument largely holds up, one can identify a key area of concern, however. Although the issue of tautology is addressed, largely through his inclusion of the importance of 'expectations', it does not fully go away (p. 13). In his preemptive responses to critics, Legro often cites their inability to identify thresholds or tipping points that trigger change. However, this same charge could be levelled at the relationship between 'shock' and 'collapse'. The argument here is unable to provide an *a priori* explanation for when a shock is sufficient to potentially cause a foreign policy idea to collapse other than to say that, since alternatives were seriously sought, a sufficient shock must have occurred. In other words, we know that a collapse occurred because there were viable alternatives and there were viable alternatives because a collapse occurred.

This is best seen in his two cases of ideational continuity – US and Germany before and after WWI – in which there is a problem distinguishing between a failure to collapse and a failure to consolidate. While the post-WWII arguments are more sound (because there was change), the post-WWI cases are less so. Were these really cases of shock, collapse, and failed consolidation? Or, were they 'shocks' that did not lead to a collapse? Legro argues in favour of the former, but this is not fully convincing. In the case of the United States, did the pre-WWI isolationism truly collapse, or was Wilson simply an aberration disguised as an alternative foreign policy orientation? If the latter is correct, then the failure of his internationalist ideas was not due to a failure of consolidation, but rather that WWI was not a sufficient shock to cause isolationist ideas to be discarded. A similar case can be made in regard to German continuity before and after WWI. Since the Germans believed that they did not really 'lose' WWI, but were betrayed by a variety of internal and external forces, then one could argue that the 'dominant orthodoxy' remained intact (i.e., did not collapse), rather than taking Legro's position that an integrationist position failed to consolidate. The existence of alternatives does not necessarily (a) identify an event or pattern as sufficient to precipitate a shock or (b) prove that a shock took place and that the process of

attempted consolidation of a replacement is actually occurring. Alternative foreign policy orientations will always exist and these cannot be taken as evidence of the collapse of a foreign policy idea.

This issue notwithstanding, Legro succeeds in his task of showing that collective ideas matter, that expectations are crucial in determining the fate of a given ideational orthodoxy, and that change occurs only when an alternative can become consolidated within a society. This is a powerful contribution to international relations theory and a ready response to critics of the role of ideas in foreign policy.

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Asia Pacific in World Politics. Derek McDougall. Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007, pp. 371. \$59.95 (hardcover). \$24.50 (paperback)

Hats off to Derek McDougall! McDougall, an associate professor of politics at the University of Melbourne, has written a concise and comprehensive assessment of Asia-Pacific politics. It's an ambitious undertaking. The region is undergoing sweeping transformations at virtually every level, and the size and scale of the forces involved are difficult to appreciate. Capturing the dynamics and complexities of this evolution in any one country is challenging; to attempt it on a regional scale – when even the definition of the region itself is open to question – is daunting.

McDougall pulls it off. *Asia Pacific in World Politics* is a readable and persuasive account of the topic. He covers the issues in a balanced and objective manner, and manages to capture virtually all the nuances. Specialists will challenge certain statements, but such complaints are inevitable. He anticipated virtually every one of my quibbles, leaving me with precious little to complain about.

In his introduction, McDougall explains that he takes an 'eclectic approach' to his study (p. 5) but argues that states still dominate politics in the Asia-Pacific. He concedes that the first difficulty is defining 'Asia-Pacific'; India and Latin America are increasingly important players, but for his purposes the region is composed of the ASEAN Plus Three nations along with the US, Australia, and Russia (the latter two countries share a chapter). Diversity is the defining feature of the Asia-Pacific. Countries embrace a range of political and economic systems, and they occupy different places all along every political, economic, cultural, and social spectrum. Nonetheless, McDougall concludes that democracy dominates political organizations and capitalism is the main mode of economic organization (p. 24).

Given a state-centric approach, the book begins with a look at the major powers – the US, China and Japan – and then devotes chapters to the Sino-US and Sino-Japan relationship. It then examines the enduring flashpoints, Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula, before turning to Southeast Asia (Indonesia gets its own chapter), Russia, Australia, and concluding with new regional challenges.

His assessment of US engagement with the region is solid. He concludes that the US 'combines elements of both the balance [of power] and the concert [of nations]

approaches in its strategy for protecting political-strategic interests in Asia Pacific' (p. 35). He rightfully underlines the critical role alliances play in 'developing agendas for cooperative action with other main centres of global power' (p. 47). While that observation may seem unexceptional, it is important to highlight when US policymakers talk about 'coalitions of the willing' and tensions surface in longstanding alliance relationships. These are not partnerships to dismiss lightly.

McDougall's analysis of China is accurate, although China hands will argue that some issues deserve more emphasis or space. His reminder that on a per capita level, China's economy remains small is an important caution amid the hype and hysteria over China's rise. The claim that 'China's sheer size makes it more self-sufficient than most countries' (p. 63) is one of those statements that seems worthy of reconsideration, especially given the tensions surrounding China's quest for energy and raw materials to feed its economy. On the whole, however, it is hard to argue with the conclusion that 'China's power derives primarily from its growing economy and the way this affects its region and the world. China's defence forces give its power a hard edge, but this should not be overestimated given the power available to potential adversaries. Qualitative aspects of power, including soft power, are relevant but not of decisive influence in China's case' (p. 64).

His treatment of Japan is also solid. Several statements are likely to invite challenge, such as the US role in 'restraining' Japan during the postwar era; the Yoshida Doctrine provided all the restraint Tokyo needed in its foreign policy. His discussion of the evolution of Japanese security policy since 1991 hits all the right notes, which is quite remarkable given the complexity of the subject and the speed with which he covers it.

The two flashpoints, Taiwan and Korea, are well explained. Curiously, these two chapters raised the most flags (even though, again, most of my complaints are rightfully considered quibbles.) Chiang Kai-shek's son Chiang Ching-kuo deserves a little more credit for introducing democracy, and Japan's relations with Taiwan merit more discussion. Tensions between Washington and Taipei have been rising, particularly as a result of Taiwan's unwillingness to purchase arms that the US agreed to sell some six years ago.

The discussion of the Korean Peninsula missed tensions between China and Korea (North and South) over the kingdom of Kogoryo, and the fact that North Koreans, for all their support from China – or perhaps because of it – really don't have warm feelings for their fraternal neighbours. Some will challenge McDougall's explanation of the breakdown of the 1994 Agreed Framework, which seems to blame Washington; others might say he isn't tough enough on the US.

McDougall has a good feel for the currents and eddies in relations in the sprawling and complex sub-region of Southeast Asia. There is a lot of ground to cover: developments within a group of diverse states that are all undergoing modernization; relations among them; and relations with outside states at a time when the international environment is being transformed. He can be accused of underplaying the Indonesian response to its domestic terror threat, even though he captures the complexity of Indonesian politics and the need for sensitivity when it comes to dealing with Islam. He also misses the centrality of Indonesia to ASEAN and the consequences that country's disarray has for the group.

Looking to the future, McDougall rightly argues that new challenges are vitally important even though old concerns aren't going away. He hones in on attempts to forge a new regional architecture and their implications for the region and its place in the world. This will be a critical development, as it is only when Asia creates a coherent and cohesive political identity that it will have the global influence commensurate with its economic potential. It is unfair to ask McDougall to tackle that topic in more detail; *Asia Pacific in World Politics* is an excellent explanation of where the region is today.

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Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power. Randall L. Schweller. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006, pp. 182. \$29.95/£18.95 (hardback).

Randall Schweller writes about the balance of power and the problem of the inability or unwillingness of states to respond to apparent threats. This phenomenon of 'underbalancing' is contrary to what one might expect from the perspective of structural realist theories of international politics. Therefore, according to Schweller, a correction is necessary in which the domestic politics of the balance of power receive attention commensurate with that accorded to systemic forces.

In order to accomplish this, Schweller is thrust from the high-altitude, low-resolution orbit of systems theory into the low-altitude, high-resolution and diverse arena of comparative politics and state decision-making behaviour. He notes that there are surprisingly few studies on the role of domestic politics in balance of power theory. The reason for this situation is that the balance of power has traditionally been treated as a law of nature or irresistible systemic imperative. To the contrary, Schweller uses the problem of underbalancing to show that the capacity, scope, and effectiveness of state institutions, as well as the decision-making proclivities and perceptions of leaders, are as important for making credible explanations for state behaviour on war and other matters of national security.

Schweller provides a very systematic discussion of the important variables in domestic politics related to balance of power theory. He summarizes the cause and effect relationships in five 'causal schemes': a normal balance of power model; an additive model; an extremely incoherent states model; a polarized democratic model; and, fifth, a model of underbalancing through wishful thinking. Combining these and other insights, Schweller develops a typology of four possible worlds based on assumptions about expanding and defending states. Where expanders and defenders are both unitary and motivated, as opposed to fragmented and unmotivated, the correlation of forces between status quo and revisionist powers determines the degree of system stability – and structural realism does well. On the other hand, in cases where expanders or defenders (or both) are fragmented and unmotivated, outcomes become less predictable from systems theory alone.

Schweller makes an important and impressive course correction for international balance of power theory based on structural realism. Some readers will be disappointed that he chose not to go more aggressively against the angled bastions of the status quo. The essential tenets of realist theories of international politics have been known and influential since Thucydides. The question whether structural realism is a truly paradigm pushing entity, entitled to its own pantheon in international relations, remains philosophically and empirically debatable. Realist doubters argue that realists remain trapped in a matrix of self-reinforcing pessimism that guarantees against the very peace and security their theories promise to provide.

Nevertheless, Schweller has clarified some of the more important issues in domestic politics that relate to international system stability and balance of power theory. He is particularly informative and original on the relationship between elite fragmentation and balancing behaviour, drawing upon and critiquing earlier important work by Jack Snyder and others (pp. 54–62). Schweller demonstrates that elite fragmentation can lead to either over-expansionism or underbalancing. Over-expansion is a power-maximizing policy motivated by greed and profit. Balancing behaviour is a security-maximizing behaviour intended to keep what one has: it emphasizes the status quo. Under some conditions, expansion can be an easy sell in domestic politics, promising more pie in the sky for all, and balancing a hard case to make, on account of sacrifices demanded and a possibly shrinking pie. Thus the domestic politics of balance of power ultimately confirm Tip O'Neill's theorem: all politics are local.

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Insurgents, Terrorists and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat. Richard H. Shultz Jr and Andrea J. Dew. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006, pp. 316. \$29.50 (hardback).

Richard H. Shultz Jr, Director, and Andrea J. Dew, Research Associate of the International Security Studies Program at Tufts University's Fletcher School have written a remarkable book which is destined to become one of the most important reference books about non-conventional warfare conducted by insurgents, terrorists, and militias in traditional societies – 'modern warriors', to use the authors' phrase. As the book shows, these actors are modern in the sense that they use innovative tactics and advanced weaponry against conventional armies, despite the fact that their organization and asymmetrical combat are embedded in the tribal/clan structure and warrior culture of their societies. This perspective, focusing on culture and traditions that underpin the *modus operandi* of these modern warriors, is what distinguishes the book from most other analyses about the same topic.

Shultz and Dew employ a framework to describe and assess what they refer to as, 'wars between traditional societies and modern states'. This framework consists of the concept of warfare followed by the irregular forces of traditional societies, the ways in which they organize for combat, the strategy and tactics they employ,

and the international support they receive. The authors then apply this framework to four cases of post-Cold War conflicts, namely, Somalia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, and Iraq, to demonstrate how a combination of tribal, clan, and warrior culture has resulted in severe resistance to foreign forces in these countries. All of these four cases have in common the fact that non-state armed groups are pitted against the military forces of modern nation-states. Each of these case studies is rich in historical, anthropological, and cultural details that determine 'how, where, when, and why' modern warriors fight and makes the book a fascinating read.

The case studies make clear that soldiers and statesmen alike often ignore the old but crucial counsel given by the Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu at their own peril: 'Know thy enemy'. This knowledge is essential for developing appropriate war-fighting strategies against modern warriors' unconventional methods of war. (Conventional force, however technologically lethal, is of little use for wars of occupation when national and tribal energies are engaged.) A lack of knowledge of the enemy can also result in underestimating their strength and the level of local support they have. In a short, but valuable concluding chapter, the authors suggest that when policy-makers 'dismiss the capabilities of irregular adversaries as primitive, and fail to plan appropriately, catastrophe ensues' (p. 260). In other words, policy-makers (especially those in the United States) should not assume that invading a foreign country will be a 'cakewalk'. In addition, they should not interpret the forces of resistance as a bunch of 'dead enders' and they should learn the culture, traditions, and history of the people they attempt to rule. They should pay particular attention to tribes and clans. In other words, one might say, the message is think tribally, act globally.

Although culture, ethnicity, and religion are included in the analysis, the book's key variables are tribes and clans, which are treated as units of analysis in order to understand the *modus operandi* of modern warriors and their motivations. The book does an excellent job of showing how tribal and clan structure heavily influences the pattern of resistance against foreign forces. It is not clear in the book, however, the extent to which tribes and clans (alongside with 'warrior culture'), play a role in motivating modern warriors. This is particularly the case for Chechen resistance against the Russian intervention in the 1990s and the Iraqi resistance against Americans since the toppling of the Saddam Hussein regime. In both cases, factors that are more important than tribal values (e.g., revenge) seem to be more influential—separatism in the case of Chechnya and nationalism in the case of Iraq.

Moreover, the book is not clear about how knowledge of tribes and clans can be converted into an effective policy of occupation and nation-building (more accurately, state-building). Should tribal systems be exploited by occupiers in order to obtain the cooperation of their elders and thus, expedite the occupation or, is it sufficient to respect tribes as they are during an occupation and leave them alone, and thus at least ensure their neutrality? Under what circumstances can the occupying power draw support from tribes and clans? Knowing the enemy, after all, is of little use, if the most important elements of the enemy (tribes and clans in this case) are not willing to cooperate with the foreign forces. The book stresses the recognition of Afghan tribes as a determining factor in the success of the United States in the Afghan war following 11 September 2001. This success, however, was arguably due to the presence of a

common enemy (Taliban and al-Qaeda) as much as the recognition of tribes' importance in Afghanistan. That myriad tribes in Iraq's al-Anbar province today cooperate with the US Army and Marine Corps against al-Qaeda and its radical Islamist allies is further evidence of the significance of a common enemy in obtaining tribes' support. In short, the book's invaluable contribution to the counterinsurgency literature could have been even greater had the authors addressed the question of when and how policy-makers will be successful in turning tribes and clans from potential enemies into allies in an occupied country once their importance is acknowledged.

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Deterring America: Rogue States and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Derek D. Smith. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 197. \$75/£45 (hardback). \$24.99/£14.99 (paperback).

Threats arising from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are here to stay. With such 'rogue states' as North Korea, Iran, and Syria suspected of pursuing WMD and other states at least retaining some capability for developing them, the United States and the international community need to consider seriously how to address these programmes. Given the politically charged nature of the topic, there is a need for careful, balanced analyses of the use of force and threats of force to prevent states from acquiring or using WMD. In this concise, but useful book, Derek D. Smith, a Yale law student with a D.Phil from Oxford, provides us with such an analysis.

In this book, Smith outlines potential ways in which deterrence may be an unreliable instrument for US foreign policy or may even induce states to develop WMD. Certainly, a lesson a rogue state may take from recent events, especially the disparity between US actions regarding Iraq and North Korea, is that the best way to prevent an attack by the United States is successfully to acquire WMD. Thus, Smith argues, a rather surprising result of the US efforts to sustain muscular deterrence, 'denial' (convincing a state that it is not worth the costs even to embark on a WMD programme), and preemptive or preventive war may be precisely the opposite of their intended goals – they may actually cause states to acquire WMD for defensive purposes or, during crises, increase the likelihood that they will use these weapons.

After raising these issues in a theoretical discussion of deterrence and its potential shortcomings in Chapter 2, Smith then turns in Chapters 3 and 4 to examine deterrence in practice, particularly during the international crises involving Iraq and North Korea. These chapters are useful reminders of histories that have frequently become too politicized. Far from fabricating intelligence on Iraq's suspected chemical and biological weapons arsenals, the United States and other states were quite concerned that Saddam Hussein would in fact use them in both the 1991 and 2003 conflicts, especially if (as in 2003) the United States decided to topple the Iraqi regime. In the end, Smith argues, despite these fears, the United States was not seriously deterred by Iraq's WMD, though they might have played a role in the decision not to invade Baghdad in 1991.

The crisis with North Korea has unfolded quite differently. Although the United States reportedly did seriously consider carrying out a preventive strike on North Korea's nuclear facility at Yongbyong in 1994, the crisis was (temporarily) resolved before the United States was forced to make a final decision. Since then, however, as North Korea overtly pressed forward with its programmes in 2002, the United States never again appeared to consider the use of force to be a serious option (barring a few 'red lines' such as overt sales of nuclear weapons or related technology). Although useful, these chapters leave the reader with a few lingering questions: How much, for example, did Iraq's WMD truly influence the US decision not to topple Saddam's regime in 1991? Was the United States effectively deterred in 1994 from attacking North Korea because of the DPRK's chemical weapons and possible (though unlikely) nuclear arsenal, or was it restrained because of North Korea's ability to strike South Korea with its conventional weapons? These questions are hard to answer conclusively, but they have great significance for our understanding of deterrence.

Given the, at best, qualified successes of deterrence in the above instances, Part III of the book assesses other means available to the United States and the international community for addressing WMD proliferation. Chapter 5 examines the strengths and significant shortcomings of various 'counterproliferation' methods – including export controls (though these are typically considered 'non-proliferation' rather than counter-proliferation); missile defence; and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a multi-country consortium designed to interdict suspect WMD shipments. For example, even the most stringent export control laws have trouble preventing states from acquiring many 'dual use' technologies, which can be used either for peaceful purposes or for WMD. Or, despite the potential for the PSI to prevent some shipments of WMD technologies, it does encounter significant legal constraints, coordination difficulties, and insufficient intelligence to identify suspect shipments.

Chapter 6 examines the controversial topics of preemptive and preventive war and elaborates the significant moral and practical constraints for such actions. Although these will remain options for the United States in certain instances, Smith argues that the United States needs to clarify when such uses of force might be taken and provides a useful set of criteria when such actions might be justified.

The final substantive chapter recommends a 'global quarantine against WMD, prohibiting all forms of WMD transfer' (p. 141). This 'quarantine', which is presented as a 'viable alternative to preventive war' (p. 139), would build on the successes of PSI and possibly strengthen PSI's authority by joining with the United Nations or the International Maritime Organization. Although this is an intriguing possibility, there is a bit of ambiguity about whether this global quarantine would apply exclusively to WMD or also to dual-use technologies that would assist in WMD programmes. If the former, one wonders whether this will sufficiently prevent aspiring states from developing indigenous WMD programmes; if the latter, international efforts may be hindered by many of the challenges outlined in Chapter 5 – including a dearth of reliable intelligence on dual-use shipments and possibly a lack of international will to enforce the quarantine's provisions. At best, the global quarantine may be a useful addition to the international community's 'toolbox' of non-proliferation and counter-proliferation options, rather than a

solution or 'viable alternative' to the many challenges relating to deterrence, counter-proliferation, and preventive war.

These questions do not detract from the fact that this book provides a very solid analysis of the many difficult challenges that will continue to face the United States and the international community as they struggle to address the threat of WMD proliferation to the 'rogue states' of the world. Indeed, it serves to emphasize how enduring these challenges will be.

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Bioterrorism: Confronting a Complex Threat. Andreas Wenger and Reto Wollenmann (eds). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007, pp. 241. \$52 (hardback).

Readers looking for a balanced and comprehensive review of the issues and problems surrounding terrorism using biological weapons are well served by this edited volume, originating from a conference held in Switzerland in 2005. Its seven substantive chapters, where the expertise of the individual contributors shines through, are divided into three sections: one on understanding the threat of bioterrorism through the lens of actors and capabilities; one on different perceptions of the threat; and a further section on policy options to manage the threat. Taken as a whole, the chapters and the structure of the book serve the objective of the editors well: namely, 'to compare a variety of views of experts from a wide range of professional and academic backgrounds' to consider the problem of bioterrorism (p. 2).

The book does not cover all viewpoints. Absent from this volume is the perspective of policy-makers that consider bioterrorism a major threat to the United States or international security. This omission is not a significant weakness as that perspective has dominated the literature for over half a decade. Also absent from this volume is a non-Western perspective of bioterrorism. The volume is Western-centric: a chapter or two of comparable quality to the existing seven substantive offerings would have been welcome additions.

Experts in the subject of biological weapons will not glean a significant amount of new information from this volume: that is not a criticism of the text but recognition of the fact that many of the authors will be familiar to those that have read widely on this subject. The book is not, arguably, aimed at such readers. It serves those working in the security studies field in need of a review of bioterrorism and advanced undergraduate or graduate students. This volume serves those three audiences very well.

All the authors take issue with the view that bioterrorism will inevitably result in mass destruction or mass casualties and that it is the next wave of terrorism globally. The authors all accept that while bioterrorism could theoretically result in mass casualties (not defined but taken to mean in excess of 1,000) it is highly unlikely to reach these levels in the near-term time frame of the next five years and is not inevitable now or in the future. Marie Chevrier, Associate Professor of Public Policy,

University of Texas at Dallas, provides the stand-out chapter in the volume through an assessment of the various expert studies on the threat of bioterrorism before and after 11 September 2001. Chevrier poses the question 'why do conclusions from the experts vary?' (pp. 119–51) and concludes that although the existence of the bioterrorism threat is not questioned, the idea that all, or even some, terrorists are armed, or able to arm themselves, with pathogens that will cause mass casualties in the future is contested within the academic community. Indeed, as becomes clear across the different contributions, it is not divergence about the threat in the academic community that is the issue, but the divergence between the academic and the policy-making communities that is of most interest. In her conclusion, Chevrier makes use of critical observations from terrorism experts which point to mass casualties with biological weapons being accepted orthodoxy among key policy-makers – particularly, but not exclusively, in the United States – whereas sober assessments have been dismissed as irrelevant. As a result, such assessments have been unable to influence decisions already made to counter bioterrorism.

This poses a very interesting question: why has the (Western) policy-making community reached one conclusion and academic experts quite another? That question is not answered directly in this volume, but Peter Lavoy, Director of the Center for Contemporary Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, offers some insights on 'Knowledge gaps and threat assessments'. Lavoy presents sobering analysis of value not only to the question of bioterrorism but also to state level biological weapons programmes. Using case studies, he points to the very real difficulties of gathering and deciphering intelligence on biological weapons, the difficulties of proving the existence of offensive biological weapons programs and/or any use of such weapons, and the equally real problems of refuting conclusively false allegations of such use. Lavoy then goes on to identify the effect of these uncertainties on policy-makers at the national and international levels. This analysis is of value not only to those with an interest in the subject of bioterrorism, but also those interested in controlling biological weapons proliferation more generally.

In other chapters the reader is provided with good overviews of the legacies of state-level biological weapons programs, the evolution of the bioterrorism threat, and the impact of scientific and technological developments on biological weapons. Other contributions offer viewpoints on the problems posed by secrecy in biodefence and how to put the bioterrorism threat in perspective but still respond to it in an appropriate manner. Along with the divergence between policy-makers and academics, the other transcending theme identified is the impact of secrecy, both within previous biological weapons programmes and existing biodefence activities. Many of the individual authors view it as necessary in certain circumstances, but to be kept to a minimum, particularly within democracies.

As indicated, the weakness of the book is a lack of non-Western perspectives. Nevertheless, students, policy-makers, and others being asked to think about bioterrorism would be well served by this volume.