

Britain: Balancing ‘Instinctive Atlanticism’¹

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Introduction: Four Decisive Factors

Britain has a unique take on ballistic missile defence.² Formulating a policy on this issue impacts on several key areas of foreign and defence policy, some of which are in conflict with each other, some of which go to the heart of Britain’s understanding of its international role and some of which compel the government to make choices it would perhaps prefer to put off.

Four aspects stand out as both decisive in impact and more or less distinctive to Britain. First, ballistic missile defence is an Anglo-American issue for Britain. The US radar base at Fylingdales is an important, though not indispensable, component of territorial missile defence of the North American continent, and so Britain has been a player in the US system of defence. It will continue to be so, unless it takes the highly unlikely step of opting out. Second, BMD is a ‘small-a Alliance’ issue for Britain. By ‘small-a Alliances’, I refer to fluid, ad hoc ‘coalitions of the willing’, as opposed to formal, institutionalized ‘capital-A Alliances’ such as NATO. Britain has regularly participated in the post-Cold War military ‘coalitions of the willing’ led by the US. This is true for the 1991 and 2003 wars on Iraq, as well as the military enforcement of no-fly zones and Operation ‘Desert Fox’ in the intervening period. Again, this is likely to continue, and in fact there have even been reports that it is unavoidable. In the run-up to the post-9/11 war in Afghanistan, unsubstantiated reports circulated of a Venn diagram drawn up by the Pentagon, categorizing states needed for various coalitions. The only states in the centre where all circles overlapped were the US, Britain and Turkey.³ Third, BMD is a ‘capital-A Alliance’ issue for Britain, a major player in NATO and one of its most Atlanticist members (of which more later). If European states are to have a missile defence of their own, it is the Alliance that remains the institution of choice for Britain. Fourth, ballistic missile defence is a defence industry question. In BAE Systems, Britain has the biggest defence company in Europe and the largest non-US company in the world.⁴ Moreover, BAE Systems is closely involved with the developing research and development programmes

for European missile defence. It should also be borne in mind that in the 1980s Britain fielded the Chevaline adaptation of Polaris, which used counter-measures developed in Britain to overcome the Soviet BMD system.⁵

These four factors operate inside an equally distinctive strategic culture. Britain has needed to balance its 'Instinctive Atlanticism' with a growing Europeanist trend in recent years. This is true of the ways in which it expresses its defence identity, but also in the more specific issue of BMD, where Britain is closer to other European states than to the US in its view on a shield for the protection of national homelands.

Self-understandings

Britain's current strategic environment is, in terms of threats to the homeland, at an unprecedented point: there is no likely threat to its territorial integrity from another European state and none is thought likely to emerge for at least a generation.⁶ The only possible change to this would come from some disastrous breakdown in relations with Russia, and while this may not be entirely cloud-cuckoo-land, it is nevertheless, as Michael Clarke puts it, 'not worth much of the time of a policy planner, still less a politician'.⁷

It follows that any missile threats to British homeland or its forces will be a result of developments outside Britain's security complex.⁸ They will come as a consequence of power projection and are therefore a long way from home. Moreover, they will not be unshared: Britain is no longer able to project significant military power by itself and will almost certainly do so only in concert with other states. Its favoured partner outside the European continent is of course the US. The first self-understanding worthy of examination is therefore that of Atlanticism and the Anglo-American relationship.

Defining Atlanticism is not as straightforward as it may seem; this is one of those terms that are used considerably more often than they are defined. It is therefore worth pausing to highlight some defining features.

First, of course, it refers to the presence of the US as a significant actor within the European security system, but can also be extended to refer to American-European cooperation on other security problems that they share outside Europe.

Second, it is a state of political mind as well as a policy; the state of mind produces policy preferences, rather than the other way round.

Third, it is a tendency to regard the US connection with European security as, to one extent or another, an end in itself. That is to say, something that brings benefits of its own that would otherwise be difficult or impossible to obtain by other means.

It is not clear how Atlanticism can or should be pursued in the absence of the great power conflict in Europe that gave rise to it (it should never be

forgotten that it is essentially a twentieth-century phenomenon in origin). For the first time in decades, nearly all the major security challenges that the US and Europe have in common originate outside the 'Old Continent', and this has led some to conclude that we have reached 'the end of Atlanticism'.⁹ If the British policy over Iraq is anything to go by, however, at least one NATO member has yet to reach that conclusion. This is perhaps to be expected of the most robustly Atlanticist of the NATO members, and a key player in securing the US membership of NATO that still represents Atlanticism's defining moment. However, the Atlanticist streak goes deeper than that, as two further self-understandings make clear.

Of the former European imperial powers, Britain has tried hard to cling to some semblance of its former global role. It has chosen to do so increasingly in collaboration with the US, and thus Britain's strategic relationship with Washington has never been confined to Europe in the way that, for example, Germany's has. This remained true even after, or more accurately especially after, the withdrawal from East of Suez in 1967. The second key self-understanding, therefore, is that of remaining a global strategic actor even in the absence of a global strategic presence. In this, Britain has increasingly relied upon the Anglo-American connection to bolster its ability to project power, and also to ensure that, as far as possible, US power is pointed in what London regards as the right direction.

A third self-understanding relates to nuclear weapons, which, along with the US connection, represent the other great 'must have' of post-Second World War British foreign and defence policy. Many justifications for the maintenance of British nuclear status, such as the need for 'a second centre of decision' or the possibility of facing the Soviet Union without allies, were driven by the Cold War,¹⁰ but underlying this was a deeper sense that Britain ought to possess nuclear weapons as part of the currency of being a major power.¹¹ Once Britain was manifestly no longer a major power, the political sense seems to have persisted that, since diminished global power did not always mean diminished global interests, it was necessary to retain as many vestiges of former status as possible. Former Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd was not alone, and neither was he being purely rhetorical, when he argued that nuclear weapons allowed Britain to 'punch above its weight'.¹² He was, in fact, consciously or unconsciously echoing Churchill's remark that the thermonuclear capability was 'the price we pay for sitting at the top table'.¹³ The inertial power of this association of nuclear weapons with prestige should not be underestimated, despite the fact that these weapons no longer represent the ultimate power currency that they once did.

These three represent the most influential and instinctive self-understandings: Britain is Atlanticist, conscious of a strategic role beyond Europe, and committed to remaining a nuclear weapon state. These three all interlink,

with Atlanticism as the irreducible element without which the others are prohibitively difficult. Britain always exhibits the defining feature of Atlanticism: that an Atlanticist strategy will always be more than the sum of its parts. A fourth self-understanding operates independently of these three: that of being European.

Colin Gray notes that Europeans think differently about MD: 'that is just the way it is, and the way it is likely to remain', he points out rather glumly.¹⁴ Britain is after all a European state, and its 'Instinctive Atlanticist' sympathies have not precluded it from adopting a position on MD that is far closer to other European states than to Washington. That is dealt with later, but at this point it needs to be noted that London's European sensibilities go beyond geography into strategic culture. Britain has shared the formative strategic experiences of other European states over the past two centuries: industrial revolution, imperial expansion and contraction, the rise of the German Question, the diminution of relative influence in the age of superpowers, as well as economic and political integration.

Like other European states again, Britain was compelled to trim its strategic sails after 1945 and give greater concentration to its immediate security complex. This has been done with some reluctance and occasional bad grace, but the continental pull on Britain's strategic priorities has been irresistible. This self-understanding is more than simply the strategic centre of gravity that recently produced the St Malo process, under which some basic principles for a Euro-centric military capability are being established. This was the evolving process in the late 1990s that led to a set of ten principles in June 2000.¹⁵ They included the capacity for the EU for military operations, and also for a convergence of, and synergy between, defence planning and the defence industry.

Like Atlanticism, this is also a state of mind that produces policy preferences. Britain, in common with other European states, has had to contend with a contraction of global power that was both relative and absolute. It has been compelled to find other ways to influence global strategic trends and underwrite the status quo, now that its own ability to do so is so diminished. One way, of course, was via Atlanticism, but Britain also shares the European preference for arms control and multilateralism as ways to achieve the same ends. All states prefer predictability, of course, but a state's need for it is likely to increase in inverse proportion to its ability to cope with instability. European states, having diminished ability to impose or restore stability through their own power, consequently tend to look for structures that hold the prospect of allowing them to make medium- to long-run assumptions about what the future will look like.

This is at the heart of European support of arms control. As Gray points out, European states are less interested in the minutiae of arms control treaties than in the promise of institutionalizing political commitments.¹⁶ Like other

Europeans, therefore, Britain placed great emphasis on the role of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty when considering US plans for missile defence, and in fact it is not an exaggeration to say that the ABM Treaty was a defining factor in national policy (see below).

It is important to stress that Britain's Atlanticist and its European sensibilities are essentially practical in nature, and especially that they are not either/or choices. Rather, they are coexisting parts of an overall foreign policy, albeit parts that sometimes are in conflict with each other. However, as Michael Clarke notes, 'the implicit belief behind pragmatic British diplomacy is that as a useful player in whatever the strategic game turns out to be, the country will emerge as one of the comfortable status quo powers in any new order'.¹⁷ In this perspective, recent British policy over Iraq was less about subservience to Washington than about remaining a 'useful player'. Outside Europe, the strategic game had been decisively rearranged by the US, and the choice appeared to be stark: join it or leave it. Within Europe, the game was also changing, albeit less dramatically, and the St Malo process is evidence of British policy changing with it. Seen in this light, there is little automatic contradiction between London's policy on St Malo and on Iraq: this was less a case of political schizophrenia than of *plus ça change* in British strategic policy.

The Dynamics of British MD Policy

In light of the above, Dean Acheson's famous jibe about Britain losing an empire and failing to find a role seems inaccurate, or at least misleading. It would be closer to the truth to say that, having lost a large role, Britain has attempted to play several smaller ones at once, with the bottom line being to maintain influence by not being marginalized.¹⁸ This has meant being a 'useful player' in several strategic games. In terms of the self-understandings listed here, it has meant staying close to the major player (Atlanticism), maintaining major weapons (nuclear arsenal), preserving some ability for power projection (the strategic role outside Europe), and continuing to uphold stability in its own security complex.

These self-understandings form the underlying framework for British thinking on threats and how to respond to them. Within this framework, there are six key points of reference for British policy-making on MD. These are: the Anglo-American relationship, arms control, military strategy, Parliament, the defence industry, and Alliance/alliance politics.

The Anglo-American Connection

Britain's nuclear capability is, of course, closely connected with its relationship with the US: the basis for the acquisition of British Polaris and Trident

nuclear systems was provided by the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement and then the 1962 Nassau Agreement. Unlike the other European NATO allies, Britain has already been obliged to make a political commitment on MD. For more than 40 years, it has been a part of the US Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) through the radar station at RAF Fylingdales in Yorkshire. This radar station is to be upgraded to perform tracking functions, and permission for this was required from the British government.

The radar station at Fylingdales tracks ballistic missiles as they become visible over its horizon, and was the source of the famous 'three-minute warning' during the Cold War. The original 'golf ball' radar installed in 1963, named because of the shape, was replaced in 1992 with the current pyramid-shaped radar which gives 360° coverage. Although the function of the radar is detection and tracking of warheads, it does not have sufficient resolution for the highly accurate tracking necessary for interception. For this, Fylingdales requires conversion to the new upgraded early warning radar (UEWR) system, which means modifications to the computer software and some new hardware.¹⁹ This upgrade has been agreed between London and Washington, and Fylingdales will operate with the other UEWR sites in the US and Greenland as part of the planned shield of the continental US.

The UEWR radars are capable of target acquisition and tracking of unsophisticated single warheads, but target discrimination to deal with decoys and other countermeasures requires the very high resolution X-band radar (XBR). Coverage of the eastern seaboard of the US will require XBRs to be deployed. This might be done under agreement with Britain, which would require a new facility to be built, but no such discussions have yet taken place. Moreover, the US is currently working on a mobile sea-borne X-band radar which would not require a permanent land base.²⁰

The function of Fylingdales is enhanced but not substantially changed by the agreement with the US. What has changed is the purpose of the information provided by the Fylingdales capability: from participating in an early warning system in which Britain also had a stake, to being effectively an outpost of a system for defence of the continental US. Stories occasionally circulate about Britain being the site for BMD interceptors, but thus far there is no firm evidence that this has gone beyond speculative enquiry. The most recent version of the story was refuted by the British government, but a spokesperson for the Ministry of Defence (MoD) did acknowledge that there have been discussions on the subject between London and Washington.²¹

Arms Control

It is easy to forget that, until very recently, arms control was the dominant theme in British MD policy, especially where American missile defence was

concerned. As Gray noted, 'Europeans have always felt great affection for the ABM Treaty',²² and Britain was not an exception. This affection was not so much for the treaty itself as for the two things it codified: First, the principle of vulnerability and thereby the primacy of deterrent strategies, and, second, the US-Russian arms reduction regime. In this way, the ABM Treaty and the 1980s arms control agreements in which it was a political unspoken assumption, helped to underpin British views about the relationship between Washington and Moscow.

In particular, the main assumption was that this relationship would dependably continue along the post-Cold War lines and would not be prone to unexpected twists and turns. Arguably, this dependability became more important, not less, when the East–West conflict was over and the future became markedly more predictable. Britain therefore had a strategic interest in maintaining those elements of the Cold War structure that might serve to provide a framework for post-Cold War relations between the US and Russia. Consequently London preferred to preserve as much as possible of the familiar tools for judging what to expect. If the ABM Treaty was abrogated, then it was possible that the rest of the US-Russian arms control regime that had been so painstakingly constructed might be similarly repealed or simply unravel. That this scenario failed to materialize when the ABM Treaty was abrogated should not obscure the fact that it was regarded as a genuine possibility at the time.²³

Military Strategy

A third dimension is that of military strategy. It is safe to assume that, barring some disastrous turn of events, no missile threats to Britain will arise within Europe for the foreseeable future, and that it is British military involvement outside the 'Old Continent' that will be important here. London has forces deployed around the world, including deployments in Iraq, Afghanistan and Kuwait. Equally significantly, Britain has demonstrated a marked willingness to participate in US-led 'coalitions of the willing' from 'Desert Storm' in 1991 via 'Desert Fox' in 1998 to 'Enduring Freedom' and 'Iraqi Freedom' in 2001 and 2003.

This means that Britain is unavoidably a player, albeit an occasional and militarily junior one, in regional security dynamics outside Europe. In turn, that means that developments in regional missile proliferation impact on British military calculations in a way that is not the case with some other European states. In the Middle East, the theatre most likely to see British military involvement, missile capabilities currently can threaten troops and theatre logistical points, and potentially bases such as Cyprus and Incirlik in Turkey.²⁴ Threats to mainland Britain are a long way in the future, if they emerge at all, but should not be entirely discounted. Most estimates suggest that a Middle

Eastern state would require several years and significant foreign assistance if they are to develop the type of multistage missile technology required to possess interregional reach.²⁵ A problem, of course, is that foreign assistance may be forthcoming from North Korea, which has an active multistage missile programme.

Parliament

British defence policy is implemented under the supervision of Parliament, but the two Houses (the Commons and the Lords) are rarely actors in their own right. That is to say, policy is debated, endorsed and sometimes rejected by Parliament but it is almost never made there. Moreover, defence policy has a relative immunity to interparty or ideological dispute. A glance at the major developments in British defence policy shows a striking cross-party consensus on most or all issues of substance when the parties are actually in power. Loud public declarations of difference rarely survive the transition from opposition party to government, producing a remarkable continuity in the basic patterns of British defence policy.²⁶

However, this does not mean that Parliament has no influence. Major government decisions are required to be passed by the House, and therefore are unavoidably shaped by the prospects of a favourable result when the time comes for MPs to vote. No government would present a policy to Parliament without being reasonably sure of a successful outcome, and consequently Westminster is unavoidably a factor, albeit an indirect one, in a government's policy. More regular scrutiny takes place through the parliamentary committee system, in which cross-party groups led by the governing party monitor policy. These are useful indicators of cross-party consensus and discord, but also provide the best public insight into bureaucratic opinion through the testimonies of officials before the committee. These bodies provide useful scrutiny, but have little real influence on policy.

The Defence Industry

A further factor is the role of the defence industry. In BAE Systems, Britain has the world's largest non-US defence company, with the fourth largest defence revenue in the world.²⁷ BAE arrived at its current position by the process of consolidation and merger that has characterized much of the post-Cold War defence industry, and in particular from its takeover of Marconi Electronic Systems in 1999, which overnight made it the world's fourth largest defence company.²⁸ Within a year of this, another European consolidation emerged in the form of the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS), which included some disgruntled companies that had been expecting to be in Marconi's place. These two entities are now the dominant actors in the European defence industry. However, BAE is by far

the bigger defence operator: in 2002 its defence revenue was \$15 billion or 77 per cent of its total, against the EADS defence revenue of \$6 billion or 20 per cent of its total.²⁹

The consolidation process was partly a response to the post-Cold War factors of dwindling government contracts and increasing technological sophistication in weaponry.³⁰ However, it was also driven by a similar process that had been taking place in the US, which produced three giants: Lockheed Martin, Boeing and Raytheon. In Europe, only BAE and EADS come close to the revenues generated by these three, but that does not imply they are entirely in competition. As the pattern of a handful of behemoths became clear, reports began to surface of a transatlantic defence partnership that would continue the consolidation trend across the Atlantic.³¹

BAE has already manoeuvred itself into a position to be able to take advantage of such a development, by putting into operation many of the export control safeguards required for collaboration with US defence companies.³² These safeguards are intended to prevent leakage of sensitive military technology, and their implementation gives BAE an important advantage in the lucrative American defence industry. They were put into place after BAE's acquisition of three large US defence companies, and this astute move meant that by 2002 BAE was doing more business with the Pentagon than it was with the British MoD, the 'Buy American' movement notwithstanding.³³ A further advantage is that British firms are, apparently, simply trusted far more than those from other European states.³⁴ Thus British industry is well-placed to take advantage of research and development opportunities in the American missile defence programme. If the defence industry has any influence over government decisions, it will be in that context, rather than through any indigenous British BMD project.

Alliances, Formal and Informal

As any NATO historian will know, the Alliance has, almost since its inception, been attended by a long succession of Eeyores loudly proclaiming that the whole thing is doomed.³⁵ Despite these regular proclamations of imminent demise, NATO still appears to be going strong.

Part of the reason for this is that, in the final analysis, European states have preferred to follow the US on security rather than each other. Security, especially defence, remains the most chronically underdeveloped aspect of common European policy, and many states would prefer it to stay that way. The character of most initiatives on a Euro-centric security system that leaves out the Atlantic connection, whether it be the European Defence Community in the 1950s or the European Security and Defence Policy in the 1990s, is evidence that, in Lindley-French's words, 'Europe's security architects should never have been given planning permission'.³⁶ Chirac of

France admitted as much when he conceded in the 1990s that the Euro-centric project had simply found too few takers.

The experience of the Balkans highlighted this in stark fashion, but also seemed to precipitate a significant shift in Anglo-French policy, culminating in the St Malo process. This was, however, focused on Europe. Outside the continent, a parallel development in the 1990s was the emergence of much more traditional alliances: the temporary type that was in fact very much the norm prior to the Cold War. These alliances, 'coalitions of the willing' as they are usually termed, are characterized by being ad hoc and elective. They disband quickly after their goal has been achieved, and their fluid nature places a premium on coalition-building by an acknowledged hegemon. Moreover, participation in these alliances, not the St Malo process, will be the source of missile threats to Britain.

The Evolution of British MD Policy

Until its demise, the ABM Treaty was the cornerstone of most British policy on MD, which is revealing in two ways. First, arms control, not missile threats, was at the heart of policy. Britain's stake in this bilateral agreement was not, of course, that of a signatory, but that of a state with a significant interest in a stable US–Russian relationship. Second, the emphasis on the treaty highlights that the dominant theme in British policy was defence of the US, and only tangentially (if at all) defence of Britain itself.

British Policy Prior to the ABM Treaty's Demise

When the British Labour Party was elected to power in May 1997 with one of the biggest majorities in parliamentary history, it had been out of power for 18 years. Shortly after arriving in office, it began a survey of British defence policy that produced the Strategic Defence Review (SDR).³⁷

The SDR addressed ballistic missile proliferation threats briefly. It noted that Britain was not yet within range of missiles from 'states of concern', but argued that this was likely to change 'well before 2030'. Even with the qualifier 'well before', this was a different assessment to that of the Rumsfeld Commission in the US, and the 1998 launch of the North Korean Taepodong-1 may have called the judgement into question.³⁸

Nonetheless, the SDR pointed to theatre-range missiles as the real problem, on the grounds that deterrence would be less effective against attacks on troops from weapons of mass destruction. The British strategic nuclear capability was still regarded as effective against threats to the British homeland, although the SDR did hedge its bets by claiming that 'some states may not respond to deterrence as we might expect'. This, however, felt like an afterthought, and one of the SDR's supporting essays

noted that it would be 'premature' to decide on whether missile defence of the United Kingdom was necessary. With Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) regarded as the priority, to the extent that it is accurate to suggest any urgency to British policy, a three-year Technical Readiness & Risk Assessment Programme (TRRAP) was established by the MoD to investigate the possibilities.

Across the Atlantic, the Clinton administration was pursuing its cautious line on what was then referred to as National Missile Defense (NMD). The administration remained unconvinced about the necessity for, and strategic wisdom of, NMD, but by 1998 domestic political pressures had led Clinton to at least make a show of a serious policy. To that end, he set out four criteria for a decision on whether to proceed: whether there was a missile threat, whether defence was technically feasible, whether it was cost-effective, and whether the knock-on effects on other strategic relations would be acceptably low. These were eminently sensible criteria, and Clinton stated that he would make his decision when the contemporary round of tests was complete, scheduled for late 2000.

The \$64,000 question in Clinton's fourth criterion was the fate of the ABM Treaty, which placed explicit limits on MD of the US and Russia. In contrast to the lengthy and often arcane texts of other Cold War treaties such as the START agreements, the ABM Treaty was a model of concision and clarity. It allowed defence of specified sites, but ruled out any national MD, including testing and development of such a system. An NMD of the continental US, even one of the limited type pursued by the Clinton administration, was unarguably incompatible with the treaty, and therefore a decision to pursue the system would necessarily mean breaching, abrogating or amending it.

In the run-up to the 2000 decision, it was less than clear which of these possibilities would be the agreement's fate. Consequently, the British government had a difficult line to tread, in view of the fact that NMD would require British permission for the necessary Fylingdales upgrade. The context in which such permission might be sought was far from clear, and the Clinton administration's ambivalence on NMD meant that it might not be required for some time, if ever. In those circumstances, the British position on Fylingdales was, in essence, not to have a clearly stated position at all until the situation had clarified.

This was a commonsense policy, but it could sound tangled and evasive when expressed publicly:

What view we took on that decision [i.e. Fylingdales] would of course depend on the circumstances surrounding that decision, for instance the relationship to the ABM Treaty on which the United States is in

discussion with Russia. Until we know both the nature of the question and also the circumstances in which we are being asked that question, it would be premature for us to debate what the response might be, particularly since at the moment there is no commitment by the United States to ask the question.³⁹

British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook said this to the Parliamentary Select Committee on Foreign Affairs in 2000, as part of its deliberations for a report on weapons of mass destruction. The report was published in August, and covered all aspects of the WMD problem, including responses such as MD. In its pondering of the implications of NMD, the Committee seemed to find the position of both government and bureaucracy frustrating.

The government's refusal to be drawn on expressing a view on NMD and Fylingdales, as elucidated (if that is the term) by the Foreign Secretary, was criticized:

It is incumbent on the Government, as one of the five nuclear weapon states and as a close ally of the USA, to make an early public statement on its analysis of NMD's likely impact on strategic stability and its assessment of whether this would be in the overall security interests of this country.⁴⁰

Views from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and MoD also caused frustration, and were criticized as contradictory by the report. This is unfair, since the two departments were in fact concerned with different aspects of the MD question. The Ministry of Defence, approaching MD as a question of military strategy, pondered whether Britain itself might require a defence of home territory, and acknowledged that at some point this might become a necessity. On the other hand, the FCO was inevitably more concerned with the international political impact of American missile defence. The principal consequence was thought to lie in the consequences of abandoning the ABM Treaty, and hence the Fylingdales issue was paramount here.

This difference in bureaucratic terms of reference naturally produced differences in view, but the principal linking theme was that both studiously avoided taking a clear public position. Where they collaborated, as in the memo to the Committee on NMD and the ABM Treaty, they contented themselves with explaining policy thus: 'The government has made it clear . . . that it wishes to see the ABMT [Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty] preserved. We are also keen to see early progress towards the further reduction of their respective nuclear arsenals'.⁴¹

The Committee conceded that a British refusal to allow the Fylingdales upgrade, whatever the circumstances of such a refusal, would be

unprecedented and would have 'profound consequences' for Anglo-American relations. Nonetheless, it urged the government to express British concerns about NMD, to encourage Washington to seek other ways to respond to missile proliferation, and to stress that permission to upgrade the Fylingdales radars should not be regarded as unconditional or inevitable.

The government's response, in October 2000, pointed out that the Clinton administration had been clear about its wish to proceed with NMD (if it proceeded at all) in the context of the ABM Treaty. There the matter rested, until the arrival in Washington of the Bush administration. Within a year of the Committee's report, abrogation of the bilateral agreement was highly likely, and it was almost a reality before 2001 was out. Moreover, the atrocities of 9/11 had thrown international security into its most far-reaching upheaval since 1989.

British Policy after the ABM Treaty

The Bush administration had made no secret of its enthusiasm for missile defence and its disdain for the treaty, both of which positions it espoused with a conviction that bordered on the ideological. The unmistakable signs that Washington was about to exercise its right to withdraw from the agreement were growing for some time prior to the formal announcement in December 2001.⁴² In Parliament, concern at this looming possibility was expressed in two Early Day Motions in 2001. An EDM is an informal parliamentary petition that can be signed by MPs. The first of these was submitted in May 2001, and expressed the House's concern at President Bush's intention to move beyond the constraints of the ABM Treaty in developing missile defence. Moreover, it endorsed the unanimous conclusions of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, which recommended that the government voice the grave concerns about NMD in Britain. The motion received 178 signatures, and an identical petition submitted the following month reached 276.

Because so much of the British position on ballistic missile defence hung on the actions of the US, it was to be expected that London's policy would begin to exhibit shifts to align itself with the new course in Washington. This was indeed the case, with the Foreign Affairs Committee being a case in point. In 2001, the Committee prepared a report on Anglo-American relations, and it is instructive to compare its conclusions on MD with those of the previous year.

The public position of the government had not changed, the Committee being told that 'it is too early to say whether a role for facilities in the United Kingdom might be envisaged'.⁴³ However, the Foreign Secretary (now Jack Straw) told the Committee that the events of 9/11 had strengthened the case for missile defence. The Committee's members visited the US as part of their deliberations, and concluded that, 'we were presented with a strong

case for the emerging US proposals on missile defence. We recommend that these proposals are most carefully considered by the Government'.⁴⁴ That they saw the way the political wind was blowing is implied in their single conclusion on the agreement: 'We recommend that the Government seek to ensure that if either party to the ABM Treaty exercises its right to withdraw, the United States and Russia establish an alternative mutually satisfactory and legally binding agreement on the development of missile defence systems'.⁴⁵

The Committee's report was published on 18 December 2001: less than a week before, the ABM Treaty's fate had been announced by President Bush. With the Russian and Chinese reactions to the abrogation of the agreement turning out to be startlingly muted, MD had faded somewhat as a foreign policy issue, which left its relevance to British policy as largely one of defence and military strategy. Consequently, two key themes in British MD policy – the participation in a US-based system, and the possibility for defence of Britain itself – converged and for a while appeared to be given equal weight. A third dimension, that of TMD for military deployments, remained fairly constant throughout.

The Bush administration committed itself to deploying a rudimentary MD – *very* rudimentary, in light of the test record – in time for the 2004 presidential election. It was therefore very clear that Fylingdales would be involved, since only the ground-based system that used forward-based radars could possibly be deployable by that date, and consequently permission would soon be sought for the upgrade. On this question, the government continued to obfuscate. The defence secretary stated in April 2000 that 'the US has not asked for UK assistance in the deployment of the proposed NMD system, nor would we expect them to do so until after a US decision on whether or not to proceed with its deployment'.⁴⁶ Two years later, he stated before the Parliamentary Defence Committee that until the US had decided on what sort of MD system it wished to deploy 'we will not be in a position to be clear about how that is going to work, how it is working to affect the UK or European allies, and therefore what kind of contribution we might be able to make, if that was judged at the time to be appropriate'.⁴⁷ MoD officials, however, did acknowledge that discussions between London and Washington were taking place.

Fylingdales had been the focus of anti-BMD protests in Britain. In 2002, for example, the head of the US Missile Defense Agency, Lieutenant General Ronald Kadish, visited the radar site to be greeted by a protest organized by the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, which had long campaigned against missile defence. The UK Chair explained why:

The US wants to dominate space and therefore dominate the land below. They will be able to knock out economies and banking systems with the

star wars system and this base is part of that system. Fylingdales may be on a remote moor but it has the ability to destabilise the rest of the world. This is not in the interests of the British people.⁴⁸

The first British policy statement after the termination of the ABM Treaty came in 2002, and came, tellingly, from the MoD rather than the FCO. In December, it published a 'Public Discussion Paper'.⁴⁹ This was an interesting document, because it was in fact not so much a discussion paper as a position paper. It set out most of the leading criticisms of missile defence (both British MD and British participation in the American system), and rejected almost all of them. In other words, it was as clear an argument in favour of both a positive decision on Fylingdales and a defence of British territory as had been put by a British government. It was only in the anodyne conclusions that it reverted to type:

There are complex issues to be considered before the UK and others can determine the best overall strategy for addressing this threat [i.e. missiles tipped with WMD] and the role that missile defence could play as an element of this strategy.⁵⁰

The Discussion Paper had been carefully timed: little over a week after its publication, the US formally requested permission for the Fylingdales radar station to be upgraded. Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon's response was to state that a decision ought to be informed by debate in Parliament and with reference to public opinion. In Parliament, the Defence Committee, broadly sympathetic to missile defence, announced shortly afterwards that it would conduct an inquiry into the twin issues of the Fylingdales upgrade and the MD of Britain. However, any findings here were pre-empted by the Defence Secretary, who announced on 15 January that, 'I have come to the preliminary conclusion that the answer to the US request must be yes, and that we should agree to the upgrade as proposed'.⁵¹

He went on to expound a new context for the Fylingdales decision – not the ABM Treaty but the possibilities offered for a British MD:

There is not yet an immediate threat to us, but there is a distinct possibility that this threat could materialize in the relatively near future. It would be irresponsible for the Government to leave the United Kingdom without a route map to acquire a defence against this threat. An upgraded Fylingdales radar would be a vital building-block on which missile defence for this country and for our European neighbours could be developed.⁵²

His conclusion was therefore that, 'this specific decision is one that has real potential benefits at essentially no financial cost. But it will ensure that

if, in the coming years, we find that a potentially devastating threat is becoming a reality, we have the opportunity to defend against it'.⁵³

This was, to say the least, a novel interpretation of what constitutes debate in Parliament and with the public, since the Defence Committee had barely begun its deliberations. The Committee's report did not neglect to note and deplore this pre-emptory treatment, a criticism that was rejected by the government, 'The Government has encouraged full and effective Parliamentary and public discussion of the issues raised. There have been many opportunities for MPs and members of the public to make their views known, including through a MOD website and e-mail address'.⁵⁴

This seemed a dubious argument: since the Defence Secretary had spent the past year studiously avoiding taking any position on MD, including a masterclass in obfuscation before the Defence Committee, it seemed rather unfair to claim that any sort of debate had taken place in the proper sense of the word. It is true that the Defence and Foreign Affairs Committees had both expressed their view on MD, but this took place in the context of either an un-abrogated ABM Treaty or, later, government insistence that no request over Fylingdales had been received or considered. There was little time to debate the decision once the request had been received, and it is this that the Defence Committee objected to.

However, the Committee was, in fact, basically sympathetic on both Fylingdales and British MD, and several of the strongest critics of the way it was treated by Hoon were MD enthusiasts who had previously criticized the government for failing to take a stronger line on the issue.⁵⁵ Only a few weeks before, in December 2002, a group of heavily pro-MD supporters in Parliament submitted an Early Day Motion urging the government to 'respond promptly and positively to this long-anticipated request'. The EDM received only 63 signatures, contrasting unfavourably with the 276 signatures for the previous year's far more sceptical Early Day Motion.⁵⁶

In June, the two themes in British policy were further conflated with the opening of the Missile Defence Centre. This is run by the British government, which has committed £5 million per annum for the first six years, and UK industry, which is to match that sum. It is designed to provide an interface between Britain and the US Missile Defense Agency over MD issues, including the participation of British industry in research and development. The centre was set up in response to two developments, the first being a Memorandum of Understanding between Britain and the US. The text was placed in the House of Commons Library, but full public access to it came through the British-American Security Information Council, a transatlantic NGO that closely monitors missile defence policy and which posted the memorandum on its website. The agreement allowed for bilateral information exchange of MD, a management structure to direct

cooperative work, and opportunity for British industry to participate in the US programme.⁵⁷

This political agreement built upon an industrial one, signed in July 2002 between BAE Systems and Boeing, the American missile defence leader. The agreement brought BAE, which was already involved in the American Theater/Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, into the main territorial defence programme as a subcontractor. Similar agreements were signed with other European companies, but BAE's existing clearance for US defence contractual work (see above) put it into a position to get immediately involved.⁵⁸

This agreement further deepened BAE's involvement with US missile defence, but had a deeper political significance. It was acknowledged, even as the deal was signed, that technological exchange would require inter-governmental agreement, which has now become a reality with the 2004 'Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation' annex to the Anglo-American Memorandum of Understanding. However, BAE and Boeing also readily acknowledged that meaningful European involvement would be largely contingent on European governments making a significant commitment to MD of their own.⁵⁹ In other words, if the main buyers of MD would be the US government, then it would be American defence contractors that would benefit most from R&D contracts. In 2005, there was still little sign that European governments were willing to make the commitment.

The second factor was the continuing Alliance discussions of missile defence for NATO Europe. In Britain, the TRRAP study had concluded that defence of British troops using ground-based systems was technologically feasible, although potentially vulnerable to countermeasures, but that it was premature to make any decision on defence of home territory. That remained the case into 2002, and MoD officials noted that 9/11 had not 'changed the equation'.⁶⁰ The Alliance had been interested in Theatre Missile Defence since as early as 1993, and an initial study into its feasibility, similar in purpose to the British TRRAP study, had been established. A follow-on study, commissioned at the NATO Prague summit in November 2002, was to investigate missile defence for national territories and populations – a far more ambitious project. The NATO-funded project, worth an estimated \$18 million, was awarded to a consortium that included the British company QinetiQ, and was designed to establish a technological basis by mid-2005 for a political decision on whether to proceed with such a defence.

In summary, three key changes in the international context of missile defence – emerging opportunities for the defence industry, the progressing NATO debate on territorial defence, and the cutting of the Gordian knot of the ABM Treaty – had produced a limited shift in the basic British position. On the issue of participating in an American defence system via Fylingdales,

the outcome had been largely as expected; on the issue of defence of the United Kingdom itself, the changes produced a willingness to speculate, but little more.

Conclusions

On the first strand of missile defence policy in Britain, that of participation in the American system, successive governments studiously avoided a firm policy, preferring to wait until the context and implications of a decision had clarified. This was political common sense, particularly in the strong cross-party consensus on most basic issues of defence policy. It is unlikely that a different government would have significantly altered the British preference for attaching few, if any, strings to the Fylingdales question beyond the pious hope that NMD would be pursued in a suitably stable fashion.

Regarding the missile defence of Britain, the strategic presence outside Europe is the role for which MD is potentially required and moreover the role where the Anglo-American relationship is at its most decisive in British policy. Although it might perhaps be thought that the evolving St Malo process might have produced a stronger strategic identification with the rest of Europe, the Iraq war showed that this would be a mistaken view, and in fact that should not be seen as a surprise. The St Malo process is significant, but it is Euro-centric in its remit, and as such has little reach into the regions from which missile threats to the UK will come. Therefore, its influence on how Britain thinks about MD should be seen as limited.

However, it is striking that Britain's comparative readiness to participate in American-led coalitions outside Europe has not produced a noticeably heightened interest in MD. This strongly suggests that missile proliferation in itself is not decisive for British policy. TMD is now apparently regarded as a necessity, but not such an urgent one that Britain participates in the tripartite MEADS (Medium Extended Air Defense System) programme. Above the TMD level, it still seems that Britain has strong faith in its strategic and sub-strategic nuclear capability over expensive and thus far unproven MD systems. The increasing involvement of the British defence industry has yet to significantly alter that policy, even given the prospect of lucrative defence contracts as a corollary of a commitment to missile defence in the United Kingdom.

The Military-Industrial Complex, therefore, does not appear to have a decisive influence on policy. In fact, it is perhaps not accurate to speak of such a complex at all in missile defence. The defence industry will be a strong voice in MD's favour, but thus far there is little indication that the British military share its enthusiasm. In addition to the presence of strategic and sub-strategic nuclear capability, there are, of course, other sound practical

reasons for this, with likely financial cost as one of the foremost considerations. It is unclear how much a defence for the UK would cost, but some have put the 'ball-park figure' as running into billions.⁶¹ This is a colossal slice of the defence budget, and the opportunity costs would therefore be huge.

The former Chief of the Defence Staff, Sir Michael Boyce, highlighted the tension between Britain's role in military coalitions and missile defence: 'Under our present defence budget, we could not maintain sensible expeditionary activity and pay for missile defence'.⁶² In short, paying for MD might erode the very thing that might make it necessary. It is worth noting that Sir Michael subsequently changed his mind: 'If there is a defence system around which we can make use of, then it must be essential for us to investigate it . . . There may not be a threat today, but there certainly will be. I can guarantee it.'⁶³

The potential costs have not gone away, of course, but it is possible that the US would be prepared to make some acceptable offer to the British government.

In conclusion, British missile defence policy is much closer to that of its European allies than its transatlantic one. Just as the St Malo process was not enough to split Britain from its strategic inclination to back the US outside Europe, that same inclination has yet to part Britain from its basically European position on MD. There is nothing like the urgency that the Bush administration has shown. That may, of course, say a great deal more about Washington than it does about Britain.

Where, then, is British policy on MD likely to go? One of the dominant themes is inertia: developments in missile proliferation, 'coalitions of the willing', and Fylingdales have yet to produce any noticeable change or urgency in British policy, and there is little reason to expect this to change, all other things being equal.

A second prevalent theme is pragmatism: policy is made with reference to prevailing circumstances rather than with an identifiable vision. Here, the decisive influence will probably be the factor that operates across all the self-understandings identified here: the US. If Britain should be asked to participate more fully in the American missile defence system, perhaps by stationing some interceptor systems here, it is difficult to imagine the answer being 'No'. If the US should develop more TMD systems to be utilized via the Alliance or by 'coalitions of the willing' (assuming the said systems can be relied upon not to shoot at British aircraft, as happened during the war in Iraq), London may well decide to go along. And if Washington should make an attractive (read: inexpensive) offer of MD coverage of the British homeland, perhaps as part of the US system, it is very possible that the answer would similarly be acceptance. The lack of a strong pro-MD constituency in Britain, other than that in the defence industry, probably means that it

is *only* in this context that London would make such a decision. Missile proliferation raises strategic concerns for the UK, but it is developments across the Atlantic that will be decisive in missile defence.

What can these factors tell us in the wider context of this collection of essays? For the self-understandings, the categorization of Britain as a medium nuclear weapons state with an interest in maintaining a strong military base is a sound one, but this position has markedly failed to produce either the anticipated interest in the broadest variety of MD projects, or a corresponding lack of same in arms control. In fact the reverse is true: Britain has thus far demonstrated little genuine interest in MD beyond theatre level, and was a keen supporter of the ABM Treaty until its demise. It has also been a significant proponent of the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, an international norm-building exercise on missile behaviour.

The disinterest in large-scale MD may be partially explained within the categorization, however, when we understand the reasons why Britain has maintained its strong if not dominant interest in maintaining a strong military base as a precondition for pursuing military options. More than a desire to have a stand-alone capability for out-of-area operations, which could be expected to produce interest in MD, a main reason is a keen interest in maintaining the ability to join US-led coalition operations. Washington would lead such a coalition, and will, in all likelihood, be the state to produce a workable territorial shield. Consequently, just as it is US strategic policy that provides the lead for British military operations, it is American MD policy that will set the context for British defensive needs. London has neither the funds nor the industrial capacity to produce a British MD: thus, coverage of troops, logistical points and even homeland is likely to be the price for participation in a coalition.

The role of military alliances, namely NATO, may be stronger. The North Atlantic Alliance has been involved on the ground in Afghanistan and in Iraq, far from its original area of operations. If this is indicative of future policy, then NATO may take a correspondingly heightened interest in MD as it becomes involved in areas where missile proliferation is most active. However, territorial defence of European member states presents a whole set of technological and architectural problems on top of those already attendant upon MD. Again, NATO members will look to the United States rather than each other for a lead.

As far as regime type and the Military-Industrial Complex are concerned, these two explicatory factors appear to exert almost no influence. Parliament remains supreme in British politics, but the size of the governing party's majority is decisive. The war in Iraq, opposed by a large segment of the British public and the subject of heated debate in Parliament, is indicative that the government of the day is not always obliged to let parliamentary or

public opinion exercise decisive influence over its decisions. Moreover, the continuity in defence policy between the Labour and Conservative parties when they are in government means that differences in Parliament can be more apparent than real.

If there is such a thing as a Military-Industrial Complex in Britain, its influence over MD policy appears to be largely non-existent. British firms are unusually well-placed to participate in research and development in the US, but such participation is contingent on their government being a future customer. The fact that this has signally failed to produce a change in policy tells its own story.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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NOTES

1. The phrase 'Instinctive Atlanticism' is used by Zaborowski and Longhurst in connection with Poland, but it can just as accurately be applied to the UK. See Marcin Zaborowski and Kerry Longhurst, 'America's Protégé in the East?', *International Affairs*, Vol. 79, No. 5 (Oct. 2003), pp.1009–28.
2. For a history of British policy on MD, see Jeremy Stocker, *Britain and Ballistic Missile Defence 1942-2004* (London: Frank Cass, 2004).
3. 'Hawks and Doves Fight for Control of Campaign', *The Observer*, 30 Sept. 2001.
4. 'Top 100', *Defense News*, <www.defensenews.com/content/features/2003chart1.html>.
5. Proceedings of the Royal Aeronautical Society Conference on 'The History of the UK Strategic Deterrent: The Chevaline Programme', 28 Oct. 2004 (typescript).
6. Michael Alexander and Timothy Garden, 'The Arithmetic of Defence Policy', *International Affairs*, Vol. 77, No. 3 (July 2001), p.510.
7. Michael Clarke, 'Does My Bomb Look Big in This?', *International Affairs*, Vol. 80, No. 1 (Jan. 2004), p.56.
8. Barry Buzan defines a security complex as 'a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another'. Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear* (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), p.190.
9. Ivo Daalder, 'The End of Atlanticism,' *Survival*, Vol. 45, No. 2 (Summer 2003), pp.147–66.
10. Lawrence Freedman, *Britain and Nuclear Weapons* (London: Macmillan, 1988), p.127; Lorna Arnold, *Britain and the H-Bomb* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001); John Baylis, *Ambiguity and Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy 1945-64* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.180.
11. Henry Tizard, virtually alone in the immediate post-war period, argued vociferously against a British nuclear capability, but to no avail. See Baylis, *Ambiguity and Deterrence* (note 10) pp.86–7.
12. Hurd made this widely quoted comment in a speech at the Royal Institute for International Affairs in 1993.
13. Quoted in Peter Hennessy, *Muddling Through* (London: Indigo, 1997), p.106.
14. Colin S. Gray, *European Perspectives on U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense* (Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy: 2002), also available at <www.nipp.org/Adobe/europe.pdf>.

15. Jolyon Howarth, 'Britain, France and the European Defence Initiative', *Survival*, Vol. 42, No. 2 (June 2000), pp.33–55.
16. Gray, *European Perspectives on U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense* (note 14) p.18.
17. Michael Clarke, 'French and British Security: Mirror Images in a Globalized World', *International Affairs* Vol. 76, No. 4 (Oct. 2000), p.729.
18. This is in marked contrast to France, which has never recoiled from isolating itself from Washington. (See the contribution of Ronja Kempin and Jocelyn Mawdsley in this issue.)
19. For a comparison of the current capabilities and those of the UEUR, see the information provided by the manufacturers: Raytheon, *Upgraded Early Warning Radars (UEWR) for Missile Defense*, <www.raytheonmissiledefense.com/matrix/pdfs/fs/fs_uewr.pdf>.
20. 'Pentagon Opts for Sea-Based Missile Defense Radar', *Arms Control Today*, Vol. 32, No. 7 (Sept. 2002), p.19.
21. For example 'Star Wars Deal Places US Missiles on British Soil', *Independent*, 17 Oct. 2004. The story was refuted by the British government, but a spokesperson for the MoD did admit that 'there have been discussions' on the subject between London and Washington. 'Britain: The Outpost for Son of Star Wars', *The Guardian*, 29 Oct. 2004.
22. Gray, *European Perspectives on U.S. Ballistic Missile Defence* (note 14).
23. Ian Kenyon, Mike Rance, John Simpson and Mark Smith, *Prospects for a European Ballistic Missile Defence System*, Southampton Papers in International Policy, No. 4 (June 2001), p.22, <www.mcis.soton.ac.uk/spip4.pdf>.
24. The Iranian Shahab-3, the longest-range ballistic missile in the Middle East other than Israel's Jericho, has a range of up to 2,000 km, which covers the whole Middle Eastern strategic theatre. See the contribution of Isil Kazan in this issue.
25. Joseph Cirincione with Jon B. Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, *Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999).
26. John Baylis, *British Defence Policy: Striking the Right Balance* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989), p.57.
27. Defense News 2003 Index, available at <www.defensenews.com>.
28. Alex Ashbourne, 'Introduction,' in Gordon Adams et al. (eds), *Europe's Defence Industry: A Transatlantic Future?* (London: Centre for European Reform, 1999), p.15.
29. 'Top 100', *Defense News*, <www.defensenews.com/content/features/2003chart1.html>; see also Terence Guay and Robert Callum, 'The Transformation and Future Prospects of Europe's Defence Industry', *International Affairs*, Vol. 78, No. 4 (Oct. 2002), p.760.
30. *Ibid.*, p.764.
31. Jeffrey Becker, 'The Future of Atlantic Defence Procurement', *Defence Analysis*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (April 2000), pp.9–31.
32. Guay and Callum, 'The Transformation and Future Prospects' (note 29) p.764.
33. 'Transformed? A Survey of the Defence Industry', *The Economist*, 20 July 2002, p.12. Despite the efforts of the 'Buy American' movement, which aimed to compel the Pentagon to shop at home for defence contracts, it is reported that contracts are being awarded to overseas companies. 'Pentagon's Global View', *Washington Post*, 8 March 2005.
34. *Ibid.*, p.12.
35. Paul Cornish, *Partnership in Crisis: The US, Europe and the Fall and Rise of NATO* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997), p.2.
36. Julian Lindley-French, 'In the Shade of Locarno? Why European Defence is Failing', *International Affairs*, Vol. 78, No. 4 (Oct. 2002), p.789.
37. One of the best analyses is in Colin McInnes, 'Labour's Strategic Defence Review', *International Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 4 (Oct. 1998), pp.823–45.
38. See also the contribution of Bernd W. Kubbig on the US in this issue.
39. Foreign Affairs Committee, *Weapons of Mass Destruction*, Eighth Report (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 2000), p.134.
40. *Ibid.*, p.xvii.
41. *Ibid.*, pp.131–2.

42. These signs included some 'consultative' visits to important allies, informing them of the administration's plans. See 'Washington's Soft Sell Seems to be Going Pretty Well So Far', *The Guardian*, 10 May 2001.
43. Foreign Affairs Committee, *British-US Relations*, Second Report (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 2001), <www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/cmcaff/327/32703.htm>.
44. *Ibid.*
45. *Ibid.*
46. House of Commons, *Ballistic Missile Defence*, Research paper 03/28 (London: House of Commons Library, 26 March 2003), p.46.
47. Select Committee on Defence, 'Examination of Witnesses', 20 March 2002.
48. Quoted in 'Catcalls Greet US Missile Chief on "Star Wars" Visit', *The Guardian*, 21 Nov. 2002.
49. Ministry of Defence, *Missile Defence: a public discussion paper* (London: Ministry of Defence, 2002).
50. *Ibid.*, p.30.
51. House of Commons Debates, 15 Jan. 2003, *Hansard*, Col. 697.
52. *Ibid.*, Col. 698.
53. *Ibid.*, Col. 699.
54. Committee on Defence, 'MoD Memorandum in Response to HCDC's First Report of Session 2002-03 on Missile Defence', Appendix to First Report, <www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmdfence/411/41104.htm>.
55. Nicola Butler, 'What Price British Influence? Tony Blair and the Decision to Back Missile Defence', *Disarmament Diplomacy*, No. 72 (Aug./Sept. 2003), p.26.
56. An official parliamentary database containing details of Early Day Motions is available online at <www.parliament.uk/about_commons/early_day_motions.cfm>.
57. The Memorandum of Understanding, and BASIC's analysis of it, are available at: <www.basicint.org>.
58. 'BAE Joins Group of Firms Developing US Missile Defense', *Defense News*, 29 July–4 Aug. 2002, p.3.
59. 'BAE Deal to Woo Blair on Missile Defence', *Daily Telegraph*, 25 July 2002; 'BAE Joins Group of Firms Developing US Missile Defense', *Defense News*, 29 July–4 Aug. 2002, p.3.
60. Select Committee on Defence, 'Examination of Witnesses', questions 1–19, 27 Feb. 2002, <www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/cmdfence/644/2022709.htm>.
61. *Ibid.*
62. Quoted in 'Cost Warning on Missile Defence', *The Guardian*, 2 March 2001.
63. Quoted in House of Commons, *Ballistic Missile Defence* (note 46) p.51.