Book Reviews

Thomas Schelling and the Nuclear Age: Strategy as Social Science, Robert Ayson. London and New York: Frank Cass Publishers, 2004, pp.235, $115.00 (hardback).

Thomas C. Schelling was one of the most imaginative and insightful of nuclear strategists, and his broad-gauged analyses focusing particularly on the dynamics of Soviet–American relations during the Cold War remain of interest in the post-Cold War period. Robert Ayson has now made an initial, overdue effort to provide a framework with which to analyze Schelling's ideas. His work is careful, respectful and probing.

Ayson argues that Schelling's writings contain a theory of stability formulated by Schelling before he tackled nuclear strategy, but which served as a consistent foundation in seeking a problem-solving approach to deterrence of general nuclear war, limited war, arms racing and arms reduction. Stability in this theory exists when expectations of adversaries tacitly, by unilateral action, converge to mutually recognized points, upon which a bargain between those adversaries is identified and kept.

The bargain is significant, first, because each adversary faces a complex and unstable environment (p.126) in which the absence of agreement would entail mutually high and unacceptable costs. It is also significant in the process by which it is reached, for the adversaries, engaged in distributional bargaining, could each insist on greater rewards at the expense of the other in a manner that would undermine agreement, but do not. And it is important in that the bargain is based upon 'qualitatively unique resting places' (p.198) from which the adversaries have strong incentives not to defect. The 'resting places' are sharp discontinuities such as a river on a battlefield, or the distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons.

Apart from usefully tracing the sources of theory in Schelling's work as an economist, and its applications, Ayson thoroughly explores the logic by which tacit bargaining that leads to restraint can occur. This turns out to be sustained by writing on oligopoly, on theory of games, on cognition and on cybernetic feedback systems, each area of which was drawn upon by Schelling. As a result, the book reads as a set of variations on a theme.

Acting as an industrious tailor to Schelling (in which, for example, a single reference by him to a Gestalt theorist leads to several pages of discussion of commonalities between them), Ayson is not uncritical of him. For example,

Contemporary Security Policy, Vol.26, No.2 (August 2005), pp.357–384
ISSN 1352-3260 print/1743-8764 online
DOI: 10.1080/13523260500190534 © 2005 Taylor & Francis Group Ltd.

while pointing out how the dynamics of Schelling's theory 'are hard to imagine in a non-nuclear environment', he points out that 'Symbolic resting points seem only to be attractive *if* there is enough cooperation to go with the conflict. . .[Schelling] may have overestimated the presence of cooperation in some instances and thus the tendency for competition to be restrained, and the background power of nuclear weapons to make all of this necessary' (pp.104–5). Ayson is correct in noting that Schelling did not study the political relationship between the adversaries, which has an important bearing on whether they reach 'symbolic resting points'.

However, Ayson's study ultimately falls short. First, in his zeal to show how indeterminacy in bargaining can be overcome, and in highlighting what he regards as Schelling's theoretical unity, Ayson slights the variability that inevitably gets in the way of tacit bargaining regularities. Whether nuclear weapons are present or absent is significant in this respect, as is whether norms – the focal points of resting points – already exist or whether they must be created *de novo.* And Ayson himself emphasizes the significance for bargaining of whether or not the adversaries are conscious of their condition and perceive the need for resting points. These uncertainties need to be studied before it can be argued that a theory of stability can be sustained; perhaps it cannot. Schelling himself was preoccupied with thinking backward about how agreement could be reached in difficult cases; as Ayson notes, '[s]tructuring a situation to produce a desired outcome is a general principle for Schelling' (p.151). But Ayson does not document any focus by Schelling upon tendencies in state behaviour.

Second, stability can be at odds with strategy, defined as a plan that supports the search for relative advantage. If stability is, as Ayson notes, 'the avoidance of mutual harm' (p.151), then the most effective way to accomplish stability is to avoid the use of force altogether; nuclear deterrence, for example, must be strengthened by reducing first strike incentives that emerge with the reciprocal fear of surprise attack. But though it may support a strategy – for example, winning a non-nuclear war – nuclear deterrence is not itself a military strategy, but a suppression of strategy. The task of tacit bargaining is at its most delicate and important when strategy is dynamic, as in a war or an arms race, and the search for relative advantage is well-developed. Then stability is least assured.

Third, largely missing from this study is a discussion of the implications of conflict *exacerbated* rather than merely restrained by the adversaries' tactics. 'Nations, like people,' Schelling writes, in a passage not cited by Ayson, 'are continually engaged in demonstrations of resolve, tests of nerve, and explorations for understandings and misunderstandings'. He goes on to observe that adversaries can be and are concerned that yielding in a confrontation 'would create an asymmetrical situation' so severe that the yielder could

not persuade anyone later that he wouldn't yield again (*Arms and Influence*, p.93). Such situations, for which we lack at present refined theory, are the toughest test for tacit bargaining and stability, because they reflect the search for relative advantage that strategy assists. This reviewer feels that Schelling's best work was to draw attention to those situations. Is it too much to wish that Ayson had pursued that line of study as well?

Barry H. Steiner
California State University, Long Beach

The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century, Thomas P.M. Barnett. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 2004, pp.435. $24.95 (hardback); $16.00 (paperback).

Thomas Barnett, a senior Pentagon analyst and professor at the Naval War College, has produced a well-written book on grand strategy that will appeal to the general reader and undergraduates as they try to make sense of the Pentagon's response to our post-Cold War, post-9/11 world. At the same time, *The Pentagon's New Map* will repel many academic readers as being too idiosyncratic and too simplistic. In the end, though, Barnett's method, if not his conclusions and terminology, deserve serious academic consideration.

Barnett's book is particularly attractive to the educated reader because the explanations of his strategic ideas are set within a recounting of his career as a Pentagon strategist and business consultant. This narrative of duelling PowerPoint briefings adds greatly to the reader's interest, creating the feeling of an insider account. Indeed, an alternative title might be *My Adventures as a Pentagon Strategist.* In light of Iraq and Afghanistan, the general reader will also be attracted by the way Barnett not only argues cogently for the inevitability of the invasions but, more important, explains why the Pentagon failed to pay more attention to post-conflict stability and reconstruction missions. Instead of facing up to the reality of post-Cold War operations in a globalizing world, Barnett demonstrates, the Pentagon continued to dream far too long of fighting a 'near-peer competitor' (aka China) just like during the Cold War, basing its planning, training and procurement decisions on this dream, and not the realities of its actual deployments.

To make his point, Barnett first argues that China is not now and never will be a 'near-peer competitor', unless the United States completely mishandles US–China relations (p.105). China is not a 'near-peer competitor' because of globalization in general and China's thrust for oil and Direct Foreign Investment (DFI) in particular (pp.228–31), both of which establish a relationship of 'mutual assured dependence' (p.122). 'As one CEO put it to

me . . . "I'm not looking to provide these guys [Pentagon planners] with future targets [in China], because that's an awful lot of my money going into that facility in China"' (p.226).

Second, Barnett reproduces a world map on which is plotted the 140 major US military operations 1990–2003 (p.144). When a line is drawn around these points, a zone of instability is identified that includes, from west to east, the Andean countries of South America; Central America and the Caribbean; Africa; and Southwest, Central and Southeast Asia, excluding India and China.

To explain the map and the forces of globalization that drive the conflicts in the zone of instability, Barnett develops a unique terminology: he labels the zone of instability as the 'Non-Integrating Gap', a Hobbesian world of poverty, injustice and 'disconnectedness' that groups together those countries unwilling or unable to join in or benefit from globalization. Surrounding the Non-Integrating Gap, or Gap for short, is the 'Functioning Core', a Kantian world of Perpetual Peace and 'connectedness' that groups together those countries able to benefit from globalization. Confronted with this 'New Map', the Pentagon needs to adopt what Barnett calls a 'global transitional strategy', 'Suddenly I don't need the bogeyman of a near-peer competitor to motivate my "defense transformation", because I realize we don't have the military that we need to deal with all this disconnectedness . . . Suddenly I understand the danger is not a *who* but a *where*' (pp.153–4).

More specifically:

> Where this [Bush's preemption policy] all leads to is extending our security rule set around the planet, shrinking the Gap by integrating it within the Core, thus making globalization truly global. The main struggle of our age is over how best to achieve connectivity that is just and ordered, and the main threats we face are those forces determined to pursue disconnectedness as means for power and control. (p.284)

> disconnectedness defines danger, so connectedness defines safety. (p.331)

In fine, the general reader or undergraduate will find a very readable explanation of both globalization and the post-Cold War, post-9/11 world that Barnett has tied very neatly together: the failures of globalization (i.e., 'disconnectedness') explain our current insecurity, while the foreseeable successes of globalization (i.e., expanded 'connectedness' through the integration of the Gap into the Core) explain our future grand strategy. And, by the way, this is exactly what the Bush administration is doing, although, not having adopted my terminology, they have been unable to explain that that is what they are really doing.

Academic readers will be less impressed; they will have heard it all before, minus the Gap versus Core terminology. They will also be annoyed with Barnett's naked self-promotion and his desire to be seen as the next George Kennan, developing not just a whole new grand strategy for the age of globalization (p.7) but a whole new 'security lexicon' as well (pp.266–7). His in-your-face patriotism ('the United States Government is the greatest force for good the world has ever known' (p.270)); his awkward, but repeated, defense of the Bush administration and its war in Iraq ('What is so amazingly courageous about what the Bush Administration has done [in Iraq] . . . is that it has committed our nation to shrinking a major portion of the Gap in one fell swoop' (p.287)); and his self-revealing biographical anecdotes (comparing his two-year-old daughter's battle with cancer to the Global War on Terrorism (pp.247–9)) will also annoy.

Yet, despite himself, Barnett has written a very challenging book. In the first place, his Geographic Information Systems (GIS) method is provocative: military plans always begin with a map. Why not security studies in general? Determining *who* is a threat involves psychological insights concerning intentions that are ultimately unfathomable, as the failure to predict the end of the Cold War demonstrates. Is it not both more empirical and fully sufficient to determine *where* future threats might come from, layering the relevant socioeconomic and conflict data onto a map? Once the potential expeditionary area of operations have been located on this 'New Map', the Pentagon can then derive the necessary procurement, force structure and planning decisions from the data displayed. This would greatly reduce the 'mind games' aspect of security studies and put them on a firmer, geographic, foundation.

In the second place, Barnett's faith that a globalization that is 'truly global' will inaugurate Kant's dream of Perpetual Peace is provocative in a number of ways: to begin, is it possible that Kant/Barnett are correct? That 'it is basically the case that when a country rises above that $3,000 [annual per capita GDP] mark, they seem to get out of the mass violence business' (p.239). I doubt it. This was not the case with Sweden and Switzerland after the Napoleonic wars. Still, by putting an economic face on the 'democratic peace' thesis, Barnett provokes both the absolute question – is Perpetual Peace actually possible? – and the relative question – which is the driver of a relative peace: economics or politics?

More interesting, though, is the futurist's perspective being proposed here. By asserting that Perpetual Peace is possible, Barnett turns strategic analysis on its head. Instead of identifying threats, he is looking for a 'preferred future' to create, 'This country spent most of the twentieth century running from fear in its planning for war, working not to create viable futures but to prevent unviable ones' (p.326). The goal, he argues, is no longer to prevent the next Pearl Harbor; rather, it is to integrate the 'disconnected', 'solitary, poor,

nasty, brutish, and short' Hobbesian world (p.161 ff.) of the Gap into the 'connected', prosperous world of Kant's Perpetual Peace, 'globalization's ultimate goal – the end of war as we know it' (p.2).

Thus, despite himself, Barnett raises elemental issues: is strategic analysis about *who* or about *where*? Is it about identifying the enemy or about identifying the context and circumstances that generate disorder and instability? Perhaps, GIS methods – the geo in geopolitics – need to be revived and re-emphasized. And, just what is the role of threat in strategic analysis? Should defence policy be determined by the pattern of our worst fears or by the pattern of our actual operations? Is defence policy about preventing or deterring threats, which are necessarily subjective, or about creating preferred futures? A risk assessment is a necessary annex to any business plan, but it is an annex, not the plan.

Brien Hallett
University of Hawai'i

Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector, Alan Bryden and Heiner Hänggi (eds). Münster and Geneva: LIT Verlag and The Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2004, pp.275. €29.90 (hardcover).

Alan Bryden and Heiner Hänggi's *Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector* is the result of a project at the Geneva-based Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, promoting reform and democratic governance of the security sector. The volume assesses progress in pursuing reform of security institutions around the world. The book is especially concerned with the complex dynamics of Security Sector (SS) Reform and the particularly challenging cases of SS Reconstruction.

Hänggi opens the study with a discussion conceptualizing key terms, especially SS Reform and SS Reconstruction. This chapter examines them from both theoretical and analytical dimensions, showing the changing contours of security, especially since the end of the Cold War. For Hänggi, the basic problem in these cases is a dysfunctional security sector, one that 'does not provide security to the state and its people in an effective and efficient way or even worse, if it is the cause of insecurity' (p.8). His conception of SS Reform is concerned with affordable security and effective oversight mechanisms consistent with democratic norms, both difficult tasks in many countries, especially post-conflict societies, but also in developmental and post-authoritarian contexts.

David Law opens the debate with a critical dissection of SS Reform in the Euro-Atlantic region. His point of departure is to show the advantages of SS Reform in the region, the home to 19 of the world's 24 most affluent economies, with the longest history of multilateral practice and the largest concentration of institutions. He traces the evolution of SS Reform in the region to the Cold War

era, although the term was not in existence then, through the rise of post-communist states and the 9/11 attacks. The chapter also reflects on the different roles of the broad spectrum of *national* and *regional* components of security sectors in the region. These range from police and armed forces through legislatures and national executives, the media, and a wide array of bilateral and multilateral agreements and organizations. Despite this complexity, Law considers SS Reform in the region to be 'unfinished business', in various stages of implementation because of 'policy fragmentation' where these bodies have different agendas and expectations with little or no coordination of their activities (pp.35–6).

Chris Donnelly examines the Central and Eastern Europe experience in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, Adedeji Ebo examines the West African condition, arguing that the character of the security sector in the sub-region is 'not people oriented, often disarticulated from the large society and anachronistic in structure' (p.66). This, according to him, was essentially as a result of 'the drought of good governance' in the region (p.67). Arnold Luethold reflects on the situation in the Middle East. These cases, despite their different contexts, have a lot in common. Collectively, they see the basic challenges of SS Reform as redefining the role of armed and security forces in emerging democracies and post-conflict societies; assuring civilian control of the military, local ownership of the SS Reform, parliamentary oversight, international cooperation/partnership as well as a critical mass of reforming states. These require strong political will, adequate funding and institutional capacity.

The book focuses equal attention on SS Reconstruction. Michael Brzoska and Andreas Heinemann-Gruder examine the international context of SS Reform in post-conflict reconstruction. The main contribution of the chapter lies in its elucidation of the dilemmas of externally driven SS Reconstruction. These include the presence of structures and institutions of war that must be disbanded, the absence of security, the fundamental democracy-deficit of external interventionalism and the self-interests of national actors. The priorities of SS Reconstruction should therefore emphasize issues such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, formation of truly national security institutions, whether army or police, and the institutionalization of mechanisms to prevent human rights abuses in the course of SS Reconstruction.

Marina Caparini continues the discourse with an examination of the Western Balkans experience, contextualizing Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovia, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, and Kosovo. Kayode Fayemi analyses the cases of Sierra Leone and Liberia. After a deep reflection on the context and metamorphosis of the crisis and contradiction of the security sector in these countries, he identifies their challenges to include the lack of functioning security institutions, as well as the most basic institutions capable of undertaking complex tasks of designing

and complementing reform; the proliferation of both formal and informal armed formation, the need to eliminate both the embedded legacies of violent conflict; resettle displaced populations and marginalized youth; and the need to restore some form of economic normally and long-term development. These, he rightly contends, call for international support, restructuring of the armed forces and the police, and demilitarizing public order, as well as tackling impunity and egregious violations of human rights, among others.

In the concluding chapter Alan Bryden recapitulates the core problems investigated by the study, as much as the contributions of each chapter. After a review of the various levels and dimensions of SS Reform as analysed in the book, he alludes to the challenges of post-conflict reconstruction in the different contexts examined in the study. For instance, the main challenge in Europe has to do with how to institute a system of better coordination both in the conceptualization and implementation of SS Reform since the architecture is already in place. In West Africa, the challenge basically has to do with how to forge a strong political will at the national level in order to contribute more deeply to sub-regional security (p.272).

What appears to be a major weakness of the book – its inability to effectively distinguish between security sector reform and security sector reconstruction – is excusable. For, as pointed out *ab initio*, while 'security sector reform and security sector reconstruction can be distinguished for analytical purposes, overlaps are manifold' (p.4). It is not surprising that the editors subsequently admit that 'this, however, does not preclude the contributors from using the terms "security sector reform" and "security sector reconstruction" in an interchangeable way – in the end, it is the reform context that matters and not the term used for addressing context-specific issues' (p.15).

Bryden and Hanggi's edited volume addresses an important subject that is pivotal to sustainable peace, democracy and development. Given the current state of the security sector in the regions and sub-regions discussed, the book is no doubt a timely publication. Its depth of analysis and penetrating theoretical and empirical insights make it superb. It is recommended as an indispensable companion for all stakeholders in the security sector and, by extension, sustainable democracy and development sectors.

J. Shola Omotola
Kogi State University, Anyigba, Nigeria

The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider their Nuclear Choices, Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn and Mitchell B. Reiss (eds). Washington DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 2004, pp.367. $22.95 (paperback).

There is, write the editors of this important new study, a 'growing consensus' that the world is on the possible threshold of a new nuclear era. Blame unstable

alliances following the end of the Cold War, the diffusion of nuclear technologies, the rise of rogue states seemingly determined to acquire such weapons of mass destruction, increasing regional instability and the appearance of terrorist groups with apocalyptic agendas. The collective failure to punish nations that crossed the nuclear threshold – most notably India and Pakistan – has contributed to perceptions that the global nonproliferation regime is dangerously leaky and perhaps irreparably broken.

The prospect of a world with dozens of nuclear powers prompted the Center for Strategic International Studies (an organization with which I am affiliated) and the Reves Center for International Studies at the College of William and Mary to undertake a three-year study of why nations reconsider the nuclear option. That focus – *reconsidering* nuclear choices – is critical. Unlike previous work, which has examined why some states opted to develop nuclear weapons or why other states didn't, this study homes in on countries in good standing with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Mitchell Reiss, former director of the Reves Center and current director of policy planning at the State Department, explained that the eight case studies – Egypt, Germany, Japan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Syria, Taiwan and Turkey – are a barometer of the viability of the NPT regime. 'They encompass a sufficiently broad range of technical capabilities and political motivations to illustrate the major themes of this volume' (p.14).

The case studies are impressive without being oppressive. Each is written by an expert on the particular country and they shed considerable light on the motivations behind nuclear decision-making. I can't speak for all the chapters, but the one on Japan – a subject upon which I focus – was accurate and persuasive. Of course, all conclusions have to be tentative given the forces at work and the secrecy that invariably shrouds national decision-making on such matters – especially when the topic is breaching a threshold previously considered taboo.

The eight studies yield five common factors that could lead to a reversal in a country's nuclear posture: a change in the direction of US foreign and security policy; a breakdown of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime; the erosion of regional or global security; domestic imperatives; and the increasing availability of technology. In the abstract, that list isn't very helpful: by definition, a readiness to reconsider the nuclear option implies a breakdown in the global nonproliferation regime.

In context, the list is important, however. And, as editors Kurt Campbell and Robert Einhorn (both former government officials and members of CSIS) note in their concluding chapter, 'in most of the cases studies, it would take a combination of highly threatening and mutually reinforcing factors – a "perfect storm" – to set in motion the momentous decision to reverse a nonnuclear course and initiate the pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability' (p.320).

Two factors appear to outweigh all others, at least for the eight countries examined here. The first is an acute regional security threat. Governments opt for nuclear weapons because they feel they need them. (The argument that status motivates governments is hard to accept since these nations have already foregone the nuclear option.) And the countries studied (with the exception of Syria) are US allies. That leads to the second key factor: US policy. Campbell and Einhorn argue 'the perceived reliability of U.S. security assurances will be a critical factor, if not *the* critical factor, in whether such countries as Japan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Taiwan and Turkey reconsider their nuclear options' (p.321).

That puts a heavy burden on the US. Campbell asserts that 'Misgivings and concerns about the long-term direction of U.S. policy on global strategy and nuclear policy are, and will continue to be, the single most decisive factor guiding the direction of would-be proliferators – both rogue and responsible' (p.29).

There are two types of 'misgivings and concerns': the reliability of US security assurances and the US willingness to honour Article VI obligations under the NPT that require it, along with other nuclear weapons states, to move toward the eventual elimination of such weapons. The authors are focusing only on the first. Washington has to minimize insecurity among its allies to keep them from 'tipping' over.

Disarmament advocates complain that US policy – which calls for the development of new nuclear weapons and which shelves, rather than destroys, older weapons – sends the wrong signal to other governments. Those policies, they argue, demonstrate the continuing utility of such weapons and encourage other nations to emulate the US. That assertion carries little weight here. As Campbell and Einhorn explain, 'the case studies suggest that Bush administration policies to continue improving the U.S. nuclear arsenal will have little or no *direct* effect on the nuclear choices of others ... Furthermore, U.S. nuclear gluttony is also judged to have little immediate relevance in the complex decision making surrounding those choices' (p.323). Ironically, US nuclear policies don't seem to affect potential adversaries either: they worry about US conventional capabilities, not nuclear ones.

If there is a 'demonstration effect', it is more likely to result from the policies of other hitherto nonnuclear nations, rather than that of the US. In other words, the internal tipping point is very much influenced by external shifts. A group dynamic – a shift in international perceptions of the utility and effectiveness of the global nonproliferation regime – may play a critical role in nuclear decision-making.

The policy recommendations that flow from these conclusions are obvious. Stop Iran and North Korea from proliferating and undermining the NPT. Alleviate the security concerns of US partners. Raise barriers to the acquisition

of nuclear components and know-how. Strengthen national and international verification, intelligence and analytical capabilities. And, finally, reduce the salience of nuclear weapons generally.

Reading this book on the eve of the Iraqi elections is disconcerting. If the credibility of US security commitments is essential to the viability of the global nonproliferation regime, then there is a premium on US readiness to stay the course in Iraq. This seems especially true for Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. At the same time, however, the overextension of US forces there must worry governments in Tokyo, Taipei and Seoul. It is troublingly reminiscent of the 1970s, and suggests there is yet another factor to an already complicated Middle East equation.

Brad Glosserman
Pacific Forum CSIS, Honolulu, Hawaii

Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency, Anthony James Joes. Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2004, pp.360. $35.00 (hardback).

Anthony James Joes' *Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency* is an ambitious work. The author, a professor of political science at St Joseph's University who has published widely on guerrilla warfare, sets out to provide a broad comparative study of the effectiveness of various methods of counterinsurgency. It is an ambitious goal, and ultimately the author falls short.

Joes' central contention is that since insurgency is essentially a political phenomenon, any response must be primarily political as well; force plays a subordinate role. In his formulation, 'counterinsurgent victory derives from justice supported by military power' (p.9). He argues that success depends upon dealing with the insurgents' legitimate grievances; committing sufficient troops; isolating the conflict area from outside support; displaying rectitude toward civilians and prisoners; emphasizing intelligence; denying insurgents arms and food; and separating leaders from their followers. In his view, the United States in the Philippines between 1899 and 1902 and Britain in Malaya from 1946 to 1954 represent the models to be emulated.

The book has some strong chapters. Perhaps the best is 'The Myth of Maoist People's War', in which Joes debunks the view that Mao's writings on revolutionary warfare represent an accurate description of the strategy that led the communists to victory in China as well as a replicable formula for success. The following chapter, which discusses the failure of communist insurgencies in Venezuela and Thailand in the 1960s, is a similarly useful corrective to the view that insurgent victory is inevitable.

The most disappointing chapter is the epilogue, which is devoted to the current insurgency in Iraq. At two pages it neither informs nor enlightens.

The author, arguing that 'no insurgency is so distant from us in time or space or culture that it cannot cast some light of wisdom upon the path ahead' (p.7), casts his net widely. His attempt to move beyond the canonical cases of insurgency, such as Vietnam and Algeria, is commendable. He explores a number of fascinating (and under-examined) cases, such as the Cristero rebellion in Mexico during the first decades of the twentieth century, the anti-communist insurgency in Tibet beginning in the 1950s and the insurgency in Sudan over the past half century. However, at times the book's breadth comes at the expense of depth. In places, the book is little more than a series of quotations that have been strung together with little in the way of a supporting argument. Too often the author succumbs to the tendency to breeze through a topic he obviously knows well without pausing to reflect upon its significance. His discussion of resettlement programmes, for example, devotes four paragraphs to Malaya, three to the Philippines, two to Cuba, and one each to Mexico, Algeria, Manchuria and South Vietnam, concluding with the uninformative statement that 'neither the Americans nor their South Vietnamese allies seem to have learned very much of value from the Malayan experiment' (p.120). Unfortunately, readers are likely to feel the same way about the author's treatment of the subject.

Somewhat surprisingly in a book that highlights obscure cases of insurgency and counterinsurgency, the author also ignores important cases. For example, the book contains no discussion of the Irish Republican Army save one oblique reference to Michael Collins. In other places, the author dwells on wars that were decidedly not insurgencies. The connection between his discussion of the peaceful end of British colonial rule in India and insurgency, for example, is less than apparent.

The book also tends to repeat the common wisdom rather than examine it critically. The level of troops necessary to counter an insurgency is a topic of considerable contemporary interest. It is thus exasperating when the author asserts (without providing sources) that 'numerous analysts of insurgency have suggested' that a successful counterinsurgency requires ten counterinsurgents for each insurgent. This is a topic of considerable importance that requires more attention than the author gives it. Indeed, it is at least arguably true that in some cases larger counterinsurgent forces stoke rebellion.

When the author does source his assertions, his references are sometimes less than helpful. On page 122, for example, he asserts that it is 'clear' that 'the great majority' of the politically active population of the 13 colonies supported independence from Britain, while 'at least one-fifth' of the white population remained loyal to the crown. The endnote following this assertion

leads the reader to the admission that 'of course all such figures are estimates' and nothing more.

Resisting Rebellion is an ambitious – perhaps overly ambitious – work. While there is much of value to be learned from it, the whole is unfortunately less than the sum of its parts.

Thomas G. Mahnken
Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University

The Future of Arms Control, Michael A. Levi and Michael E. O'Hanlon. Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 2005, pp.190. $44.95 (hardback); $18.95 (paperback).

For 30 years from the mid-1960s through the mid-1990s, arms control and deterrence served like brothers as the basis of international security. Neither is healthy any longer. Confidence in deterrence yielded to paranoia and the temptations of pre-emption. Visibly weakening even in the Clinton years, arms control all but disappeared under Bush. Although its passing is widely lamented, does arms control still have an important role to play?

In this short book, two analysts at the Brookings Institution emphatically answer 'yes'. On virtually every question of international security, they show that arms control is among the most promising and underutilized resources we have left. Their faith is admirable, but it is far from persuasive. To join in their conclusion that arms control can be at the centre of virtually every security dispute requires the reader to suspend the lessons of recent experience and enter the authors' world of faith in compromise and the natural appeal of good ideas.

The book suffers from two fundamental weaknesses. The most basic is the enormous shortcut the authors allowed themselves. Instead of re-analysing the theoretical foundations of arms control to better understand what it can achieve today, they skip theory and proceed directly to potential applications. Although this sounds pragmatic, in practice it leaves the book rudderless, little more than a long list of good ideas, with no way to evaluate which are most important or most promising. The authors are fully aware of this shortcoming and try to make a virtue of it. But the rich menu of arms control options they present is no substitute for systematic recommendations. Instead of an agenda, one encounters little more than cheerleading. Like a greedy eater who can't wait for dessert, Levi and O'Hanlon skip the main course that everyone knows they need. Despite an approving jacket-blurb from Thomas Schelling, one of the fathers of arms control theory, there is no disguising the incoherent result.

A second problem has less to do with muddled thinking than a chronic sunny disposition. Although arms control was crushed by a series of harsh events and adamant political choices, the book consistently avoids criticizing anyone or anything. Even the worst troublemakers like Osama bin Laden and Kim Jong Il are left unmentioned. Although it gleefully took credit for nailing shut arms control's casket, the Bush administration and its leading thinkers like John Bolton are never criticized. The authors may live and work in Washington, DC, but they write as if they've never been there. To open the pages of *The Future of Arms Control* is to enter an unrecognizable world populated with good ideas, where everyone is basically right and no one is totally wrong. As an effort to suppress the polarization of the Bush years this may be admirable, but as practical politics it is unconvincing. Abandoning political engagement in the name of politeness, it prefers irrelevance to the confrontational realities of twenty-first-century security politics.

The often-repeated method of the book is to identify a good idea that has worked somewhere and recommend its wider application. This leads the authors to cruise through the security spectrum collecting nuggets. Some nuggets are unquestionably useful: banning provocative weapons, Cooperative Threat Reduction, Permissive Action Links, safeguarding, export controls, de-alerting, transparency, etc. This pragmatic approach leads to an emphasis on instruments that often seem tangential or secondary; such measures may have a palliative effect, but they cannot be mistaken for a cure. The approach also leads to an emphasis on bilateral mechanisms. Absent here is the Cold War emphasis on arms control as a process above all, more important as a dialogue massaging tense political relationships rather than for its formal results. Multilateral approaches are acknowledged, but the authors appear to concede that is not where the action is. Of course multilateral processes still may be the most effective in the long run, and bilateral dialogues the most valuable in the short run, but in lieu of a theory of arms control to guide us, there is no way to tell.

Aware of the weaknesses in many of the palliatives they support, the strongest recommendation of the book is for America to make greater use of security assurances. These include negative assurances for countries feeling threatened by America and positive assurances for those more concerned with regional neighbours. The authors recognize the political obstacles, noting that 'This concept is broad – but it is not radical' (p.15). The instruments would be 'new security guarantees and perhaps alliances' (p.73). 'As a key part of arms control strategy, the United States and its allies should ... offer a broad but focused vision of collective security to the world in general' (p.133). The logic of their proposals is undeniable, but it comes only by sacrificing any contact with political reality.

Without a theoretical foundation that would establish clear guidance and priorities, Levi and O'Hanlon have produced an exceptionally dissatisfying book. Lacking a systematic agenda or clear goals, focusing on secondary issues and mechanisms, always ready to compromise, there is little to recommend the effort. For outsiders hoping to influence the Bush administration, there is no practical advice here. For others with an eye on the world after the 2008 American presidential election, some of the good ideas may be more relevant, but virtually all have been heard before. Ten years after the last hurrah of arms control – with the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 – there is a profound need for a book on just this topic. But this is not the way to do it.

Aaron Karp
Old Dominion University

Water, Power and Politics in the Middle East: The Other Israeli–Palestinian Conflict, Jan Selby. London: I.B. Tauris, 2003, pp.275. $69.95 (hardback).

If the reader's aim is to understand Israel's methods of making the lives of Palestinian people unbearable, then this book is a perfect source of information about the challenges of survival in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. It provides an excellent battery of hands-on field research that details the use of water as a political weapon in the hands of a state against a population determined to expel it from territories it occupies. Unfortunately, the book's utility stops short with the quality of the research. This review will return to the merits of the book towards the end, but there are four basic problems with the overall analytical overlay: nature, history, people and identity. In terms of scholarly analysis and addressing the issue of water in international relations, the book reveals all the common sense of an attempt to water a mule with gasoline. There are also stylistic problems, such as the overuse of the word 'naive', that reveal profound animus on the part of the author towards others in his field, even when his own work provides ample evidence for the supposedly 'naive' arguments made by others as this review will demonstrate below.

Selby's attack on the use of nature in the literature related to water is remarkable. No one writing in the field has ever argued that people do not modify the environment in order to increase the amount of water available for human use. No one has ever argued that water cannot be reused, but Selby attempts to use hydrology as if it were a magic wand. He assumes, in true Marxist fashion, that water is simply a matter of labour and capital.

Unfortunately, there are certain natural limits to what our human ingenuity can accomplish. Timmasaret, a city in southern Algeria, cannot produce rice. Vietnam and Thailand are water-rich, while Palestine, Syria and Israel are water-poor in terms of their natural hydrological endowment. The literature has traditionally used the amount of water available for utilization every year, before the human engineering schemes took place, as a basis for analysis, because it is critical to understand the amount of water being disputed over versus the natural annuity.

He attacks all of the three discourses in the literature for lacking a historical perspective. Yet his own review of Lowi's work is peppered with references to her use of history. Unfortunately, like many other Marxists, he falls into the trap of defining alternative readings of history as ideology. There is an assumption that class dynamics create the state and that the state is a function of the World System, defined along Wallerstein's twisted line. In other words, the suffering of the Palestinian people is ultimately due to the World Bank, Wall Street and American capitalism. Even Marx acknowledged that people make history and not vice versa. For Selby, his issue with a Realist account of the conflict lies in its not leading to the revolutionary, world-shattering conclusions conducive to his perspective. In his world, the moral tragedy of Marxism, the gulag, never existed and is ultimately Realist and Liberal propaganda.

Selby's critique of Malthusian language in the field is welcome, but it makes his attack on the technical discourse very unusual and perhaps strange. I searched for references to classical hydrology and was sourly disappointed. Selby uses the language of the World Bank development schemes as a sample of the technological discourse of the water issue in international relations. Of course, hydrology entails working with nature in order to improve water yields in a *sustainable* way. This entails basin/aquifer-wide planning, regulation, and politically acceptable sharing of water resources.

In short, good hydrological practice means a pattern of behaviour totally lacking today in the Jordan River Basin. The book misunderstands the meaning of the *political* in the Middle East. The most basic definition of politics is '*who* gets *what?*' Selby attempts to inject Marxist approaches into his interpretation of the Arab–Israeli dispute. He quotes an Israeli historian who argues that Israel can trace its foundation to an alliance between *Jewish* colonial plantation owners and *Jewish* workers against dispossessed *Palestinian* peasants. The total absence of economic sense in that policy, a crucial element in Marxist logic, evades Selby and his guide, Shafir. If Marxist analysis were applicable, Jewish plantation owners would have set themselves up in an alliance with Palestinian peasants to maximize their profits at the expense of the more expensive Jewish workers. The conflict is not given to Marxist analysis, because it is a *national* conflict, pitting *Israelis*

against *Palestinians.* These two categories of people have constructed each other as 'the other'.

Also in true Marxist fashion, Selby is uninformed about the role of religion in the Middle East and especially with regard to water. His attack on Gray and Dolatyar is particularly ill-informed. They essentially argue that Islam provides for a regime of water-sharing in the Middle East. While their case studies may not be sufficient to prove this as a general proposition, anyone who has actually bothered to read the Qur'ān's statements, the prophet's sayings and Arab traditions on water would know that Dolatyar and Gray have conveyed some of the truth. More damning, however, is Selby's own work. He shows how the Palestinians share water with each other in great detail. There are water merchants of course, but people share water with each other because it is the society's religiously and socially constructed *norm.*

After Al Qaeda has tarnished the image of Islam in the West, questioning it and its relevance has become an unacknowledged norm of the times. Unfortunately, its positive aspects, such as those entailing the sharing of water, have been ignored by Realists. Marxist marginalization of its power to move behaviour is another form of eroding its study in international relations. In his policy recommendations, Selby calls for the Liberalization of the Israeli state. That the book concludes with a *Marxist* calling for *Liberalism* reveals the absurdity of its main thesis.

Unfortunately, the book fails to understand the source of the Arab–Israeli dispute and, in so doing, its overall policy recommendations (put in the convenient form of questions, to avoid moral liability or academic criticism) miss the mark. Selby's solution entails the creation of an anational state in the region, but unfortunately, it is too late for such a revolutionary idea. *History*, not the Marxist misappropriation thereof, stands in the way. About 120 years has passed since the start of the Zionist project in Palestine, and today peace will require a *political* settlement between a *Jewish Israeli* state and an *Arab Palestinian* state. This is the solution outlined by Mariam Lowi, and it is the only solution that can spare the two populations the disasters of thirst and terrorism.

Peace is a prerequisite for solving the water shortages faced by the Palestinians. The book's chief merit lies in the detailing of the suffering of the Palestinian people in their search for water, and for that alone, it should be read by anyone interested in the problems of the Middle East, for the sake of developing an empathetic understanding of the people who actually have to live in the region.

Jack Kalpakian
Al Akhawayn University,
Ifrane, Morocco

Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb, Strobe Talbott. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004, pp.268. $27.97 (hardback).

In the more than 50 years since India acquired independence in 1947, the relationship with the United States has ranged from being prickly and estranged during the Cold War to a tentative rapprochement after the Soviet Union became a former entity in 1991 in the global strategic calculus. The one issue on which India steadfastly resisted the US was the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which recognized special rights for the select band of five permanent members of the UN Security Council.

India opposed what it saw as a form of discrimination and chose to remain outside the ambit of the NPT for it was convinced that the fine print of the treaty did not address its own core strategic aspirations and security anxieties. The principle of discrimination was equally reprehensible and this added to India digging its heels in. It merits repetition that until recently India was not alone in rejecting the NPT. The contentious nuclear bone in more ways than one remained stuck in the throat of the Indo-American relationship. With its own Peaceful Nuclear Explosion in 1974, India had a special status in the nuclear pantheon since it was neither fish nor fowl. The prevailing logic would have suggested that like other states that had gone down this road, India having exploded a nuclear device would soon declare itself as a de facto nuclear weapon state in 1974. But this is where the distinctive Indian strategic culture that is reticent about macro military power manifested itself. India under the late Indira Gandhi chose to poise itself on the thin divide between the nuclear and non-nuclear. Cold War calculations ensured that the Indian nuclear ambivalence, while a stubborn irritant, remained a back-burner issue on the American radar screen.

Paradoxically it was India's decision in May 1998 to close the option by carrying out five nuclear explosions in the Rajasthan desert and declaring itself a state with nuclear weapons that changed the texture and context of the Indo-American relationship. The boil had been lanced and while the US was 'mad' – it had to take India and its nuclear status more seriously. From being 'estranged democracies' (in the phrase of Dennis Kux), the world's oldest and largest democracies started the process of 'engagement' and an intense but inconclusive two-year dialogue ensued from 1998.

The dialogue is the substance of this very readable and insightful book by Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State in the Clinton administration. Talbott is better known as a Russia hand and Soviet expert, the author of five books on the latter subject. India and South Asia were relatively new to him but he was literally pushed into the deep end by his boss and friend – President Clinton – to deal with the fallout of the Indian nuclear tests. 'We're going to

come down on those guys like a ton of bricks' was the opening gambit of the President at the emergency Oval Office meeting in May 1998. It was left to Talbott to convey this ire to his Indian counterpart, Jaswant Singh – later India's Foreign Minister.

The book leads the reader through a succinct introduction to India and its complexities. It is evident that Talbott is adept at learning on the run. His first association with India was in 1974 when he accompanied then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger on a whistle-stop tour that included India – which had just conducted its first nuclear test. The nuclear issue was at the core of the Kissinger-Indira Gandhi meeting. Here the insights are both deep and delectable.

Kissinger recognized a kindred soul in the steely resolve of Mrs Gandhi who refused to be intimidated or admonished by her American interlocutor over the 1974 test. Talbott notes of that meeting that Kissinger 'was a master of realpolitik. Briefings that HK gave to reporters who traveled with him to New Delhi suggested that he accepted, and even grudgingly admired, the way Mrs Gandhi put that theory into practice'. In a delectable, albeit macabre, footnote that is vintage Talbott, he notes what may be termed the Typhoid Mary syndrome. Of the seven leaders Kissinger met on that visit, only Leonid Brezhnev 'died in his own bed and in his own country'. All the others including Mrs Gandhi were assassinated, executed or died in exile!

The major part of the book covers the 14 dialogues that Talbott and Singh conducted in a peripatetic fashion in different parts of the world – and in airport lounges. The central element was the five-point agenda that Talbott wanted India to commit itself to and these included joining the CTBT, the FMCT, adhering to a 'strategic restraint regime', implementing stringent export controls and a resumption of the stalled India-Pakistan dialogue process. Jaswant Singh, a master of diplomatic stalling and linguistic calisthenics, was abundantly affable and led Talbott through the many meandering paths of the Indian strategic mosaic. Singh hinted at a modus vivendi including the CTBT but did not yield ground.

The CTBT had a chequered trajectory as far as India and America were concerned. Paradoxically the two countries, despite, their ontological difference over the nuclear issue, co-sponsored the key UN resolution in 1993. India supported the principle of a test-ban initially as an irrevocable first step in global nuclear weapon elimination. Gradually the bonhomie soured. The fine print of the treaty, as it was going through the draft stage became increasingly unacceptable to India. In 1996 India rejected the CTBT draft in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. That the CTBT was finally passed by the major powers through the UN despite Indian (and Pakistan's) rejection is another matter.

Other developments, including the 1999 Kargil War launched by the Pakistani military and the overthrow of civilian leadership in Islamabad by General Musharraf, altered the context of Indian-American relations. Consequently, in mid-2000, President Clinton undertook a five-day state visit to India and made a five-hour pit stop in Pakistan where he chided the leadership for its adventurism and did not hide his distaste for military dictators. The initial post-test animus of the White House with India was slowly changing to a more nuanced and calibrated approach and the high point was the address by Clinton to the Indian parliament where he was feted and cheered in an unprecedented manner. The Talbott-Singh dialogue may have been inconclusive but it created an ambiance that resurrected the stalled bilateral relationship and this may well have been a case of the means being more valuable than the ends. As Talbott generously concedes elsewhere, Jaswant Singh is perceived to have got more out of this sustained dialogue than his American counterpart.

The book is rich in detail and provides many rare vignettes about the roller coaster nature of the American-Indian-Pakistan triangle and its myriad contradictions and realpolitik conundrums. For the US with Clinton at the helm South Asia was a minor priority, except when the nuclear issue became animated. On the other hand, the Vajpayee leadership in India grasped strategic issues in a manner that few other authors have been able to convey. In like fashion the Pakistani leadership is delineated with all its warts and institutional characteristics – the military calling the shots on the nuclear issue for instance – and the rapport that the top American military brass has with their Pakistani counterparts. These are valuable insights about the prevailing strategic culture in the three countries. It merits repeating that the nuclear issue cannot be meaningfully interpreted or comprehended devoid of the cultural determinant. Talbott's book offers a distinctive insight through the manner in which the skills of a seasoned journalist are combined with diplomatic dexterity.

If there is one reservation, it is that Talbott attempts to pack too much about India and its diversities into one slim book. Like imperial overstretch, the pitfall of the scholar-diplomat-journalist's over-reach is an abiding one. The China factor in the Indian calculus is a case in point. It is briefly dwelt upon but the complexity is not probed. Perhaps there is another book that is germinating in the Talbott hard-disk. Just as there is no such thing as the first visit to India, a first book on India is an appetizer!

In charting the movement from estrangement to engagement in the Indian-American relationship, Talbott brings to bear a rare empathy and this is perhaps the ingredient most required now when the Bush team in its second term seeks to build on the resilient foundation that was laid during the Clinton-Talbott phase of the bilateral relationship with a new leadership in

Delhi. As Talbott wisely counsels at the end of his journey with Singh: 'Partially reconciling India's status as a *de facto* nuclear weapon state with the need to maintain the NPT as a *de jure* system' is still with us. This is the challenge for the Bush-Manmohan Singh combine.

Commodore C. Uday Bhaskar
Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi

Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations, Jennifer M. Welsh (ed.). New York: Oxford University Press, 2004, pp.240. $72 (hardback).

This volume seeks to analyze the place, propriety and efficacy of humanitarian intervention by looking at both the theories that provide its justification and the practical dilemmas that constrain its effects. Editor Jennifer Welsh, university lecturer in international relations at Somerville College, Oxford, has brought together a mix of academics and practitioners to address three themes: the expansion of intervention beginning in the 1990s; the controversial development of a norm of intervention; and the problems 'of will and capacity' that plague so many cases (p.2). Such analysis is necessary, she notes, because much of the debate on intervention tends to focus on its legal aspects, while 'giving insufficient attention to the underlying ethical issues, the politics within organizations and coalitions, and the practical dilemmas faced by international actors' (p.1). *Humanitarian Intervention* does a nice job of distilling the controversies present at every level, and clarifies, though it does not always answer, the important questions of debate.

The book is divided into two parts, with the authors in Part One treating the thorny questions of where and how humanitarian intervention fits within international relations theory. One of the most thought-provoking contributions in the book is provided by Henry Shue, professor of politics and international relations at Oxford. In the first substantive chapter after the introduction Shue examines the right and scope of the norm of sovereignty in order to assess the protections *and* duties it imposes on states. He concludes that the privileges of sovereignty come with obligations to protect certain rights – 'there can be no system of rights consisting of only negative duties' – and that citizens must be taught to see why those duties are essential, even when dangerous (p.26). Nicholas Wheeler, reader in the department of international politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, then considers the more foundational issue of whether a norm of humanitarian intervention exists at all and how it developed, while Welsh examines the objections to intervention and its consequences. Welsh's chapter is particularly strong because it highlights the complex philosophical differences driving both supporters and critics of intervention. She demonstrates that the debate is not

black and white, a discourse between those who support human rights and those who do not, but rather about 'boundaries of moral community, the consequences of intervention, and the density of values that underpin international society' (p.53).

Part Two addresses the practical side of intervention, demonstrating that numerous problems of implementation and coordination exist even when (or if) the theoretical justifications are agreed upon. The chapter on the UN, by Adam Roberts, professor of international relations at Oxford, sets the stage by examining how perspectives on the use of force changed within the UN. The chapter suffers, however, by seeming to assume more unity among participants than often exists. This issue stands out particularly because the other chapters in this section explicitly address the problems of divided loyalties, interests, capabilities and organizational structures as constraints on outcomes. Roberts also raises but does not really address an extremely interesting question – whether and how intervention might hurt the UN by raising more points of contention and intensifying debate on norms. This question permeates his chapter and others but receives perhaps less attention than it deserves.

The remaining chapters in Part Two address specific cases and areas of intervention. Nicholas Morris, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees' Special Envoy in Yugoslavia, examines intervention in the Balkans to derive lessons for future operations. He makes a powerful argument for why operations should address the causes rather than merely the symptoms of crisis, saying, 'both the beneficiaries and the international community have or promote unrealistic expectations of what a humanitarian operation that is not accompanied by political action to address the causes of the crisis can and should achieve' (p.100). In considering Africa as a potential testing ground for intervention, James Mayall, professor of international relations at Cambridge, concludes that the continent presents a mismatch of interest and need for the West. That combines with 'African schizophrenia on the subject of humanitarian intervention' to create a situation of neglect from outside and sometimes obstruction from within the continent (p.129).

Ian Martin, head of the UN Mission in East Timor, looks at that case to examine the simultaneous difficulties and necessities of worst-case planning, as well as the unique characteristics that helped make the intervention reasonably successful. He writes in part to disabuse readers of substantial parallels between the East Timor and Kosovo operations, but his discussion fails to account for the influence of time and philosophical perspectives on each. While much of the first part of the book emphasizes the development of practical and theoretical responses and their sequencing throughout the 1990s, Martin's effort to separate the cases seems to make them too discrete, suggesting that East Timor did not benefit from the mindset and approach developed over the course of the Kosovo mission. While he may be correct that they

are very different operations, viewing the one as uninformed by the other seems to be a mistake, and somewhat out of step with the first section of the book.

The section concludes with Simon Chesterman, senior associate at the International Peace Academy, analyzing intervention in Afghanistan. His chapter addresses the broader challenges now understood to be a consequence of state collapse and the particular incentives for intervention from a state perspective. He notes, 'the capriciousness of state interest is a theme that runs through the history of humanitarian intervention' (p.172). Another theme running through his chapter, and much of the book, is the issue of prevention and when it might be effective. Chesterman argues that more could have been done to prevent Afghanistan's deterioration, but his chapter, like the book itself, does not seriously grapple with how prevention fits within the theoretical discussion, or how the norms and approaches discussed might make it more or less possible. Although this does fall somewhat outside the three themes of the book it is nevertheless implied in almost all of the chapters, and probably deserved a chapter of its own.

In the conclusion, Welsh points out that intervention is an extremely difficult issue to resolve because it requires making a determination on the legitimate use of violence in the international community. Both the theoretical and practical chapters in the volume support that point, poignantly at times. She also notes that any attempts to establish criteria for intervention are unlikely to succeed, in part because powerful actors don't want them and in part because they depend on subjective perceptions of circumstances, thereby preventing development of hard and fast guidelines for response. A reader may ask, then, whether this book provided any clarity. But Welsh's summation in this chapter underscores why this is both an important and extremely readable book. Although intervention is an oft-treated subject, few volumes address the theoretical aspects in combination with practical constraints as fully. This book does not offer facile answers to the controversies, as has been attempted elsewhere, but focuses on defining the problems more fully, and fairly. In the process of struggling with one question the authors have raised others that deserve equal attention, and in so doing clarified and advanced the current discourse.

Andrea Kathryn Talentino
Drew University, Madison, NJ

Immaculate Warfare: Participants Reflect on the Air Campaigns over Kosovo and Afghanistan, Stephen D. Wrage (ed.). Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003, pp.120. $59.95 (hardback); $19.95 (paperback).

Under the shadow of Operation 'Iraqi Freedom', it is tempting to wonder what became of the air power advocates who worked such miracles in campaign

after campaign from 1982 to 2003. Was the apparent perfection of aerial attack just a temporary respite from Clausewitzian realities? Or will it remain a Platonic ideal to guide future conflict? Was it all a complicated illusion, or something that inspired targetters can aspire to do again?

In this engaging and judicious book, Stephen Wrage, associate professor at the United States Naval Academy, cautions against just such polarized thinking. The essays draw upon his investigations and the experience of a group of American officers who participated as pilots and planners in air wars over Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. The result is a mercifully brief and incisive book. It offers an ideal introduction to the policy issues of aerial warfare and responsibility in the use of force.

The amazing potential of aerial warfare has elicited a uniquely literary response from political scientists. Christopher Coker referred to 'post-modern warfare'. Colin McInnes titled an article in this journal 'Spectator Sport Warfare'. Robert Mandel boldly offered 'bloodless war'. Wrage seems to have the right combination of promise and gravity with 'immaculate warfare'. It is a tone set by former Joint Chiefs Chairman William Crowe in his introduction, where he maintains that Kosovo was 'an exceptional war'. He cautions – four years later – against drawing premature conclusions (p.viii). The theme is reinforced through the volume by the contributors who remain cautious, even about their personal accomplishments.

The promise of successful aerial warfare is almost irresistible. The achievement of perfect precision has ended the intentional killing of civilians as part of Western war. 'Collateral damage' still happens, but the term has fallen into disuse since it no longer excuses anything. High expectations make the use of force harder to resist but also make war tricky to prosecute. Mistakes like the bombing of China's Belgrade embassy, the destruction of a passenger train and a refugee column are no longer simple tragedies; they endanger the ability to use force altogether.

Despite the extensive writings of Douhet and his successors, we still lack a formal theory of air power. As Scott Cooper notes in his essay, 'No one has explained why Milosevic relented'. With so many causal links still obscure, airpower strategy was and remains fundamentally 'bomb and pray' (pp.6, 11). In the book's most sophisticated contribution, Spencer Abbot notes that air power remains 'an enormously powerful but fundamentally blunt force' (p.22). Substantiating the earlier findings of Robert Pape, he concludes that Kosovo revealed that air power is most effective at raising costs, denying an adversary the ability to change the status quo or reducing the benefits of their aggression. Aerial coercion and punishment are much weaker at restoring the status quo. Kosovo, in other words, was an example of lucky overreaching. In Afghanistan and the initial invasion of Operation 'Iraqi Freedom', ground forces assured victory.

The best understood key to success is gifted leadership, a theme developed here by Derek Reveron. In Kosovo, General Wesley Clark got the political arithmetic just right, even if he reaped no professional rewards for the feat. His air commander, Lieutenant General Michael Short, is the comic figure in this and most other accounts of Kosovo, blind to the political contradictions of 'immaculate warfare', left to sputter his demand to 'go downtown' with attacks on Milosevic and the Serbian government. Short had a serious point, but it was concealed by his bombast. There were more cautious military voices as well. Had someone like British General Michael Jackson been in charge, the outcome almost certainly would have been less decisive.

Wrage conveys the delicate nature of immaculate warfare. America's unprecedented capabilities create moral pressure to intervene. They arouse a Wilsonian impulse to remake the world in its own image, a spirit that helped lead to Operation Iraqi Freedom. But the uniqueness of American air power inhibits the international political coalitions essential to successful use of force. Although the authors never suggest it was inevitable, they create the impression that the Iraq quagmire was a logical result of these contradictions.

Aaron Karp
Old Dominion University

Enforcing the Peace: Learning from the Imperial Past, Kimberly Zisk Marten. New York: Columbia University Press, 2004, pp.208. $27.95 (hardback).

In spring 1919, General William Graves, the commanding officer of an expeditionary force sent to Vladivostock by the administration of Woodrow Wilson, refused to allow a group of Bolsheviks captured by a White Russian leader – the putative allies of the American expeditionary force – to be executed without a proper trial. In his memoirs, Graves explains his decision by noting that:

> [a]s the Allies were responsible for order in Vladivostock, it was incumbent upon them to see that justice was shown to all, therefore, we would not permit Russians to be arrested and taken out of Vladivostock where their guilt or innocence should be determined, and, if tried, we claimed the right to send a representative to the trial with a view to determining if it was a bona fide trial for an offensive.[1]

Understanding the course of the Russian intervention could be useful for those seeking to create new models of intervention in complex emergencies. It includes many components found in today's peacekeeping operations: competing allied visions (British and American); military commanders confused about their tasks, but understanding the liberal impulses of the overall

policy; combining humanitarian efforts with military policies; sympathy with both sides in the civil war; and, finally, a disastrous failure.

Kimberly Zisk Marten, a professor at Barnard College, Columbia University, has written an important book that demonstrates a similar point. In *Enforcing the Peace: Learning from the Imperial Past*, Zisk Marten proposes to learn from the practices of early twentieth-century liberal imperialism. She begins with an important dilemma: 'liberal democratic change cannot be forced on foreign societies using liberal democratic means' (p.13). To demonstrate this dilemma, she compares colonial occupations undertaken by Britain, France and the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries with both multilateral and unilateral interventions in what she calls 'complex emergencies' of the 1990s, particularly in Haiti, Cambodia, the Balkans, East Timor and, more tentatively, in Afghanistan and Iraq. Her comparison leads to three 'lessons' from the imperial past, two negative and one positive: liberal democracies lack political will to accomplish large-scale occupations; military organizations in liberal democracies today are not structured to undertake large-scale peacekeeping operations; and, more hopefully, 'disciplined soldiers can do a good job of providing public order' (p.17), especially when their task is limited to that alone rather than creating a whole new political order. She concludes 'a return to the goal of keeping the peace, rather than imposing change, will lead to more realistic policies that have a better chance of reaching their goals' (p.165).

Zisk Marten's book is an important contribution with a relatively new idea. Others have begun to write along similar lines, as does William Bain in *Between Anarchy and Order: Trusteeship and the Obligations of Power* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). Zisk Marten writes well, providing insights that can be understood by an engaged public, including undergraduate students, making this a useful classroom text in courses on international security, international organizations and peacekeeping. She also critically challenges a set of moral assumptions about peacekeeping and democracy-building that seem predominant in some international affairs circles. The belief that peacekeeping operations reflect the best intentions of the international community often leads to anger and incomprehension when communities where interventions occur react in hostile ways. Her book demonstrates that if those tasked with organizing such interventions would limit their policies to a level of minimal policing rather than full-scale political change, they might be more successful.

The book is not without its flaws, however. Methodologically, it could use more rigour in defining its terms and presenting its evidence. While she does provide a definition of peacekeeping, her understanding of imperialism and colonialism is not clear. Various forms of colonial occupation differed

drastically in the period under investigation. It might have been useful to present an in-depth study of two or three colonial occupations rather than referencing them at random as the book proceeds. Similarly, her critiques of modern peacekeeping operations combine various forms of military action that were quite different. The coercive diplomacy used in the Balkans differed quite distinctly from the use of military peacekeepers in East Timor and Somalia. Again, a bit more care in presenting focused groups of cases might have clarified her argument at points.

Some of her lessons, while important, might be developed further. In her chapter on the lack of political will, Zisk Marten provides some useful, but not necessarily new, evidence about the problems faced by the Clinton administration in its concern with causalities. Moreover, she does not mention the controversial decision to close the Army War College's Peacekeeping Institute in the early years of the Bush administration, a decision that some believed reflected a particular political view rather than a more general inability of democracies to sustain political will. In other words, the problems faced by the previous and current American administrations in peacekeeping may be more peculiar to them than general tendencies of liberal democracies.

One of her other lessons remains somewhat confusing. In her discussion of the complexities of military operations, she engages in a critique of multilateral operations, suggesting that when one state takes the lead success is more assured. Yet, she claims 'multilateralism is manageable'. Coalitions of the willing, which is closer to what Zisk is describing, is not the same as multilateralism. If she believes multilateral operations will not work, then she should more forcefully make that point, rather than try to rescue it with unclear advice.

Finally, there is an assumption throughout the book that advice about conducting successful interventions need not be concerned with their overall purpose; that is, one can engage in similar military and political practices no matter if an intervention is designed for national security reasons or humanitarian ones. In suggesting that her book can help understand what to do in Afghanistan and Iraq, based on lessons from Cambodia and East Timor, Zisk Marten fails to confront the fact that insurgents in Iraq may be resisting occupation because the intervention was motivated by a much different set of intentions than more standard UN peacekeeping operations. Separating *jus ad bellum* from *jus in bello*, to borrow terms from the just war tradition, leads to serious misunderstandings of how such actions are received both in the countries under occupation and more widely.

Overall, though, this is an important book. It should be read by both scholars interested in the dilemmas of humanitarian assistance and policy-makers who formulate such missions. As liberal democracies face more civil wars and

humanitarian emergencies, they will need to be more creative in their policies. Zisk Marten's book is an important first step in aiding that task.

Anthony F. Lang, Jr.
University of St Andrews, Scotland

NOTE

1. William Graves, *America's Siberian Adventure, 1918–1920* (New York: Jonathan Cape, 1931), quoted in Anthony F. Lang, Jr., *Agency and Ethics: The Politics of Military Intervention* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2002), p.53.