

## Book Reviews

*Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle*, Stephen Biddle. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004, pp.352. \$37.50/£24.95 (hardback) \$19.95/£12.95 (paperback).

This book is a must read for scholars, defence analysts, military officers and other students of war and national security policy. Stephen Biddle takes on the problem of explaining success or failure in battle. He is concerned primarily with the operational and tactical levels of analysis. Battles frequently have outcomes that contradict pre-war expectations based on various models. The relationship between measures of military capability and military effect is not only clouded by the 'fog of war'. According to Biddle, it is also obscured by the fog of analysis.

Biddle focuses his case studies and mathematical analyses on the mission of controlling territory in mid to high intensity continental warfare. For this purpose, he defines offensive military capability as 'the capacity to destroy the largest possible defensive force over the largest possible territory for the smallest attacker casualties in the least time' (p.6). Defensive military capability is the ability to 'preserve the largest possible defensive force over the largest possible territory with the greatest attacker casualties for the longest time' (p.6). By mid to high intensity conflict, Biddle refers to events on the conflict spectrum from regional conventional wars to conventional world wars among great powers. Thus he deliberately excludes guerrilla warfare at the lower end of the spectrum and interstate wars involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD) at the high end.

According to Biddle, the most influential explanations for outcomes in battle are based upon the relative sizes of forces and their equipments (preponderance) or on the state of their military technology. In a number of historical case studies and statistical analyses, he shows how predictions based on these variables are limited in their explanatory and predictive power.

The author contends that a particular pattern of force employment, which he terms the 'modern system', has been pivotal in determining the outcomes of modern battle since at least 1900. World War I was marked by the prevalence of lethal firepower such that unconcealed mass movement of forces to contact became virtually suicidal. Technological innovations since World War I have served mainly to increase the ranges over which lethal fires can dominate unprotected and/or unconcealed forces.

In response to this emerging dominance of a 'storm of steel', 20th century militaries evolved the modern system, as Biddle describes it: 'a tightly interconnected complex of cover, concealment, dispersion, suppression, small-unit independent maneuver, and combined arms at the tactical level, and depth, reserves, and differential concentration at the operational level of war' (p.3 and *passim*). However, the modern system is difficult for militaries to apply and master. Those who cannot master the modern system are behind the power curve in battle and increasingly at risk. Larger numbers are no

guarantee of prevailing in battle: 'Superior numbers can be decisive or almost irrelevant depending on the two sides' force employment' (p.3).

Nor does state of the art technology in weapons, sensors or communications necessarily improve the probability of victory. Biddle takes issue with the assumption that future warfare will perforce be dominated by the 'Revolution in Military Affairs' (RMA). Advocates of the RMA assume that future war will be based on long range precision strike and advanced information systems (C4ISR – command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance). However, according to Biddle, RMA advocates misunderstand the relationship between technology and force employment. RMA-proponents misunderstood warfare prior to 1991; mischaracterized the Gulf War of 1991 as a radical new departure in warfare; and, by projecting the misreading of 'Desert Storm' into the 21st century, 'derive a case for a radical restructuring of US defense policy that is neither necessary nor desirable' (p.4).

The author's methodology in defending these arguments is complex and nuanced. He prefers 'methodological triangulation' or coming at the problem from different vantage points in order to compensate for imperfect data and limited inferences. His hypothesis-testing draws upon historical case studies, simulations, statistical analyses, and formal theory. As a result, he is able to enrich the analysis of force employment by including it in large-n statistical studies as well as in the more typical setting of small-n case methods. For the mathematically inclined readers, the Appendix provides a formal description of the model of territorial gain, casualties and duration of war as a function of force employment, technology and preponderance.

Do the arguments advanced by Biddle have policy implications? It would appear so.

The United States, as a result of its lead in information and other technologies related to military art, now dominates the global 'commons' of aerospace and the expansive maritime environment (although not necessarily particular littorals). However, this global power projection does not automatically or necessarily transfer itself into favourable outcomes in land warfare. War on and for territory has its own imponderables: the vagaries of topography and climate, for example.

But in addition, land warfare is 'war amongst the people' as General Sir Rupert Smith has recently emphasized. And in wars mixing regular and irregular combat, the 'people' are: (1) the source of conscripts or volunteers for battle; (2) the culture and society within which the battle takes place; (3) the sources of human intelligence upon which the art of war may turn out to be successfully employed, or not.

The most interesting thing about conflict in the 21st century thus far is the recurrence of fighting that is neither 'conventional' set piece nor classical Maoist 'guerilla' warfare. It is being driven by primordial forces of identity but making use of modern instruments of destruction. As a result, traditional prophecies fall short of accuracy, and prophets in academia and war colleges are rewriting their syllabi.

Despite this bewildering change in the character of warfare, the essence of war maintains certain continuities. Thus the mastery of force employment (or at Fort Leavenworth, operations and tactics writ large) is a required course for aspiring commanders and for serious students of security policy and strategy. Biddle has increased the clarity of our understanding of force employment as an explanatory variable.

He has also provided some informative case studies and path breaking statistical work. It would be hard to improve upon the quality of this book.

If Generals Heinz Guderian and Vasily Chuikov had been commissioned as reviewers instead of this writer, they might be equally enthusiastic: albeit for different reasons. Guderian would concur that tanks alone did not account for the restoration of operational and tactical mobility in World War II: it was the Germans' mastery of what Biddle refers to as the 'modern system' of warfare that did so. Chuikov, having marched his 62nd Army (renamed on the way) from Stalingrad to Berlin, would remind us that attrition and firepower still matter: it is how they are employed that makes the difference between a master of operational art and a time server in a Soviet penal battalion.

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*My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope*, L. Paul Bremer III with Malcolm McConnell. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006, pp.417. \$27 (hardback).

L. Paul (Jerry) Bremer's book on Iraq is a memoir of his service and a defence of the decisions he made while serving as the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq from May 2003 to June 2004. The work has already been extensively reviewed in several excellent publications due to Bremer's important and controversial involvement with Iraq policy in the early phases of the occupation. These reviews focus on Bremer's clumsy efforts at de-Ba'athification, his controversial order to dissolve the Iraqi Army, his subsequent failure to recall selective units, and his shock that the Iraqi public's first concern following the ouster of the Saddam Hussein regime was not the public good (see for example, 'The Proconsul's Tale', *Economist*, 20 January 2006). Bremer argues at length in defence of his policies throughout this book, and it is probably useful for him to do so since he will undoubtedly be making these arguments to sceptical audiences for the rest of his life.

Despite the wide discussion of Bremer's book, many of these critiques have been made by public policy experts rather than specialists in the region. Some of Bremer's key assumptions used to formulate policy therefore have not been adequately critiqued because a variety of reviewers focus heavily on his calls for increased troop strength (and his failure to go to the President over this issue despite regular contact), his disagreements with the military, and especially his bureaucratic battles with the civilian leadership at the Pentagon. Other critics have also noted that Bremer is not so much demanding a share of the credit for success in Iraq but is instead is deeply concerned with not being blamed for key failures there. The index actually includes an entry on Bremer 'as fall guy'. Despite this scrutiny, many of Bremer's most important points are made (sometimes briefly) as though they should be self-evident to all and need no further elaboration. These include key assertions on such issues as de-Ba'athification, the proper size and role for a post-war Iraqi military, and Iraq's non-existent weapons of mass destruction. All of these claims need to be scrutinized.

On the issue of de-Ba'athification, it has been widely noted and is now accepted by Bremer that sweepingly exclusionary policies poisoned US relations with Iraq's Sunni Arabs almost from the beginning of the relationship. Yet, this problem is often treated as the end of the story, which it is not. In addition to undermining and antagonizing the Sunni leadership, de-Ba'athification appears to have eliminated the influence of at least some important Shi'ite secular leaders. There is no question that some secular Shi'ites collaborated with the Saddam Hussein regime, but most did not indulge in criminal acts, and some rather pathetically tried to seek reform within the system. A key problem here is that Saddam actively reached out to secular Shi'ites to serve as 'democratic ornaments' while attempting to marginalize the Shi'ite clergy. Some secular Shi'ite leaders, including those with degrees from Western universities, took the bait in the hope that they could gain a few crumbs of patronage for their own communities. Thus they became targets for de-Ba'athification in ways that the clerics did not. This trend may have become more pronounced when Ahmad Chalabi took over the function of de-Ba'athification with an eye toward eliminating his own future rivals. The big winners in this process were the religious leaders who had been so deeply persecuted by Saddam.

Bremer also continues to defend the notion that Iraq should have only a small, lightly equipped army to avoid the danger of a military coup. A weak army may very well be too feeble to implement a coup, but an effective army can actually come in handy in defeating a raging insurgency. The US has now reversed this policy, but a great deal of precious time was lost as a result of the decision to postpone military expansion until the insurgency threatened to bog down Coalition troops for an indefinite but very long period. Throughout this study Bremer does not seem to comprehend that the insurgency needed to be extinguished as soon as possible and not allowed to grow and fester while he was worrying about how to keep the Iraqi military weak. Moreover, any long term Iraqi government will demand a large and substantial military to cope with dangerous neighbours and because the leaders of important Arab states feel such forces add to their prestige as natural leaders within the region. Why therefore deny them this asset early in an insurgency when they desperately need it.

Bremer further asserts that the United States invaded Iraq in the knowledge that every Western intelligence agency agreed that Saddam possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD), although he does not elaborate on this issue. This is a somewhat slippery approach to the issue since a great deal of this dialogue is not yet publicly available. Nevertheless, it is publicly known that some US intelligence organizations including the Office of Energy Intelligence and the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research did not believe that Saddam had a viable nuclear weapons programme. By using the catch-all phrase WMD, Bremer lumps limited capability chemical weapons with biological and especially nuclear weapons. These weapons are not equally dangerous and deserve to be disaggregated if this topic is to be discussed as a justification to go to war. Sweeping generalizations that obfuscate the truth are not helpful in this regard, even if all Western intelligence agencies mistakenly believed (as is yet to be proven) that Saddam also had deliverable and militarily effective chemical and biological weapons.

In considering his own role, Bremer states that he was chosen for this position because of his knowledge of how to get things done in Washington and his high-level

diplomatic experience. He also attempts to show the relevance of that experience by noting the back and forth bureaucratic politics that characterized his job in Iraq including attempting to motivate Iraqi leaders while resisting excessive meddling by the US Department of Defense.

Nevertheless, Bremer's lack of a strong understanding of the region repeatedly hurt him in ways that he does not seem to understand fully today. Mr Bremer is not clearly a neo-conservative ideologue, but he did uncritically accept a great deal of neo-conservative dogma on creating a new society in Iraq by deep de-Ba'athification and large-scale demilitarization with the expectation that the United States would have bottomless reserves of goodwill that it might draw upon while remaking the Iraqi political entity. While Bremer did learn on the job, some of the damage he inflicted is not easily reversible. Others are now trying to do this, and let us hope that they will be successful.

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*The Bomb: A Life*, Gerard J. DeGroot. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005, pp.397. \$27.95 (hardback).

This is a very interesting, and at the same time very frustrating, book. On the positive side, the author pulls together a tremendous number of secondary sources and some primary materials on the history of nuclear weapons, including extensive detail on the human experience of those designing such bombs, and of the victims at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and of the military officers handling such weapons and the population at large having to put such weapons in perspective.

On the negative side, the author allows himself to express a long series of moral judgements by asides and gratuitous characterizations, judgements which in the end may leave most of the more difficult policy questions about nuclear weapons undressed and unanswered.

The bulk of the book conveys the impression that all the scientists who worked on nuclear weapons were morally somewhat at fault, and that even the German scientists who did not produce such a bomb during World War II were in various ways morally culpable. Unlike some of the more standard criticisms of the nuclear arms race from the left, Professor DeGroot does not spare the Soviets in his slighting references, or his British countrymen, or even (pp.230–1) the marchers at the nuclear disarmament rallies. One of the problems with the book is indeed that one can find a number of logical inconsistencies, whereby scientists are condemned for being unrealistic about the world of international power-politics, while government decision makers and military planners are condemned for being ready to exploit the horrible capabilities of nuclear weapons. Accusations of nuclear espionage get characterized at points as anti-Communist hysteria, while another long section details some of the extent of this espionage. On page 111 the author approvingly notes an estimate that more Japanese would have died if nuclear weapons had not been used,

because the war would have gone on for at least several months, exactly the argument he mocks a few paragraphs later when quoting President Truman.

The author is thus quite selective in attributing deceit or honesty to various people. Mao and Stalin are given full credit for being unintimidated by nuclear weapons (even though this is what they should have indeed *pretended* to be, as long as they had no such weapons of their own, while they assigned the highest priority to Soviet or Chinese acquisition of such weapons), while someone like Truman is characterized as simply making up numbers when he claimed that hundreds of thousands of lives (Allied *and* Japanese) were saved by the nuclear attack on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. At one point (p.132) Stalin is portrayed as being 'surprised' that Truman had used the atomic bomb (this surprisable Stalin is someone many of us would have difficulty in recognizing).

While the author has indeed pulled together a great deal of interesting material, some of his judgements seem cavalierly to be based on just one or two sources (for example, on the question of the motivation of Heisenberg and others in the German nuclear physics community, about which we have seen on average a book a year appearing since the 1950s). Was the Manhattan Project based on the assumption that the Germans were competent enough to make nuclear weapons? If so, the fact that they did not at least supports somewhat the view that they were not eager to do so. DeGroot seems to endorse the view that the Manhattan Project was acceptable as a way of developing a bomb so as to *deter* a Nazi bomb if one were to emerge. But he also notes, without critical comment, statements (p.28) that Franklin D. Roosevelt would have had the American atomic bomb used against Germany, if it had been ready in time, even if there were no evidence of a German bomb.

The very first pages of the book lay out the case well that nuclear weapons were inevitable, given how the knowledge of physics was spreading at the start of the twentieth century. And the very last two pages of the book finally address the argument that the presence of nuclear weapons, and the threat of their use, actually very much reduced the frequency of conventional war in the years after 1945 (these pages almost read like an afterthought, tacked on at the end because some early reviewer of the manuscript found the omission of this kind of analysis to be too glaring). But the bulk of the book, in the tone of its judgmental prose, would leave the reader unaware that nuclear weapons were either inevitable or helpful.

The book cites Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer in disparaging tones as being extreme enough to see advantages to the existence of the Bomb, but leaves out all the more subtle arguments whereby a very selective deployment of such weapons may have prevented hundreds of thousands of people being killed in the conventional wars that might well have broken out between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, or in the conventional invasion of Japan in 1946 or 1947 that would have had to be four times the size of the Normandy landings. Herman Kahn is presented as a caricature of a 'warped mind', and Henry Kissinger's writings on nuclear weapons issues are hardly mentioned, while Thomas Schelling's work on limited war and nuclear escalation (for which he finally just received the Nobel Prize in Economics) is not mentioned at all. None of the work of the historian John Gaddis, who explains much of the post-1945 'long peace' on the basis of nuclear deterrence, is noted.

Bertrand Russell's later statements denouncing nuclear weapons are noted, but there is no reference to his earlier pre-1949 op-eds and letters urging that the United States use its nuclear monopoly in a preventive war to preserve that monopoly.

There are indeed many easy targets for the author to hit in this book, including the often glib and seemingly heartless statements of the generals in charge of nuclear targeting, or the silly references to 'atomic' consumer products by the ordinary Americans and others responding to the advent of nuclear weapons. Yet the most basic of all questions is one that drowns out all such follies of tone on discussion of these weapons. What would the world have been like if nuclear weapons had proved to be impossible? What would the world have been like if Hitler had acquired them first, or if Stalin had obtained them first (or if Stalin or one of his successors had been able to launch a clever counterforce first strike so that only the USSR had nuclear weapons after that strike)? Is all of the preparation to head off the latter so foolish or morally culpable?

And, what would the likelihood of horizontal nuclear proliferation be, to countries like Brazil or Japan or Australia, etc., if the United States and the Soviet Union had *not* amassed the overkill of their enormous thermonuclear arsenals?

In human terms and humane terms, the story of the atomic bomb is drawn together well by this author, but the difficult interactions, in the different kinds of violence and warfare that we all want to head off, are not really done justice. A recurring tone of moral indignation can blur the sharper analysis that would be needed to make this book a serious text on nuclear strategy.

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*The Struggle Over Islam: Fundamentalism, Reform and International Politics*, Radwan Es-Sayyid. Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-Arabi, 2005 (in Arabic). No price.

With the growth of anti-Western feelings and global terrorist activity using Islam as a justification, studies of Islamist anger and violence are a growth industry. While outside observers mostly see Western experts talking to each other, regional scholars have begun to enter the fray as well. Radwan Es-Sayyid, senior professor of theology at the Lebanese University, writes primarily to provide Arab audiences with a deeper understanding of the politics of the Islamist currents sweeping the Middle East. His book aims to explain the complex relationships and disagreements between Islamist streams, and between the political Islamism and the rest of the world. The result is a degree of systematic rigour previously absent in similar Arabic studies, a serious scholarly effort to understand the problems of political Islam. Es-Sayyid has much to say of interest to global audiences. Here is a work that deserves broader recognition.

This book covers three ongoing struggles over Islam. The first and most important is between Muslim thinkers about the role and the place of the religion in public life, government affairs, and by implication the foreign policies of Muslim states. The second struggle is between Western analysts of Islam, whom Es-Sayyid classifies

as orientalists or anthropologists. The final struggle is over the definition of the relationship between the world of Islam and the Western world.

Unlike many other authors in the Middle East and North Africa, Es-Sayyid is keenly aware of the long-term consequences of his words and the effect that they may have on overall relations between Muslims and others. This sensitivity reflects the healthier aspects of Lebanon, where religious diversity mandates discretion, caution, and moderation in scholarship, at least for those who take the academic profession seriously. The book is written from a standpoint of a Muslim rationalist theologian. The author does not 'hide' this standpoint, but he does not over-indulge in its particularities either. In short, the book constitutes a balanced, well-written, and well-argued response to the increasing view of Islam as a problem. The author realizes that the perspective that views Islam as a problem is not limited to the Western world but that it exists in South Asia and also in the Far East.

In sharp contrast to the dominant discourse in the Arab world, the book addresses not only Western shortcomings in terms of understanding and empathy, but also the gross failure of the Arab world to entrench and absorb modernity, education, rationality and tolerance towards others. The book explains that religious traditions embracing hundreds of millions of people, like Hinduism and Buddhism, are not understood in the Islamic world. The book also engages the Western world, both in terms of its scholarship and in terms of its popular culture. Unlike Edward Said's *Orientalism*, the book does not attempt to banish non-Middle Eastern people from the study of the Middle East, it instead engages in careful analysis of the arguments raised by the orientalists and their modern heirs, pointing out their utility as well as their shortcomings.

One chapter outlines the evolution of the study of the Islamic world in the Western from its amateur, travellers', and semi-scientific origins to its eventual professionalization and its inclusion of North African and Middle Eastern social scientists. The author does take issue with Daniel Pipes and Martin Kramer for what he regards to be their hostility to the Islamic world. Nevertheless, there is implicit acceptance in the book of the responsibility borne by al-Qaeda for strengthening the harsher interpretations of Islam in the West. The chapter ends with the appointment of Pipes to the board of the United States Institute of Peace. That particular event clearly embitters him, but in a sad testimony to our times, the author ironically finds some consolation in Bernard Lewis's placement of blame on Muslims rather than on Islam. From the tone of writing, it is clear that the irony is apparent to Dr Es-Sayyid. Unlike Said, Es-Sayyid finds Western scholarship to be useful, even when it simplifies matters for heuristic and education ends.

It does call, however, for the completion of the picture. For example, the author accepts that some of Ernest Gellner's characterizations of Islam as parsimonious in terms of theoretical elegance, but he enjoins adding insights from Clifford Geertz' works on Islam as well as indigenous perspectives. Gellner argued that Islam contains a puritan core that it reverts to in times of crisis and instability. The problem is once this 'core' is conceived the concept is no longer regarded as a method of understanding Islam's dynamics but as an inherent reality of the religion. Overall, the book takes on the challenge of posing a serious set of responses to traditional and modern

Western scholarship in place of Said's book-length *ad hominem* attack on the study of the Middle East and North Africa by Western scholars.

Perhaps the most profound lesson to draw from the book is the struggle within Islam concerning how it can relate to non-Muslim peoples, cultures, and civilizations. There is deep division between Islamists of all colours about the relationship with the non-Muslim world. The categories of *salafi* (a follower of the precedent), *islahi* (reformer), *usuli* (fundamentalist in the Western sense), and *ihyai* (reviver) represent deep divisions between Islamists. Not only do these various currents disagree over the relationship with the outside world, especially the West, but also over the practice of Islam within Muslim countries. While all of these four tendencies agree with the notion that Islam should inform public life, they differ strongly about what precisely that influence should mean. In the case of the author, he argues that Islamic law and jurisprudence can be interpreted to allow a functionally secular, modern state. Responding to salafist and fundamentalist arguments concerning minority religions and relations with the non-Muslim world, the book screams: 'it is history, history, history . . . like the jurisprudence governing the slave trade'.

The author identifies the intervention of the state in the religious sphere as a crucial factor in the growth of fundamentalism as a response. Unique among thousands of living Arab Muslim religious jurists, Es-Sayyid argues for the liberation of Islam from the Muslim state. In other words, he argues for Islam's return to the sanctity of the individual and the home and its flight from the clutches of the state. The book ends with a call to the Muslim world to accept the call of modernity, in the manner of East Asia, and a call for the West to integrate its Muslim minorities and to accept the particularity of the Muslim world.

Overall, the book represents a major breakthrough for literature in the Middle East and North Africa. It avoids the demonologies that haunt many 'scholarly' works present in the region, but it is unapologetic in its espousal of an Arab perspective. The book contained a few inaccuracies, but the author stated that these have been addressed in its 2006 edition. It ought to be translated into English and given wide publicity. The only negative matter remaining is the book's occasional burst of bitterness at current United States policy in the Middle East, but even this is mild by regional standards, and does not reduce the book's overall contribution to understanding the Muslim world. It is an excellent book that should become a classic.

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*Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons*, Sumit Ganguly and Devin T. Hagerty. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005, pp.234. \$55 (hardback). \$25 (paperback).

The spectre of India and Pakistan teetering precariously over a nuclear precipice has become part of the dominant narrative and related discourse in much of

Western scholarship that dwells either on South Asia or nuclear deterrence and this perception received official endorsement when former US President Bill Clinton once described the subcontinent as 'the most dangerous place in the world'. The book under review seeks to interrogate this deep seated anxiety, that till recently permeated much of US policy and academic pronouncement, in a commendably holistic manner and the 200-odd pages are rewarding in more ways than one.

Jointly authored by Ganguly and Hagerty, who have already made substantial contribution to the existing literature in the domain, the book draws on their earlier work and weaves together six Indo-Pakistan 'crises' beginning with the purported 1984 crisis through to 1986–1987, 1990, 1998, 1999 and 2002. While individual events such as the 1986–1987 'Brasstacks' military exercise and the May 1990 'near nuclear war' and others have been treated independently by other authors, this is the first work that looks at all the six purported crises together. The authors (Ganguly wrote four chapters and Hagerty the other five) pose a central, albeit anomalous question derived from an empirical overview, namely:

What accounts for the fact that India and Pakistan have avoided a major war over the past two decades, despite profound mistrust, chronic everyday tensions, an intractable political conflict over Kashmir, a prior history of three Indo-Pakistani wars (1947–1948, 1965 and 1971), and the gradual but steady refinement of both sides' nuclear weapon capabilities – all of which in combination suggest to many analysts that South Asia is ripe for war, even nuclear war?

Clearly despite the scare scenarios that have dominated US perception, perhaps abetted by non-proliferation zealots, nuclear Armageddon, mercifully, has not blighted the subcontinent and only one of the crises – 1999 – led to the limited Kargil War. Despite years of hand-wringing and unstated fears in the generic West that emotive, irrational South Asian leaders and security professionals lacked the rational strategic logic which leavened the Cold War experience of the erstwhile superpowers and their military allies in husbanding apocalyptic nuclear weapons, empirically, as the authors establish, the subcontinent has proved to be 'crisis-resistant' – till now! But it is not the contention of this reviewer, much less the authors, that this is cause for roundly castigating the Cassandras or being complacent, for Southern Asia – with China included – represents the most complex and tangled nuclear matrix, and long-term sustainable deterrence stability cannot be taken for granted.

However Ganguly and Hagerty make a compelling case by examining three propositions as to why the subcontinent did not slip into a mode of irretrievable nuclear escalation in each of the six crises beginning with 1984. These include, first, unipolarity theory or timely and forceful US intervention; second, nuclear deterrence theory derived from McGeorge Bundy among others, that fear of escalating to the nuclear level dissuaded both sides; and finally, John Mearsheimer's conventional deterrence theory that both nations lacked sufficient conventional military superiority to arrive at the definitive degree of favourable asymmetry they each sought. Marshalling extensive data over a two decade period and drawing from the

work of other scholars, Ganguly and Hagerty make a cautious assertion that ‘the nuclear-deterrence proposition provides the strongest explanation for the absence of major war in the region over the last two decades . . . US intervention in the form of crisis management sometimes played a secondary, but important role’.

This is an important conclusion, albeit based on deductive logic and informed speculation and marks a significant departure from the dominant discourse in this area. It may be recalled that in two instances at least – in May 1999 and in the summer of 2002 when the Indian military mobilized in response to a terrorist attack on the Indian parliament – the US was convinced that a nuclear war was imminent and took certain initiatives accordingly. The authors add in a citation that in 2002, ‘a senior US intelligence analyst with years of regional experience told one of the authors in early June 2002 that he estimated the chances of war on the Subcontinent at “100 percent”’. Perhaps based on such intelligence inputs the US Embassy in Delhi evacuated most of its staff though respected Indian analysts opined otherwise.

This book offers one of the more detailed and objective assessments of the US role in all the crises and breaks fresh ground in pointing out that on occasion Washington may have helped to heighten the panic-index in a hasty manner. The authors aver: ‘In some cases, the US has helped to lower tensions by providing information in a timely fashion to both parties. On other occasions, the US has been inordinately hasty in sounding the tocsin about the prospects of war’.

Various policy prescriptions relevant to the US have been outlined including the resolution of the stubborn Kashmir problem but the one that merits greater scrutiny by the academic and analyst is the quality of American intelligence and related assessment as regards weapons of mass destruction. The mismatch with respect to the subcontinent is delineated persuasively in this volume and the glaring inadequacy in Iraq is the most recent example wherein narrative, data collection and subsequent analysis have been (deliberately?) distorted to suit specific policy objectives. This characteristic has eroded US credibility and the India–Pakistan nuclear narrative from the American perspective is a case in point.

This muddying of the narrative through exclusion of information and the nature of the new challenges that the region faces is most discernible in the A.Q. Khan episode – which receives mere passing mention towards the end of the book. Dr Khan, a well-known Pakistani scientist, has been at the centre of a clandestine nuclear network for almost three decades in what is described as the world’s first nuclear Wal-Mart. The US has remained reticent about disclosing the degree to which Washington was aware about this aspect of nuclear proliferation in the subcontinent and for some reason the authors have not applied their proven skills to this niche. In August 2005, a former Dutch prime minister, Ruud Lubbers, revealed that he had been advised by the Central Intelligence Agency as far back as 1975 to desist from arresting Dr Khan when he was found purloining nuclear material and documents from the Netherlands. This is a trail that warrants analytical scrutiny to comprehend the deeper compulsions of US policy and the role played by some American agencies in adding to the nuclear entropy of the subcontinent and hopefully this issue will receive the attention of these two perceptive authors.

I have a couple of minor quibbles that are more to do with the editing of the book. Detailed references and comment pertaining to international relations and deterrence theory and background information about each of the crises that could have been usefully brought into the main body of the book have been tucked away in the endnotes after each of the nine chapters. For instance the introductory chapter of about 11 pages that posits certain theoretical formulations is supported by 9 pages of notes. The propositions of Waltz and Mearsheimer to my mind could have been in the main text to help the less informed reader. And for a jointly authored book, the use of the word 'I' (page 202) is an editorial Irish pennant. In like fashion, the Army Chief in India is the COAS (Chief of Army Staff) and not just Chief of Staff. Semantic exactitude must be the Holy Grail for all editors and publishers.

But none of this must detract from what is a very useful and important contribution to South Asian/deterrence literature aimed at US policy-makers. The last chapter is particularly relevant at a time when US–India relations are poised for a major review and re-orientation that in turn has the potential to reshape the strategic architecture of the 21st century.

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*Protecting Liberty in an Age of Terror*, Philip B. Heymann and Juliette N. Kayyem. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2005, pp.194. \$40 (hardback). \$30 (paperback).

In *Protecting Liberty in an Age of Terror*, authors Philip Heymann, professor in the Harvard Law School, and Juliette Kayyem, adjunct lecturer at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, offer legal recommendations in the war on terror following a series of meetings of terrorism experts held under the auspices of the Long-Term Legal Strategy Project for Preserving Security and Democratic Freedoms. The suggested recommendations are meant to provide legal safeguards to US counter-terrorism policies, especially in view of seeking a balance between the presidential claim to wartime powers and the oversight they need from Congress and the courts. The book is specifically oriented at policy-makers to recommend to them the rules and procedures that must govern the US legal system's response to terrorism.

Besides the introduction, the book consists of ten chapters on various strategies in the war on terror that have often been the subject of debate and controversy since the events of 9/11 and the US-led invasion of Iraq. By means of modified or new legal arrangements, the book's recommendations seek to offer a democratic counter-weight in the use of counter-terrorism strategies. Heymann and Kayyem's book thereby addresses the powers of the executive at home and abroad and the necessary tools to provide accountability to these powers.

In two additional appendices to the book, policy experts Thomas Lue and Tom Parker provide informative overviews on the existing counter-terrorism regulations in the United States and the United Kingdom.

Briefly reviewing the chapters of this book, the authors first deal with coercive interrogation techniques, suggesting that the prohibition of torture should be upheld, while other coercive interrogation techniques are proposed to be regulated by the attorney general under supervision of the US Congress. Indefinite detentions are recommended to be allowed only in a zone of active combat pertaining to a conflict between the United States and another state, an organization, or a defined class of individuals. The authors apply the same active combat zone restrictions to the use of military commissions and targeted killings. In the case of the surveillance of communications and other information collection methods, probable cause restrictions in terms of the Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) are to be employed to limit the use of such techniques. Investigations of religious and political meetings are only to be allowed when terrorist activities are planned, while profiles of US citizens always ought to be prohibited. All extraordinary measures in the war on terror, finally, the authors recommend to be subject to the review of non-partisan commissions established by the congressional leadership.

This book offers technical-legal advice for policymakers and those legal experts who work to support official policy. As a manual and guide of law, this book has clear merits in understanding the delicate nature of the war on terror vis-à-vis liberty and democracy in the US. Yet, the technically confined orientation of this book is very restrictive. Perhaps amplified by the fact that I read this book while attending a terrorism conference in Turkey, the book strikes me as limited in offering recommendations to counter-terrorism only from the viewpoint of the US legal system and the assumed centrality of American responses to terrorism on a global scale. The authors admit as much when they assert that 'the United States has not merely seen itself as a model for others but also as an active source of positive change in the world' and that this 'tradition must continue' (p.9).

However, in a globalized world, not least of all with respect to the organization of terrorism and counter-terrorism alike, such a stance is problematic. Besides wondering whether the self-perception of the US is shared among the nations of the world, it is important to recognize that counter-terrorism strategies need a cosmopolitan approach based on an egalitarian sense of cooperation among nations. Also in view of the interests of the United States, there is no alternative to a global civil society that is built on the basis of the manifold relevant visions from the world's democratic nations rather than merely the position of its current political and military centre.

Heymann and Kayyem, however, are comfortable in suggesting recommendations that offer greater protections to US citizens and persons residing in the United States than to non-US citizens abroad. For instance, the authors argue that targeted killings are allowed outside a zone of active combat only if there is a 'reasonably imminent threat' to the life of a person, but never in the case of a US citizen so threatened (p.65). The problem with such a recommendation is not only its potential harm in terms of international relations with the United States, but the practical difficulties officials will find themselves in making any determinations of citizenship in imminent-threat situations.

Legal demarcations cannot always neatly follow the ever-changing complex reality of terrorism and counter-terrorism. This book relies not only on an approach of more and more detailed laws to modify the war on terror, it does so in a top-down approach that lacks the input and insights from the agencies whose members employ the discussed strategies in the field. Narrowly focused on certain legal issues of the US war on terror, this book does not analyse the war on terror and offers no extra-legal contextualization to the suggested recommendations. As the authors write, their book seeks to ‘explore how American democracy can thrive best in a “war on terror”’ (p.vii, my italics).

As such, this book will surely be of interest to policy-makers, but whether this book can also be of interest to concerned citizens may be another matter as the reasons of their concerns towards the war on terror may well be fuelled rather than mitigated by a technocratic-legal perspective. Scholarly analyses of the war on terror, in any case, will need more than an effort in legal engineering to offer meaningful contributions directed towards the development of a terrorism policy that is effective as well as sound with respect to a plurality of standards. Even contributions on the legal aspects of terrorism policy at home and abroad must rely on analyses that do not avoid breadth and depth in studying the manifold responses to terrorism (such as they were addressed, for instance, in Heymann’s well-balanced book, *Terrorism, Freedom, and Security: Winning Without War*, The MIT Press, 2003).

In order to develop a thoughtful counter-terrorism policy, the techniques of law alone will not suffice. For policy-makers willing to continue the war on terror, this book’s recommendations may offer helpful legal advice.

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*Defending Europe: The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy*, Jolyon Howorth and John T. S. Keeler (eds). New York/ Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, pp.256. \$75/£50 (hardback). \$32.95/ £17.99 (paperback).

This is a noteworthy book, in three respects. First, editors Jolyon Howorth and John T. S. Keeler, respectively of the universities of Bath and of Washington, have assembled an impressive roster of contributors, who have produced a high-quality set of analyses on diverse aspects of the EU–NATO relationship. Second is the book’s timing: it is very much a post-Kosovo War project (most of its chapters being initially vetted at a Seattle conference in May 2000) that made it to publication in an emphatically Iraqi moment. Third, it contains an unusual (though not totally unknown) feature for an edited volume: two contrasting conclusions. I return to these three items below, taking them in reverse order.

The double-barrelled concluding section carries forward the debate that had been indirectly opened by several of the earlier chapters, over whether or not European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), if it could be effected, would be a good thing for the Europeans to have done. In a misleadingly titled chapter (‘Why ESDP is

Misguided and Dangerous for the Alliance'), Anand Menon, of the University of Birmingham, offers ESDP partisans cause to hesitate before breaking out the champagne. He is not the tenacious foe of the project the chapter's title might suggest, and indeed he can even be said to have mellowed in his opposition to an autonomous European defence and security entity. But ESDP is far from having cleared all the obstacles, and Menon identifies several of these. Some of are obvious and chronic (as in the Europeans' dogged ability to resist funding the dream); but one of the obstacles Menon cites has come into full view as a result of something still in the future at the time he was writing, the Iraq War. That obstacle, which he labels 'leadership', accounts for some of the smaller European states having cocked a snook at their betters and sided with Washington. In fact, most of the EU member states and aspirant members lined up not with the EU's alleged dynamic duo of France and Germany, but with the US and Britain, and this has to have some bearing on the future of ESDP, given that for the majority of this Euro-ginger group, the issue was less Iraq and more the future shape of decision-making in Europe.

Howorth's own concluding chapter offers, as one would expect, an optimistic take on the prospects of ESDP. It also provides a very useful service, in that while everyone in Europe likes to talk about ESDP, few bother to say what is to be meant by the acronym. Not Howorth, who on page 221 offers this definition: 'a project to confer upon the EU the ability to take collective decisions relating to regional security and to deploy a range of instruments, including military instruments, in operations of crisis management, peacekeeping and, if necessary, peace-enforcement (preferably with a legal mandate), as a distinctive European contribution to the overall objectives of the Atlantic Alliance and in consultation with both European members of NATO and non-allied EU accession candidates'. If on the matter of funding the enterprise Howorth can appear a bit blasé, telling us (p.231) that we should not make such a big deal of anaemic European defence budgets, his overall sense that ESDP will have a future is probably closer to the mark than the pessimism of those who write it off. Why this is so is to be glimpsed in the second of the items flagged above, the issue of the book's timing.

One might think that European disunity over Iraq will stand as striking testimony to the untenability of the ESDP project. After all, the Kosovo War today seems like ancient history, and who needs to heed its supposed 'lessons', enjoining the Europeans to become more capable and autonomous in matters of security and defence? The short-term discord associated with Iraq to the contrary notwithstanding, it is likely that long-term implications of that war will stimulate rather than frustrate European security and defence. There are several reasons for this, but the most important one has to do with Britain and France. Simply put, the longer-term consequence of the Iraq War will be to remind both parties that ESDP can only be built along lines identified at Saint-Malo in late 1998: that is, as a project embedded within NATO, albeit an increasingly Europeanized NATO, thus a project that can both deliver 'autonomy' and preserve the alliance. Britain's flirt with excessive closeness to America will be one casualty of the Iraq War, but so too will France's rhetorical sallies against the alliance and its supposed (to the French) objective correlative, 'Atlanticism'.

Let us now turn to the individual contributors, proceeding in alphabetical order. Frédéric Bozo, of the University of Nantes and the Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI), offers in 'The Effects of Kosovo and the Danger of Decoupling' a very French view that unless the alliance becomes more 'balanced' it risks falling into terminal decay. I do not say a 'French view' because I believe Bozo wishes NATO to expire; quite the contrary, he feels that a viable ESDP is necessary for NATO's continued health, and wishes for both. I merely suggest that his chapter betrays an all-too-French tendency to hold up something called 'Atlanticism' as a straw man, one that serves merely as a synonym for excess American domination. Thus he remarks, with no sense of glee, that by the second half of the 1990s NATO had evolved into 'an Alliance perhaps more "Atlantic" than at any time since its creation' (p.62). Presumably he would regard the post-Prague NATO, which seven new allies from Central and Eastern Europe would be joining, as even more 'Atlantic' than post-Kosovo NATO.

This is a curious way to construe things, both geographically and geopolitically. Not only will NATO's enlargements since 1997 be leaving it with several members who are not remotely connected to the Atlantic (Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria), but the rest of the bunch (Poland, the three Baltic states, and Slovenia) have at best an indirect link with the Atlantic, along the lines of Italy, Greece, and Turkey. Not only is NATO becoming geographically less Atlantic than ever before, but it could well be geopolitically less 'Atlanticist' as well, given that the alliance and the European allies have lost centrality in American strategy.

This gets us to Julian Lindley-French's chapter, 'Dilemmas of NATO Enlargement'. The author, a long-time analyst with the EU's Paris-based Institute for Security Studies and subsequently a member of faculty at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, worries that NATO's expansive enlargement will put paid to it as a working alliance, and will also lead to a lessening in the ability of the US (or anyone else) to run it. Not only is NATO threatened by the 'affliction' of enlargement, but it is imperilled by an America too focused on warfighting from the air and not prepared enough to have its ground forces engaged in 'muddy boots' peacekeeping. Lindley-French's chapter perhaps shows the most wear and tear from the Iraq War, for not only did the US along with the UK (and to the author's hearty applause in several op-ed pieces) get into ground combat and eventually peacekeeping (of a sort), but it also showed itself willing to tolerate casualties. Moreover (though it may be too early to say for sure), Lindley-French comes across as too sceptical of NATO's ability to expand without incurring Russian displeasure.

Alexander Moens, a professor of political science at Simon Fraser University, Canada, offers a rather upbeat assessment in his 'ESDP, the United States and the Atlantic Alliance'. He is also correct to remind us (p.35) that the Bush administration in its early days was more supportive of ESDP than had been the Clinton administration – something that no one these days seems to recall.

Kori Schake, a staffer with the US National Security Council, provides an interesting and refreshing take on what used to be a bugaboo of the Clinton administration, the prospect that the EU would 'duplicate' existing NATO capacity (as well, of

course, as 'decouple' and 'discriminate' against non-EU allies). As indicated by the chapter title, 'The United States, ESDP and Constructive Duplication', a bit of redundancy can be a very good thing if the Europeans acquire certain capacities that already exist within the alliance, but not in sufficient quantities (e.g., strategic lift, intelligence gathering and assessing, theatre reconnaissance, strike forces, and air-to-air refuelling). These will all cost money: 'if governments are serious about ending their dependency on the United States, raising defense spending by 10 percent per annum should be possible' (p.129)!

Terry Terriff, of the University of Birmingham, offers a sober and much needed assessment of the likelihood (not great) of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) serving as the *deus ex machina* by which the EU and the alliance resolve the implicit tension between autonomy and capability. His chapter on 'The CJTF Concept and the Limits of European Autonomy' leads me to conclude of the CJTF that is a good idea whose time will never come. It is not clear whether either NATO or the EU have need of it.

Sunniva Tofte, a PhD student at the University of Bath, focuses in 'Non-EU NATO Members and the Issue of Discrimination' on two allies in particular, Turkey and Norway, and argues that it is this pair, albeit for differing reasons, who will have the most difficulty accommodating themselves to EU 'decision-shaping' processes on matters related to defence and security.

Mark Webber, from the University of Loughborough, makes a good case in 'NATO Enlargement and European Defence Autonomy' that the nexus between ESDP and NATO enlargement has suffered from 'under-articulation' (p.159). It has also suffered from anachronism, as for a time the pundits were sure that the EU would be quicker off the mark to expand than NATO. Intriguingly, Webber suggests that synchronization problems between the two institutions, so far kept to a minimum, might surface in the future: 'it is realistic to conceive of Russia and Ukraine in NATO as part of a grand strategic bargain between the Alliance and Moscow' (p.174).

David Yost, at the US Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, writes intelligently on 'The US-European Capabilities Gap and the Prospects for ESDP'. He traces the origins of the gap in capabilities between the US and the allies, and makes a cogent case that it matters too much to simply be sloughed off. He is dubious that the European allies will be able to muster the means to buttress their will toward greater autonomy, but his own argument has been overtaken by recent events when it comes to America's fiscal wherewithal, for no longer can it be said that 'the US federal budget appears well enough balanced to permit Social Security reforms and real increases in defense spending in the coming years' (p. 102).

If there is any disappointment that I would record with what is, overall, an admirable and valuable collection of articles, it is the absence of any sustained conceptual inquiry into 'autonomy'. It should hardly be a bit player in this existential saga, and deserves more than the cameo role it received. For if those French who profess to desire a 'multipolar' world really are serious about this, then autonomy must be invoked for the purposes of balancing the US. And if this is so, it is hard to see how the French vision can over the long haul be rendered consistent with the British one, at least as articulated by Tony Blair, who has made no secret of his

conviction that multipolarity is not a prescription for stability. It all depends, I suppose, on what is meant by 'autonomy', and I suspect that minds in Paris and London are in closer agreement than they might appear to be. Still, it would have been helpful if someone could have tackled this question.

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*Renegade Regimes: Confronting Deviant Behavior in World Politics*, Miroslav Nincic. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005, pp.219. \$29.50 (hardback).

Professor Miroslav Nincic of political science at the University of California, Davis, makes an important contribution to the literature of international relations. Specifically, this volume seeks to challenge the paradigm of realism, or what the author calls 'power politics'. Global powers, particularly the United States in the post-Cold War era, have established the rules and norms of international relations. However, despite Western nations' enormous economic and military power as well as dominant 'soft power', not everybody in the international community plays by these rules and according to these norms. Some nations and non-state actors have rejected the international system, as defined by the West and have sought to challenge the emerging world order.

Nincic refers to this phenomenon as 'international deviance'. He examines deviance in history, particularly the French Revolution and the Bolshevik Revolution. Nincic is aware of the huge differences between the past and present. Globalization and the revolution in information technology have substantially strengthened the foundations of global community. Simply stated, there is much more interaction between peoples and nations from different cultures. This intense and growing interaction means that the majority of members in the international community can agree on a certain manner to pursue their interests and on the way to agree or disagree in their bilateral and multilateral relations.

The volume is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 1 provides basic definition of the terms used in this study. In Chapter 2, Nincic lays the theoretical foundation on which the subsequent arguments stand. Chapter 3 provides the specific operational criteria to designate certain regimes as renegade. Chapter 4 examines the genesis of renegades, asking how a regime's domestic standing might be affected, beneficially or not, by renegade conduct. Chapter 5 follows the trajectory of renegade regimes to the point where they are stigmatized as such by the international community and treated accordingly. Chapter 6 examines the impact of military responses and their two possible purposes: to oust the regime or to modify its behaviour by altering its incentives. Finally, Chapter 7 draws the implications suggested by the previous chapters, summarizing the elements of an empirically grounded theory of the origin and development of renegade regimes and of the manner in which this is shaped by their interaction with the global community or, at least, its principal players.

Nincic is careful in choosing and defining the terms he uses and the framework of his analysis. Instead of describing a regime as 'rogue', he prefers 'deviance' or 'renegade'. Both words are less biased than 'rogue' which is used mostly by the United States government to label its opponents such as Cuba, Iran, and North Korea. Nincic considers a regime 'renegade' if its methods of rule and/or its goals violate norms embraced by the bulk of the international community.

The author also distinguishes between three terms that often overlap with one another – state, regime, and government. A state is viewed as 'the community organized for political purposes'. A regime is defined by three attributes: characteristic methods of rule; characteristic policy goals; and characteristic principles of legitimacy. Finally, government is the regime's agent – it concretizes and applies regime rule – and it is embodied in a set of individuals embedded in institutional settings. Taking this distinction into consideration, Nincic does not focus on states. States are viewed only as 'agents of renegade conduct'. He chooses to focus on regimes because as long as they persist, a change of government may not alter the renegade behaviour.

The temporal framework for this volume is the post-Cold War era, dated from the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Within this framework, Nincic provides a comprehensive analysis of renegade regimes. He extensively examines the foundations for such regimes including domestic and foreign. The author recognizes the dynamics of change within renegade regimes. In other words, regimes do change due to internal developments or external pressure.

Like any good study, this volume suffers from few shortcomings. The thrust of Nincic's argument is that there are well-established and recognized international norms and those who disagree with these norms are labelled renegade. Despite the extensive and rapidly growing personal and official interaction between people all over the world, it is premature to make such an assumption. The United Nations and other international and regional organizations have sought to create a consensus on what is acceptable and what is not in conducting foreign affairs. Despite these sincere efforts, this consensus has yet to be established.

For example, terrorism has been a major concern for the international community for several decades. Yet, the boundary between who is a 'terrorist' and who is a 'freedom fighter' is not clear. Are Hamas and Hizballah (Party of God) considered terrorist organizations or resistance movements? Who should be recognized as a 'nuclear power'? How to define the status of India, Israel, and Pakistan regarding the Non-Proliferation Treaty? In short, the international community has a long way to go to reach a consensus on universally accepted international norms.

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